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Foreword
Decentralization and the establishment of a modern public
sector raise the need for transforming monopolistic state own-
ership. In transition countries the transfer of state property
to new owners has been implemented through restitution,
privatization and property devolution. The combined affects
of these processes created various models with different scales
and types of local government property.
Since the early years of transition, property devolution
has been a highly debated issue in Central and Southern
Europe. This publication aims to summarize the experiences
of four Central European countries. The experiences of
Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia might provide
lessons for countries which started the property devolution
process later.
The specific reason for collecting information on these
four countries was to support the local government reform
process in Serbia. The Serbia Local Government Reform
Program (SLGRP) has documented that the most impor-
tant obstacle, by far, for the reform of the system of local
self-government in Serbia, as perceived by local government
officials, was state ownership of the all property used by
cities and municipalities. To address that problem SLGRP,
the Local Government Initiative of OSI–Budapest, the
Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities and the
PALGO Center designed the Property Devolution to Local
Governments in Serbia project.
The Serbia Local Government Reform Program, fund-
ed by United States Agency for International Development
and implemented by Development Alternatives Inc., in
cooperation with the Open Society Institute, the PALGO
Center, the Development Alternatives Inc., Mendez England
and Associates, the Foundation in Support of Local Democ-
racy, the International Cooperation Agency of the Asso-
ciation of Netherlands Municipalities, IGE Consulting
Limited, the Center for Community Organizing, Rutgers
University and the European Movement in Serbia, is
designed to revitalize the deep roots of strong community-
based management forms within Serbian society in order to
reestablish an effective, responsive and accountable local
government tradition.
The Local Government and Public Service Reform
Initiative (LGI), a regional program of the Open Society
Institute–Budapest, aims to support information exchange
between countries in the region. LGI’s mission is to facili-
tate the knowledge transfer between Central and Eastern
European countries, which share common traditions and
history. Public sector reform is the focus of LGI’s projects,
and we believe that this publication on property devolution
will provide useful information for other countries, as well.
The program in Serbia had other activities beyond
providing four case studies of property devolution processes
in the CEE countries. Local and international specialists
conducted analyses of the Serbian legal framework for prop-
erty devolution, organized presentations on these findings
to the policy community in Serbia and prepared policy
recommendations for property devolution. The next step will
be the  organization of a National Conference on Property
Devolution to help place this question on the agenda of the
government and parliament of the Republic of Serbia. The
SLGRP will finally help a working group finalize a Draft
Law on Property Devolution.
We hope that this publication on property devolution
will further support the decentralization process in Serbia
and provide useful information for policy-makers working
on public sector reform in other countries of the region.
Belgrade–Budapest, March 2003
Gábor Péteri Steven Rosenberg
OSI/LGI SLGRP/DAI
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1. INTRODUCTION
Decentralization reforms have to do with problems of own-
ership. Property is one of the basic pre-conditions for au-
tonomous local government. In transition countries,
property devolution was implemented together with the dis-
mantling of ‘social ownership.’ The countries of Central Eu-
rope, for which decentralization was the first step in transi-
tion, have accumulated significant experience. Their successes
and failures provide lessons for other countries struggling
with ownership problems today and in the future.
This report contains summaries of the property devolu-
tion process in four Central European countries—Hungary,
Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. Information was also collected
at a regional workshop in Belgrade, where property devolu-
tion practices were discussed with Serbian policy-makers.
These activities were organized within the framework
of a cooperation agreement between the OSI-Budapest
Local Government and Public Service Initiative (LGI) and
the USAID-funded Serbian Local Government Reform Pro-
gram, managed by DAI Inc. The primary objective of this
joint project was to formulate recommendations for Serbia.
It is supported by information exchange among profession-
als. Policies on property devolution for Serbia are continu-
ously being discussed with local counterparts, so the policy
proposal included in this publication is still preliminary.
We believe that the experiences summarized in this pub-
lication will be useful for other countries. There are several
countries in Southeastern Europe, and several others fur-
ther east, that will have to prepare property devolution pol-
icies in the near future. Decentralization and public sector
reforms always involve property devolution, so lessons and
an inventory of relevant issues should help policy-makers
prepare for changes in ownership structures.
The primary concern of this publication is the devolu-
tion of public property. The problems of restitution and
privatization are discussed elsewhere. Despite the fact that
these issues are closely connected to local government prop-
erty transfer, they are beyond the scope of our work. We still
believe that policy-makers and advisors working on proper-
ty devolution reform policies will find useful and relevant
information in the papers that follow.
2. DEVOLUTION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
2.1 Arguments for and against
Property Devolution
Professional and political debates on public sector reform in
transition countries revolved around three interrelated
issues: (i) political decentralization, (ii) re-assignment of
public functions and their funding and (iii) transfer of state-
owned assets. Multi-party systems, free elections and the
strengthening of locally-elected bodies form the basis of
modern local governments. Increased local political autono-
my was combined with transfer of municipal services and
new intergovernmental financial relations. As part of the fis-
cal decentralization process, the status and size of municipal
property was also settled. During this reform process, prop-
erty devolution was discussed extensively in all transition
countries, leading to the elaboration of several arguments
for and against public property devolution.
2.1.1 Why Decentralize?
The most evident argument for property devolution was
political: there can be no real local government without a
sound economic basis. Generations of politicians were raised
on Marxist theory, so it was easily understood that ownership
was the fundamental condition for systemic regime change.
An economic rationale, based on public choice theory, also
argued for decentralization of state-owned assets. According
to this argument, effectiveness and efficiency in public ser-
vice delivery can only be achieved if decisions are made at
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the level of government which is responsible for funding
and control of the service.
Significant own sources are required for fiscal decen-
tralization, and local government property can be an impor-
tant source of municipal revenues. The sale of local assets
creates one-time capital revenues, and local property can also
contribute to current budgets through operating revenues
collected as fees, rent, dividends, etc. Local property as col-
lateral for municipal borrowing indirectly supports local cap-
ital investments. Financial arguments also include the claim
that municipal property is the basis for local economic de-
velopment through public-private partnership schemes.
2.1.2 Counter Arguments
Despite strong reasons for property devolution in Central
and Eastern Europe, arguments against property transfer were
also articulated. In the preparatory stage and the first period
of transition, decentralization of public assets was often re-
garded as a loss of national property. However, decentraliza-
tion does not necessarily mean a loss of public assets. It only
changes the proportion of assets owned by the various levels
of government. Rules and methods for property manage-
ment can prevent economically unsound decisions.
From the point of view of local government finance, a
common counterargument claimed that property transfer
increases imbalances among municipalities. Rich urban mu-
nicipalities become owners of valuable assets, while poor rural
local governments are not able to benefit from public prop-
erty transfer. This argument fails to consider the differences
in public service delivery (cities manage more services than
rural communities) and other components of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations (vertical and horizontal equalization
schemes).
Perhaps the most frequent argument against property
devolution was the claim that it will lead to inefficient prop-
erty management. The lessons from the era of command
economics with large state-owned enterprises and centrally-
controlled allocation decisions proved the opposite. Despite
the relative inexperience of the new administrations, local
governments were consistently able to develop more efficient
methods of property management. Transparency of local de-
cisions prevented the misuse of public assets, which was not
the case during the centrally-managed privatization process.
2.2  What Should be Transferred?
Once a political consensus for devolution had been reached,
several technical questions were raised: What should be the
basis of property transfer? How much time should be al-
lowed for implementation? Are local governments allowed
to accept the transfer of deteriorated public assets? Can
municipalities act as entrepreneurs? Responses to these ques-
tions varied from country to country.
As a first step, the scope of public property had to be de-
fined in some countries. In Latvia, where independence had
been lost to Soviet rule, public assets first had to be ‘nation-
alized’—transferred to the new Latvian state. In Hungary,
the categories of state and local/municipal property had to
be legislated as well. This was followed later by privatization
and the decentralization of public assets.
2.2.1 Functional Approach
The basic principle behind property devolution is function-
al: all assets connected to functions assigned to local govern-
ment should be transferred to those governments. Some leg-
islation identified groups of assets that must remain under
state control (natural resources, waters, important roads, air-
ports, telecommunications frequencies, etc.).
Beyond these restrictions, when a certain level of gov-
ernment (village, city, county, etc.) took responsibility for a
specific service (education, utilities, etc.), then all the assets
required for the delivery of that service had to be transferred
to that level of government. As the assignment of local
government functions was implemented over a significant
period of time, public assets could be transferred in several
stages.
For example, the establishment of regional government
in Slovakia and Poland was accompanied by the realloca-
tion of public assets: regional governments became owners
of service organizations, assigned to these newly-created tiers
of government. Property devolution might be implemented
at different speeds according to the rules of decentralization
in specific service areas (e.g., in Poland, public education
was an optional local service for several years, so the manda-
tory transfer of schools was enacted only in 1996). In Hun-
gary, legislation was enacted in two stages: first the general
boundaries of local government property were legislated by
constitutional law; later, it was followed by a specific law on
actual forms and ways of property transfer.
As soon as local governments became proprietors, former
owners had no right to claim compensation. This legal decla-
ration was needed to ensure that local governments were the
real owners of the assigned property. Clear regulations had
to exclude any further restitution claims. Had the owner-
ship of municipal assets been debated for a long time, mu-
nicipalities could not have become real actors in the privati-
zation process.
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2.2.2 Timing
Two basic procedural issues commonly arose during proper-
ty devolution: the time-scale for implementation and the
option to refuse a transfer. In the case of budgetary service
organizations, property had to be transferred simultaneous-
ly with the transfer of functions. However, state enterprises
in the manufacturing and public utility sectors could be trans-
ferred gradually, piece by piece. For such assets, a deadline
for completion was usually set.
Another timing issue was based on the operational forms
of local entities. In Hungary, local governments had to specify
the organizational setting of local utilities before 1996. They
were presented with three options: (i) to manage the service
from within the local administration, (ii) to establish a bud-
getary organization or (iii) to establish an entity according
to the Enterprise Law. This forced municipalities to avoid
unclear forms of ‘public companies’ and develop more effi-
cient and acceptable forms of operation.
An important decision on property transfer was the se-
lection of a reference date, when the status of public assets
was defined. This technical question had a political back-
ground—it should have been fixed at the moment when the
communist takeover began. In Latvia it was quite easily iden-
tifiable as the date the Republic of Latvia became part of the
Soviet Union (July 21, 1940). In Hungary (1948) and Slo-
vakia (1949) the dates were set to indicate the moment when
the multi-party political system was terminated. These ref-
erence dates impacted all forms of property transfer, such
as privatization, restitution and the transfer of church prop-
erty.
2.2.3 Obligation to Accept Ownership
Whether or not property transfer would be voluntary was
similarly addressed. It was obligatory for local governments
to accept property that had been transferred to localities as
part of the decentralization process. When a particular func-
tion was localized, the accompanying property was also trans-
ferred, including all liabilities. Local governments had no
right to ‘cream off’ the most lucrative properties to avoid the
financial burden of deteriorated assets with a negative value
(e.g., social housing in large cities).
However, there were some instances when local gov-
ernments still had the right to refuse ownership of public
property. In Latvia, particular units of state property under
ministerial control could be rejected by localities. In Slova-
kia, local governments had the authority to reject liabilities
exceeding the value of the property and specified types of
liabilities (unpaid taxes, social charges, etc.).
In Hungary, state-owned assets that had not been pre-
viously managed by local governments or those with signif-
icant protection costs (historical monuments, natural re-
serves) could also remain at the national level. In the case of
transferred social housing and public utility companies, lo-
cal governments were obliged to own the transferred prop-
erty. However, individual municipalities had the right not
to accept shares in utility companies if assets were distribut-
ed between several local governments. These assets were not
transferred back to the state; other municipalities simply re-
ceived more shares.
2.2.4 Local Businesses
The property transfer and decentralization process was com-
bined with a debate on the entrepreneurial and business func-
tions of local governments. Under the soviet system, munic-
ipalities and counties had a strong influence on state-owned
enterprises through political channels. There were relatively
high hopes among several reformers that, under market con-
ditions, local governments might directly benefit from the
ownership of these public entities.
‘Entrepreneurial local governments’ were regarded as
significant sources of revenues for public budgets. The first
generation of mayors was rather active in investing local gov-
ernment assets. According to this strategy, local governments
received shares in formerly state-owned companies and then
had the right to acquire land and benefit from privatization
revenues. Legislation in some countries (e.g., Latvia) clearly
stated, that municipalities could conduct any type of busi-
ness; in others, specific rules of entrepreneurial property trans-
fer were established (in Hungary, former state-owned urban
lands without any structures became local assets; municipal-
ities could benefit from privatization up to the land-value of
companies).
Involving local governments in business risks may en-
danger the delivery of public functions. Experience from the
business sector also proved that only every fifth new busi-
ness survives long-term and that municipalities are not pre-
pared to manage such activities. For example, legislation on
municipal business activities in Hungary allows only partic-
ipation in companies with limited liability.
2.3  Subjects of Property Devolution
Within the framework of these general rules, legislation on
property transfer usually specifies the subjects of devolution
in great detail. Property transfer is based on the location prin-
ciple, so previous state-management responsibilities are not
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considered (except in Latvia, where management was the
primary condition for decentralization). Characteristics of
selected major groups of local government assets will be dis-
cussed below.
2.3.1 Waters and Natural Resources
Natural waters are usually transferred to local governments,
assuming that these waters have a minor significance and
that they lie within the boundaries of the municipality. Larger
rivers and lakes are deemed national or public (in Latvia)
property. Waters under the earth’s surface are regarded as
natural resources, so only its usage (not its ownership) is
regulated. Charges on water use and leasing fees can be shared
with local governments in some countries (leasing revenues
for fishing rights in Latvia; excavation charges shared with
local governments in Poland). On the other hand, local gov-
ernments tended to have the right—and obligation—to
manage riverbanks, lakeshores, flood protection facilities and
equipment.
2.3.2 Land, Public Spaces
Local governments became owners of public spaces, such as
streets, squares and city parks within their territory. Usage
of these assets was limited, and their value was hardly assess-
able. Local governments had very limited autonomy in mod-
ifying the purposes of use. They had a larger stake in the
transfer of urban and agricultural land. In Slovakia, land
and forests owned by municipalities before the reference date
were transferred to local governments. In Hungary, local gov-
ernments received undeveloped state-owned plots. In  agri-
cultural regions, local governments had to apply for land (to
the State Land Service in Latvia, to the National Land Fund
in Poland) allocated to various owners during land reform.
2.3.3 Service Organizations, Urban Infrastructure
As in most cases, ownership of service organizations followed
the transfer of competencies and functions. Local govern-
ments became the owners of real estate, equipment and in-
tangible assets belonging to schools, cultural centers, sports
organizations and social or healthcare institutions. The rights
to use these assets were limited both by sectoral (profession-
al) guidelines and general provisions on property manage-
ment. The former included, for example, regulations on the
closing of schools; the latter included restrictions on the use
of property as collateral, requiring permission for changes to
buildings with historical value, etc.
Transfer of urban and public utility services was restricted
in most of the countries studied. Infrastructure networks were
under stricter control, so owner municipalities had limited
rights to use and alienate these assets. Operational assets,
equipment and office buildings could be physically assigned
to specific local governments, and they could be transferred
to the balance sheet of utility companies.
The privatization of energy and natural gas companies
created larger problems for local governments. They could
hardly benefit from privatization revenues, because the op-
erating companies were usually state-owned entities easily
purchased by foreign investors. However, large portions of
the residential energy supply networks were built with local
or users’ contribution (e.g., Action Z in Slovakia, users’ as-
sociations in Hungary). Local governments could claim some
compensation for their shares only with significant delay and
in cash or shares. In Hungary, this was achieved only through
a decision by the Constitutional Court.
2.3.4 Social Housing Units
Social housing stock and apartments were easily transferred
to local governments, because they were built with local
funds, they were located within the boundaries of the mu-
nicipalities and local governments hold the responsibility to
provide social housing. Often, housing units belonging to
former state-owned companies were also transferred to mu-
nicipalities. Local housing was rather uneven—some units
were easily sold to tenants; other parts were retained by
municipalities. In both situations, reconstruction and oper-
ational costs were rather high. Consequently, local govern-
ments remained responsible for housing policies, even in a
privatized environment. They had to develop new housing
schemes and introduce local social policy measures.
2.3.5 State-owned Enterprises
There were two basic issues regarding this group of assets:
(i) transfer and privatization of small services and manufac-
turing companies, (ii) allocation of shares from privatization
to local governments. The first was solved as part of the small-
scale privatization process. Local businesses (shops, restau-
rants, repair shops, etc.) were privatized or transferred to
local governments and excluded from privatization (e.g., in
Slovakia). In other cases the owner municipalities had only
limited influence, because privatization had been started
before the new local governments were established (e.g., in
Hungary).
Of greater importance to municipalities was the privati-
zation of state-owned enterprises. In Poland and Hungary,
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local governments argued that, as they held ownership of
state companies’ land, they should benefit from property
transfer and privatization. In Poland, where state enterpris-
es always had excess land, local governments received no
access to this reserve land. In Hungary, the Local Govern-
ment Act stated that local governments became sharehold-
ers in transformed state enterprises up to the value of land;
they also received compensation up to 50% of the land val-
ue.  These were significant capital revenues for local govern-
ments during the 1990s.
2.3.6 Financial and Intangible Assets
As legal successors to Soviet councils, newly-elected local gov-
ernments had the right to claim all financial and intangible
assets of the previous owners. Cash and bank deposits were
transferred to the new entities; similarly rights, licenses, con-
tract benefits, etc.
2.4 Legal Basis of Property Devolution
The legal transfer of state property was initiated during the
process of constitutional reform. The basic laws were usually
approved or amended by new democratic parliaments after
elections. Local government structures had to be legislated
by the constitutions, so the general rules on municipal prop-
erty were specified in amendments. This was followed by
legislation on new local government systems, when specific
laws—sometimes with constitutional power (e.g., in Hun-
gary)—defined municipal property in greater detail.
In most countries, local governments became real own-
ers, eliminating the earlier soft forms of usage and manage-
ment of state assets. Slovakia was an exception, where in
1990 municipalities received only the right to “administer”—
to manage commercial and service facilities of former soviet
councils (but they became owners of assets like buildings,
plots, agricultural land and forests).
2.4.1 Categories of Local Property
The basic local government laws also classified various types
of local assets. Legislation identified core property that could
not be alienated, such as public spaces, streets and monu-
ments. Properties outside the core were subject to other laws,
such as civil codes, sectoral legislation, privatization or con-
cession laws.
In Hungary, core property was divided into two catego-
ries. Non-negotiable core property (such as roads and city
parks) was distinguished from a sub-group of core assets that
could be alienated under specific conditions. Locally-elect-
ed bodies were authorized to regulate transactions on these
assets (such as water networks and public buildings). This
municipal discretion could be also limited by local referen-
dum. The critical element of this legislation was the discre-
tion it created, within a general framework, for local gov-
ernments themselves to limit or enlarge their authority by
collective (council) decisions.
The actual transfer of property was implemented in two
ways: (i) by virtue of law or (ii) through property transfer
committees and commissions. In most cases, the latter had
only administrative and management competencies; they
were merely allowed to implement laws (e.g., in Hungary).
In some cases this administrative process of property identi-
fication and classification was managed by government agen-
cies (e.g., in Latvia). Property transfer committees were pri-
marily responsible for identifying local assets and assigning
them to local governments (in the case that several govern-
ments claimed a unit).
2.4.2 Separating Land and Buildings
One fundamental legal question had to be solved by legisla-
tion. According to basic legal concepts, the fate of any struc-
ture carries ownership of the land below that unit. This prin-
ciple was followed by most countries, with some exceptions.
Local governments claimed land that, the claimed, was con-
fiscated by the states or by state entities—often without even
registering a change of ownership.
Ownership of buildings did not always include land
ownership. The most evident example is Latvia, where land
was first transferred to the ‘original,’ pre-Soviet owners—
private persons, churches, municipalities, etc.—while build-
ings might have different owners. Later, the Civil Code of
1993 made it clear that ownership of structures and land are
to be connected. This relationship is reflected in Hungarian
legislation, as well. It sets municipal shares in privatized com-
panies in proportion to land value.
For this reason, land reforms were of such importance
in these countries. Land ownership was of great value in
these traditionally agricultural societies.  The transfer of ag-
ricultural land was the most hotly debated issue during land
reform. Various solutions were used for state farms, cooper-
atives and for compensating private landowners. Methods
ranged from direct restitution to allocation of assets to work-
ers to auction schemes.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of this legal
process is that several stages of property transfer can be iden-
tified. In Latvia, it began with ‘nationalization’—public prop-
erty had to be created together with the reestablishment of
the Latvian state. Devolution could be started only after
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local functions and competencies had been identified. Reg-
ulations on restitution and privatization were subjects of sep-
arate pieces of legislation, not to be confused with rules on
property devolution to local governments.
2.5 Transfer of Public Property
Following the complicated legislative process, the next step was
the implementation of these laws and regulations on property
transfer. This enormous task involving transfer of thousands
of property units from the state to local governments required
the support of administrative procedures and specialized or-
ganizations. The first job was the identification of assets,
followed by the actual legal transfer, settling potential dis-
putes at the same time. This lengthy process was managed
in different organizational settings from country to country.
In Latvia and Slovakia, the actual property transfer was
managed by the public administration. National government
agencies collected information and made inventories on state-
owned assets to be transferred to localities. In Slovakia, ‘pro-
tocols’ specified units transferred to local governments. They
were signed by mayors and a representative of the local ad-
ministration. Commissions were set up only for land trans-
fer (in Latvia) and for privatization (in Slovakia).
In Hungary and Poland, the administrative process was
managed by committees or commissions. They had adminis-
trative duties, but the huge task of property transfer was
supported by joint bodies from various organizations. In
Poland, the voivod administration was responsible for issu-
ing decisions on municipal property, supported by lower level
local government (gmina) inventory commissions. In
Hungary, a specific law forced the government to set up
13-member councils based on property transfer committees,
which were to designate each unit of property.
Bodies administrating legal resolutions were needed
because property transfer was accompanied by fevered dis-
putes, as several local governments were involved in many
cases, and the basis of property transfer was often unclear.
In Hungary, the forum for appeals was the Ministry of Inte-
rior; second appeals were heard in court; in Poland, appeals
went to the National Enfranchisement Commission.
Members of property transfer committees had to fulfill
their obligations in addition to their ordinary work. Civil
servants supporting the committees were assigned only tem-
porarily. County-based property transfer committees coop-
erated with municipal working groups; otherwise they would
not have been able to manage this enormous task.  There
was no real administrative support for these committees. After
five years, when the committees had almost completed their
job, their members were decreased to four. Later, in Hunga-
ry, they ceased to exist.
The most critical element of managing property trans-
fer was a reliable and accurate inventory of public assets with-
in the territory of a local government. Municipalities were
interested in establishing reliable local property cadastres, as
it formed the basis of their claims and disputes. At the first
stage of the property transfer, it was a simple inventory of
buildings, equipment and other tangible assets. This served
as the basis for registration (usually free of charge) or proto-
cols signed by interested parties.
More sophisticated inventories (e.g., for accounting or
investment purposes) were set up only at a later stage. That
is why the valuation and assessment of transferred property
was not really an issue. The profession of assessors also had
to be gradually developed during these years, when privati-
zation was sped up and more precise information on state-
owned assets was required.
There was another specific problem related to local gov-
ernment property transfer: churches claimed assets confiscat-
ed during the decades of communist power. As churches
had provided public services (education, health care, social
services, etc.), they were at times in conflict with local gov-
ernments. In Hungary, churches received all the property
needed for delivering their services—not only religious ac-
tivities but public services as well. If they guaranteed that
services would continue, they were eligible for certain con-
fiscated buildings. In case of disputes, special conciliation
boards were set up with local government participation.
2.6 Scale of Property Devolution
in CEE Countries
There is no comprehensive statistical and fiscal information
on property transferred to local governments. It was not
possible to survey the status of local government assets be-
fore devolution has started. Data on actual transfers mostly
concern physical characteristics (area, number of units) of
land, housing, buildings, etc. Transferred municipal prop-
erty was definitely a new type of asset for local governments,
bringing additional revenues to local budgets. It also opened
new, indirect revenue-generating opportunities for local gov-
ernments through local economic development and privati-
zation or commercialization of municipal companies.
One of the most visible changes in ownership structure
has been in the housing sector.  Social housing became mu-
nicipal property with the transfer of former management
rights to real ownership. Most countries in Central Europe
tried to build up the private housing sector by selling or
transferring municipal apartments to tenants. At the begin-
ning of the 1990s, various forms of public housing (state,
municipal, cooperative, company, etc.) dominated the sec-
tor (50-60% of total housing1). By the end of the decade, it
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was decreased to 26-50% (the lowest in Slovakia and the
highest in the Czech Republic)—a major stock of assets.
However, this process of privatization did not bring signifi-
cant revenues to local governments, because the net value of
these assets was rather low, due to deferred maintenance
during past decades.
The transfer of communal and utility companies had a
more significant and positive impact on the balance sheet of
local governments. In the water sector, former large state
companies were broken up and transferred to localities: the
number of new local entities increased from 33 to 400 in
Hungary, from 50 to 713 in Poland.2 Similar restructuring
happened in the solid waste management sector and in dis-
trict heating services (in Poland 55 regional state companies
were transferred to 600 municipalities).
Property transfer had a significant impact on local gov-
ernment balance sheets. As the first step of property devolu-
tion was the transfer of physical assets to municipalities, real
estate dominated the local balance sheet (in Latvia 6% of
real estate, measured in surface area, became local). In Hun-
gary real estate dominated local governments’ balance sheet
(1991: 58% of assets, while shares and dividends formed
only 2%). Later, when the transformation of companies had
been launched, shares and dividends became more signifi-
cant forms of assets (1994: 31%, while the proportion of
real estate decreased to 36%). This raised local budget reve-
nues and made the relationship between municipal owners
and service organizations more indirect.
Property-related local revenues also indicate the signifi-
cance of municipal assets. During the past decade of fiscal
restrictions, municipalities were able to fund capital invest-
ments mostly from privatization revenues. Sale of their own
assets (buildings, urban land), revenues from privatiza-
tion of state-owned and municipal enterprises resulted
2–3% of local budget revenues each year. However, this rel-
atively steady revenue flow tended to dry up at end of the
decade.
2.7  Municipal Property Management
New types of local government assets and extended munic-
ipal responsibilities in property management forced local
governments to modernize their management forms and
practices. In most CEE countries, decentralization resulted
in a greater degree of autonomy concerning local property
and gave freedom in designing forms of service delivery. Local
governments had the right to utilize private incentives, build
up new relationship with businesses and make decisions on
the financial and management rules of their own assets. This
local autonomy was limited by national regulations and lo-
cal internal rules of operation.
2.7.1 Limitations on Local Decisions
The most important area of national legislation is the limi-
tation of local autonomy on changing categories of municipal
property. Conditions for using a public (e.g., school) build-
ing for other purposes has to be clearly regulated. Studied
countries followed different practices. In Hungary, for ex-
ample, where general authorization was given to local gov-
ernments on some groups of assets (e.g., core assets with
limited negotiability), while specifying the required proce-
dures for moving assets among groups of property (council
decisions are needed to change the use of a property). An-
other solution was to give authorization to higher levels of
government (to voivods in Poland; ‘authorized’ bodies spec-
ified by sectoral legislation in education and social services
in the case of Slovakia).
There were other general limitations on local historical
buildings and units of cultural or natural value. Another set
of regulations limited local property management autono-
my over entrepreneurial activities. Local governments had to
have limited liability for protecting their primary public ser-
vice functions. Using local assets as collateral for loans or
issuing guarantees for municipal service organizations might
also be limited. Rules could be set by general laws (e.g., on
municipal debt burden in Hungary) or a decision might be
taken on a case-by-case basis by national ministries (e.g., in
Latvia).
2.7.2 Audit and Transparency
Greater autonomy in local financial and property manage-
ment raised the importance of audit practices. New forms of
local government operation should be subject of regular ex-
ternal audit and the forms of control should also be adjusted
to new local conditions. In general, the function of audit has
changed, because only the legal compliance of municipal
decisions can be audited. In the area of property manage-
ment, an audit might be focused on the use of property (Po-
land) or on the appropriateness of municipal reports (Hun-
gary). This increased task of the national audit system has
resulted in new forms of audit (e.g., obligation to use private
audit reports for large municipalities in Hungary) and in-
creased the significance of internal audit and control prac-
tices.
A critical element of local regulations is the assignment
of property management authority within a local government—
authorizing the elected council, its committees, the mayor
or the municipal administration to make specific types of
decisions on local property. Usually the type of transactions
(sale, lease, rent, etc.) and the value limits are specified by
regulations.
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Thus, local autonomy led to higher transparency in lo-
cal property management. Procurement and tendering reg-
ulations are set by international standards and national laws.
Local government could supplement them by setting the rules
for transaction below the national thresholds and specifying
the internal procedures. For decreasing the possibilities of
conflicts of interest situations in local decision making codes
of ethics and detailed procedures (for committees, muni-
cipal officials and for the staff) should be designed and
enforced.
2.7.3 Financial Techniques
and Organizational Forms
In the area of financial management, special techniques might
improve municipal property management practices. As one
of the most frequent mistakes in property management is
the use of property-related revenues for operational purpos-
es (under the current budget), earmarking asset-related rev-
enues could prevent these practices. Separation of current
and capital budgets (both revenues and expenditures) by force
of national legislation is a common solution. But local gov-
ernments can also set up their own internal rules for capital
revenues or they might introduce fund accounting practic-
es, which would allocate property-related revenues to spe-
cial purposes.
In the early stage of property transfer, local governments
had to establish new organizational forms of local property
management. The former general purpose ‘city management’
companies were split into smaller entities or property man-
agement was taken back by the municipal administration.
Contracting out property management of financial assets was
common. Property management companies had to establish
their own accounting (e.g., on depreciation) and budgeting
practices. The emerging new forms of public-private part-
nership also demanded new expertise and capacities from
staff and management of these municipal companies. Hence,
municipal professional capacity in property management had
to be developed relatively quickly.
2.8 Related Issues
Devolution of public property to local governments is not
solely a legal action, when constitutional rules and munici-
pal legislation are changed. Beyond these highly political
steps, which would require general public support, there are
several other conditions for establishing an efficient and trans-
parent system of local government property management.
Without creating a legal and administrative environment
and institutionalizing new practices, property devolution does
not benefit local governments. Without ranking these ex-
ternal conditions, the most important pieces of legislation
are, as follows:
a) Legislation on commercial entities within the public and
private sector (a Company Act) should clarify the basic
rules of operation for businesses. These general rules
will support local governments as they develop their own
internal mechanisms of property management.
b) Privatization is usually implemented parallel to proper-
ty devolution. For local governments, it should be clear
from the first moment what their legal options are as
new owners of former state-owned public utility com-
panies. It is also critical to specify the proportion to which
of privatization revenues, especially in those unique in-
stances when local government had a financial stake in
transformed companies (e.g., in the energy sector).
c) As local governments became owners of urban land op-
erating in a market environment with various private
business actors, the purposes and functions of urban
planning changed as well. Land use (zoning) regulations
and an urban planning system must be adjusted to these
new conditions, otherwise local government cannot
benefit from their property. Greater autonomy should
be given to developers, but investments should be indi-
rectly regulated through new forms of urban planning.
This shift in traditional municipal planning activity re-
quires much time and would require changes in the
mentalities of both among urban planners and local
councils.
d) Finally, economic and financial regulations had to be
adjusted with this new environment. Local governments
will benefit from their property only if they enjoy great-
er autonomy in setting user charges and levying pro-
perty-related local taxes. Property devolution is part of
the general fiscal decentralization process. As property
revenues might increase differences among local gov-
ernments, they might be considered important factors
in the design of intergovernmental transfers.
3. LESSONS FROM PUBLIC PROPERTY
DEVOLUTION POLICY
Based on the experiences of selected countries in Central
Europe, this section will attempt to provide a checklist for
property devolution policy design. Issues listed below are
reflections on lessons drawn from the previous sections. As
the countries studied also followed different property trans-
fer practices, this list is a tentative proposal for policy makers
in countries tackling public property devolution.
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3.1 Changing the Legal Framework
3.1.1 Building Political Consensus
As property-related decisions are critical to transition, they
should be based on political consensus. However, as all po-
litical actors clearly understand the significance of prop-
erty transfers and the long-term economic implications of
these decisions, this consensus-building is rather difficult.
Property devolution should be part of a general decentrali-
zation strategy, which might enjoy broader political and so-
cial support. Property is mostly a question of economic pow-
er, so promoters of property devolution will confront not
only inherited communist values, but representatives of the
emerging market economy and their allies in national agen-
cies.
3.1.2 Legislative Process
Formation of new public property should be based in con-
stitutional law. Basic laws on the future of the state and the
role of the public sector should lay down the conditions for
specific laws. More detailed legislation can identify the com-
petencies of local governments, rules and procedures of ac-
tual property transfer and the broader regulatory environ-
ment. In transition countries that have not completed
property devolution, land ownership can be a critical issue.
Land codes might be the basis of municipal property re-
forms. During this legislative process, the relationship be-
tween land and buildings should be clarified (whether they
share the same status or not). Property devolution might be
implemented in several stages (nationalization, devolution
according to transfer of functions, commercialization and
privatization of local/public entities).
3.1.3 Restitution, Privatization
After a decade of political changes, countries still addressing
property devolution will be faced with the problems of priva-
tization and restitution. Decentralization of property should
be implemented in the context of privatization—as new
owners, local governments must follow the same rules. Res-
titution claims should be rejected on transferred public prop-
erty, and local governments have no right to claim compen-
sation for municipal property confiscated earlier.
3.2 Issues in Property Transfer
3.2.1 Identifying Local Property
Local governments should receive assets related to the pub-
lic services provided by them. This functional approach may
be legislated gradually, in order to ease implementation.
Categories of local property should be clearly identified by
legislation listing all types of assets. This can be supplement-
ed by the categorization of local property, separating core
public assets from municipal property which local govern-
ments have greater autonomy to use, sell, etc. Specification
of assets remaining in state ownership will also help in the
long run.
3.2.2 Inventory and Registration
The cadastre of public property is critical. Local governments
have to know which units are unquestionably under their
control. However, in many transition countries, these in-
ventories are not available, so information on transferred
property will not be perfect. This fact should not prevent
decision-makers from initiating devolution, as it is likely that
most assets can be identified with little dispute.
3.2.3 Administrative Procedures
Property devolution policy should take the lack of perfect
information on public assets into consideration. Adminis-
trative procedures should be adjusted to give greater auton-
omy to central-local negotiations (e.g., in the form of prop-
erty transfer committees) or by improving inter-ministerial
coordination and leaving room for dispute resolution (e.g.,
setting up commissions).
3.2.4 Timing and Speed of Property Transfer
The process of property devolution might take a long time.
There is a need for setting a reference date for legal debates
and to set a final deadline for completing the process. In
countries of Central Europe, the reference date was con-
nected to the communist takeover, and usually five to six
years were sufficient to manage the devolution process.
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3.3 Special Issues
3.3.1 Missing Rules and Regulation
In many transition countries, several components of fiscal
decentralization have to be developed parallel to property
devolution. Local governments are not able to benefit from
their increased municipal stock of assets if they lack basic
financial and management competencies. They have to re-
ceive authority from public utility companies (selling, re-
structuring, etc.) to set user charges and other local own-
source revenues related to property. Rules of contracting out,
lease and concessions are also critical to local autonomy. As
local governments enter into public-private partnership ar-
rangements, these rules have to be modernized as well. This
requires changes in urban planning from direct control of
plots to a zoning-based land-use plan.
3.3.2 Improving Local Capacity
Local governments have to learn methods to manage newly
transferred property. In the slowly emerging market envi-
ronment, local organizational forms of property management
should be established, and both municipal staff and service
organizations must develop greater professional capacity. This
institutional and capacity development process requires new
forms of audit and internal mechanisms ensuring higher
transparency in local government.
3.3.3 The Future of Self-managed
Service Organizations
In many countries still faced with large-scale property devo-
lution, service organizations are still controlled by ‘self-man-
agement’ bodies. These management forms, inherited from
the communist period, are mixed bodies of owners, employ-
ees, users and sometimes even representatives of government
agencies. Within the general process of decentralization, these
‘corporatist’ forms of management should be shifted to elect-
ed local governments. This will improve the efficiency of
property management practices, because elected general pur-
pose local governments have greater legitimacy and more
comprehensive development strategies.
3.4 Managing the Reform Process
The property devolution process should be based on a con-
sistent legal framework. Constitutions should clearly set the
foundations of local government ownership and specific laws
have to outline or define administrative techniques and im-
plementation methods of property transfer. This legal re-
form is closely related to other elements of decentralization,
so it is an extremely complex legal process.
Actual property transfer can be started before all the
specific conditions of the legal environment are in place.
Assuming that the basic rules are set and there is a political
consensus over the necessity of property devolution, many
unregulated problems can be solved in practice. It is more
important to initiate the property transfer process in less
controversial areas (e.g., transferring public service units and
municipal companies), than waiting until all potential ele-
ments of local property are identified (land, infrastructure,
etc.).
It is also advisable not to wait until all administrative
circumstances are available (e.g., a precise property cadas-
tre), because most cases can be managed in incomplete con-
ditions. Local governments which are most interested in
property transfer will find solutions (e.g., collecting infor-
mation, providing evidence) for cases that might be debated
because of imperfect rules or procedures.
However, it might be useful to examine whether the
property transfer process is manageable. Pilot cities or exper-
iments can help design the general process and check the
feasibility of devolution concepts. In the countries studied
here, there were no such examples, because most had to
launch property transfer in the early stages of transition, when
the political climate was favorable. Still, a learning process
took place, as local governments were authorized to arbi-
trate over communal company transformation until a cer-
tain date (Hungary, Slovakia), or they were given the right
to ‘opt out’ of public schools from state to local governments
(Poland). Countries under lower political and financial pres-
sure might design their property devolution policies by im-
plementing pilot programs.
Finally, as for any major policy change, publicity for
property transfer programs is a basic requirement for suc-
cessful reform. Interested local governments, ministries and
service organizations and the general public have to be in-
formed about the rationale and legal process of property
devolution. Decentralization of assets will be more accept-
able when all regulations and practical consequences are
known and understood.
NOTES
1 Lux, M., ed. 2003. Housing Policy: An End or a New
Beginning? Budapest: OSI/LGI, 2003.
2 Péteri, G. and Horváth, M.T. eds. Navigation to the
Market. Budapest: OSI/LGI, 2001.
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1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY
1.1 Legal and Constitutional Basis
1.1.1 Establishment of Local Governments
In 1990, a new system of local democracy was established in
Hungary which respected both local traditions and the Eu-
ropean Charter on Local Self-Government. After issuing Act
64 of 1990, the new local governments began to operate in
the autumn of 1990. The former system of local public ad-
ministration—a centralized hierarchy of local councils based
on the Soviet model—was unsuitable for the strengthening
of local democracy.
The Constitution and the Local Government Act gave
local communities, including the smallest settlements, the
right manage local public affairs; at the same time increasing
the number of local territorial units to 3,149. Local govern-
ment representatives and executives were elected by the
local residents.
The local government system was given a legal basis by
Chapter IX of the Hungarian Constitution. Local self-gov-
ernment is defined as the autonomous and democratic man-
agement of local public affairs and the exercise of local pub-
lic authority in the interest of the local population. Eligible
voters exercise their right to self-government by directly elect-
ing a body of representatives, the rights and duties of which
are determined by Parliament. The lawful exercise of local
self-government is protected by the judicial system; in the
event of a conflict, any local government may appeal to the
Constitutional Court.
The overall territorial division of Hungary is fixed by
the Constitution. It is divided into counties, cities, commu-
nities (villages) and the capital city, which is divided into
districts. At the same time there is administrative division.
Local governments are constituted in settlements, counties,
as well as in the capital and its districts. The organization of
local public administrations (local branches of the central
administration) and other bodies such as courts, generally
respect this system of territorial division, with some excep-
tions defined by specific tasks (such as those of regional ad-
ministrations).
1.1.2 Local Government Systems
There are two major categories of local government in Hun-
gary: municipal and county. The basic elements of the
system are the municipal governments in settlements—
including villages, cities and cities with county status. The
middle-tier of the local government system consists of the 19
county governments which serve as regional local govern-
ments. The capital city, Budapest, has a special legal status.
There is no hierarchical relation between the two levels
of local government. As the Constitution declares, the fun-
damental rights of local governments are equal; only their
duties are different. County governments do not have the
right to interfere in matters delegated to municipal govern-
ments. This is seen in the division of duties between the two
levels: municipalities provide local public services in each
settlement; counties have a subsidiary role in that they pro-
vide public services with regional impact.
Settlement governments have broad responsibilities to
provide public services. They may undertake any local pub-
lic activities not prohibited by law. There are two categories
of tasks performed by local governments: optional tasks and
mandatory tasks. The Local Government Act determines the
functions and powers for local governments to discharge.
Simultaneously, parliament must provide the financial means
necessary for such purposes.
The role settlement governments take in the reform of
local public services is defined by the Local Government Act,
falling into the optional category of local government activ-
ities. The act does not prescribe a list of tasks to be per-
formed exclusively and obligatorily. Local governments may
freely undertake such tasks. Settlement governments may
determine these tasks on the basis of the requirements of the
population and the financial means available.
The same act fixes obliges local governments to provide
certain public goods and services—healthy drinking water,
kindergarten, primary school education, basic health and
welfare services, public lighting, maintenance of local roads
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and public cemeteries. Settlement governments are further
charged with protecting the rights of ethnic and national
minorities. The provision of these public services by each
settlement government, including the smallest village, is
mandatory.
Major cities (cities with county status) may enjoy a spe-
cial legal status as fixed by the Local Government Act, which
also defines the procedure for obtaining this status. Such
city governments, as well as fulfilling all the responsibilities
of settlement governments, are assigned additional tasks and
duties which reflect their status as counties.  The cities’ ter-
ritories may then be subdivided into districts with district
offices, etc.
Autonomy for counties is a tradition reaching back
several hundred years in Hungary. This is one reason this
level was created during public administration reform. The
Local Government Act of 1990 assigned counties subsidiary
roles in the provision of local services. Later modifications
to the act changed this. Legislation in 1994 defined counties
as regional self-governments, still with secondary roles in
the provision of local services, but with certain duties not
assigned to settlement governments. Legislation may require
county governments to provide some public services of
regional character, applicable in all or a large part of the
territory. Legislation may also demand the organization of
public services of regional character, even when the majority
of the beneficiaries do not live within a government’s terri-
tory. The Local Government Act does not provide a list of
mandatory tasks for county government, instead providing
examples of possible activities.
The capital of the country has always had a particular
legal status. In 1994, the Act on the Local Government of
the Capital and Its Districts (originally approved in 1991)
was modified, eventually becoming Chapter VII of the
Local Government Act.
Budapest has a two-tier local government system con-
sisting of 23 district governments and the city government.
Both tiers are settlement governments with independent
functions and powers.
1.1.3 Relationships between
Local Governments and Central Organs
1.1.3.1 The Relationship between
Parliament and Local Governments
Parliament regulates the legal status of local governments, their
exclusive functions and powers, their mandatory functions
and organs, guarantees the financial resources for their activ-
ities and the basic rules of asset-management. It also regulates
the legal status of local government representatives, the pro-
cedure for their election, their rights and their obligations.
 If proposed by the government and approved by the
constitutional court, parliament may dissolve a local re-
presentative body whose activities are deemed unconsti-
tutional. In such a case, new municipal elections must be
called within 60 days.
The state audit office monitors the management of
local government assets. The office’s tasks related to local
government are defined by the Public Finances Act of 1992.
This act states that of local governments are to be audited
particularly regarding the utilization and accounting of nor-
mative budgetary contribution, aid granted for defined
objectives, consigned aid and other defined public funds.
The government ensures the legal supervision of local
governments through the minister of the interior, the heads
of public administration offices in the capital and the coun-
ties. It may propose that Parliament dissolve a the local rep-
resentative body operating contrary to the constitution. The
government also issues decrees which determine the qualifi-
cation requirements for local public service, direct the dis-
charge of state administrative functions and settles disputes
between state administrative organs and local governments
not in the jurisdiction of other bodies.
1.1.3.2 The Relationship between the Offices of Public
Administration and Local Governments
Before the reforms completed in 1994, public administra-
tion was divided between eight regions, each including two
or three counties, chaired by republic commissioners appointed
by the president. Now there are offices of public administra-
tion relating to each of the territorial divisions defined by the
reforms. Heads of office are recommended by the minister
of the interior and appointed by the prime minister. These
offices receive their budgets from the central administration
and are charged with legal supervision of local governments,
serving as the local contact for public administration tasks
and coordinating activities between local governments and
administrative organs subordinate to the central government.
1.2 Local Administration
1.2.1 Structure and Operation
of Local Administration
One of the elements of self-government is the autonomous
establishment of an organization to serve the local popula-
tion. The administrative organization of local governments
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is determined mainly by a decree on organization and pro-
cedure. This decree is proposed by the mayor or chief exec-
utive and approved and issued by the representative body.
The representative body, then, establishes its own offices and
departmental divisions.
The office may by divided into administrative branches
(education, welfare, local economy), functional tasks (labor,
finance) or types of activities (issuing licenses, direction of
institutions). The office may also be distinguish between
governmental and administrative tasks.
Under the Hungarian local government system, func-
tions and powers may not be exercised directly. Representa-
tive bodies exercise the functions and retain the powers of
local government, while chief executives and civil servants
may retain state administrative powers. The latter is exer-
cised by the mayor only in exceptional circumstances.
The management of the office is divided between the
mayor and the chief executive. It is often said that the mayor
directs the office and the chief executive leads it. The mayor
directs the office in accordance with the resolutions of the
representative bodies, as well as acting as the employer of the
vice mayor, the chief executive and the heads of local gov-
ernment institutions.
The chief executive regulates the issuing of documents
pertaining to defined duties and acts as the employer or public
servants hired by the office. The mayor may require consul-
tation or approval on specified decisions—key appointments,
the withdrawal of such appointments and the granting of
certain bonuses. Decisions on affairs of state administration
are made by the chief executive, not by the mayor.
1.2.2 Control, Auditing and
Supervision of Local Governments
Control and auditing of local government is exercised both
internally and externally. Internal control is the responsibil-
ity of the representative body, carried out through the chief
executive, the auditor, the financial committee and the ac-
countant. The chief executive holds the responsibility of re-
porting to higher authorities if any decisions of the local rep-
resentative body, its committees or the mayor violate the
law.  An auditor employed by the local government super-
vises the management of public assets.
 The financial committee assesses the annual budget pro-
posal and drafts a semi-annual report on its implementation.
The committee monitors changes in budget revenues, ex-
amines justification and feasibility of any proposed borrow-
ing and ensures adherence to cash management regulations.
The state audit supervises asset management by local
governments as regulated by the State Audit Act. The gov-
ernment exercises control through the minister of the interior
and the heads of county administration offices.
1.3 Local Service Delivery
Act 65 of 1990 distinguishes between mandatory and
optional tasks performed by local governments.
In every settlement, no matter how small, the local gov-
ernment is required to provide healthy drinking water,
access to kindergarten and primary school education, basic
health and welfare services, public lighting and local road
and cemetery maintenance. It is also responsible for ensur-
ing the rights of minorities.
 A second category of tasks are mandatory if an act
determines and ensures adequate financial resources for
implementation. Such tasks tend to be delegated to larger
settlements and localities. All possible tasks are not specified
in the Local Government Act, but many are outlined in oth-
er acts (See Annex 1).
1.3.1 Forms of Service Delivery
Service delivery may take several forms. Legislation states
that local governments perform their tasks according to the
needs of the local population and originating from their own
budgets, with the support of private enterprise or other paid
services. Local governments may select forms of service
delivery independently.
 Most frequently, the local government itself provides
services. A service may be provided entirely by government
institution, or it may be provided by a private enterprise
under tight government supervision. According to legisla-
tion, local governments may establish cooperatives and cor-
porate entities for the purpose of business ventures. Gov-
ernments have done so to efficiently manage public property
and provide park, cemetery and road maintenance.
 In a second category are services provided through con-
tract to private enterprise or entrepreneurs. In some cases
a contractual enterprise might be established with a state
company not owned by the specific local government. Such
procedure has been used for fuel and water supplies, public
transport and burials.
 The Concession Act of 1991 created a new possibility
for local governments to use their assets, especially publicly-
owned property. In principle, concession can be utilized
to finance public utilities such as water and sewage, fuel,
power, heating and telecommunication. The process is com-
plicated by the fact that these utilities are part of the larger,
national system and therefore subject to state concession.
T R A N S F E R  O F  M U N I C I PA L  P R O P E R T Y  I N  H U N G A R Y
32 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
F R O M  U S A G E  T O  O W N E R S H I P
Concession by local governments, therefore, is currently
possible only for water, sewage and local broadcasting.
 The third form of service delivery concerns tasks
carried out by association or by other municipalities. This
exists only for water management and landfill operations.
1.3.2 Alternative Service Delivery
Along with the general process of privatization, the private
sector’s role in providing public services also started to
develop in the 1990s. Privatizing public utilities allows
capital investment from the private sector. This led to the
establishment of both private and public hospitals, schools,
etc.
Other significant forms of privatize enterprise include
foundations, churches, civil associations and other non-profit
organizations which may be contracted as public service
providers. The government, in such cases, supervises and
provides financing for an activity without directly imple-
menting it.
1.4 Local Finances
Chapter IX of the Local Government Act, titled “Economic
Resources for Local Governments,” outlines planning,
accounting and information systems as well as financing.
Local governments have their own assets and manage their
revenues and expenditures independently. Local governments
are connected to the larger state budgetary systems through
turnovers from the central government, grants, etc.
1.4.1 Revenues
Local government revenues include own revenues, shared
revenues, normative grants and capital investment.
 Own revenues mainly include local taxes and other fees
imposed by the local government. Currently, local govern-
ments are allowed to impose certain taxes—on property,
tourism and certain kinds of business activity—by decree.
Other revenues derive from capital gains on the govern-
ment’s own activity (leasing, interest, etc.) and loans from
other organizations. This is primarily important for health
care financing, which comes directly from the social security
fund. A separate act regulates taxes on environmentally pro-
tected activities and cultural monuments. Hunting taxes may
also be collected in certain territories. Local governments
may also earn revenue by privatizing property or issuing loans
and bonds.
 The portions of central taxes shared with local govern-
ments are determined annually by the national assembly.
This sharing comes primarily from the personal income tax.
Motor vehicle taxes, also, are shared equally between central
and local government levels.
Budgetary grants are determined by the national assem-
bly to reflect the population of local governments’ territo-
ries. Amounts are regulated by the State Budget Act and
may be used without limitation by local governments.
 Capital investments include targeted grants, addressed
grants and deficit financing.
Table 2.1
Local Government Revenues
[in Percentage of Total Annual Revenue]
1997 1998 1999 2000
Own revenues 23 25 25 20
Shared revenues 12 14 14 17
Normative 22 20 20 19
budgetary grants
Transfers from the 14 14 14 18
social security fund
Other (asset sales, 29 27 27 26
loans and other
state grants)
SOURCE: Ministry of the Interior.
1.4.2 Expenditures
The scale of local government expenditure in Hungary is
exceptional due to the concentration of responsibilities, es-
pecially in the social sphere. Education, health care and wel-
fare services are important functions of local government,
while public utilities, culture and sports are mainly financed
by commercial or off-budget entities. Local government ex-
penditures include administrative expenditures, debt ser-
vicing and other economic services. As the responsibilities of
local government are determined by the Local Government
Act, any changes would require an amendment to this act.
The great number of social sector tasks necessitates a
certain dependence on transfers from the central govern-
ment. This has been the subject of debate in recent years.
Grants and shared taxes formed 71% of local government
revenue in 1998.
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Table 2.2
Distribution of Local Government Expenditures
[in Percentage of Total Expenditure]
1997 1998 1999
Personal expenses 28 28.6 29.2
Payroll taxes 12.6 12.8 12
Material expenses 26 26 28.3
Capital improvements 33.4 32.6 30.5
and maintenance
SOURCE: Ministry of the Interior.
2. PROPERTY DEVOLUTION IN HUNGARY
2.1 Types of Property
As a consequence of transition, the system of property rela-
tions was significantly changed in recent years. These rela-
tions are regulated by the Constitution and the Civil Code.
 Section 9 (1) of the Constitution declares “the econo-
my of Hungary is a market economy with public and pri-
vate ownership enjoying equal rights and protection. Con-
sequently there are two main categories of property: public
and private.”
Section 10 (1) states that “the property of the Hungar-
ian State is national property.” Section 10 (2) goes on to say
that “the scope of the exclusive property and the exclusive
economic activities of the state shall be defined by law.” Thus
state property is always public property, but public property
is not always (centrally-owned) state property. Section 12
(2) declares that the state must respect property rights of
local governments.
The distinction between state property and local gov-
ernment property appears clearly in the Civil Code as well.
Section 1 (1) regulates pecuniary relationships between cit-
izens, the state, local governments, economic and social or-
ganizations.
2.1.1 Legal Status of Public Property
Section 172 of the Civil Code defines the following kinds of
public property:
• the riches of the earth;
• natural waters and waterways;
• riverbeds and river islands;
• roads, railways, international civil airports and airspace;
• telecommunications frequencies.
That the above are state property has three conse-
quences:
• The objects are nonnegotiable.
• The objects can be owned only by the state.
• The objects cannot be owned by local governments.
Can local government property be categorized in a sim-
ilar way? Is there a legal basis for the protection of local gov-
ernment property?
2.2 Local Government Assets
and their Classification
Chapter IX of the Constitution enumerates the rights of
local governments, including the following:
• the right to own property;
• the right to spend revenue autonomously;
• to enter into contractual relationships;
• to possess own revenues in conformity with the perfor-
mance of tasks determined by the Local Government
Act.
Section 1.5 of the Local Government Act is titled “Rights
of Self-Governments,” and defines them as follows:
• the right to dispose of property;
• the right to independently manage revenues;
• the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity.
2.2.1 Local Government Assets
It is of particular importance to define the difference be-
tween assets and property. According to the Local Govern-
ment Act, the assets of local governments comprise:
• property;
• the rights to use property (lease, copyright, etc.).
The key to self-government is financial autonomy. Even
under ideal bureaucratic conditions, autonomy cannot be
guaranteed without independent financial resources.
 The financial foundation are assets such as property and
the right to raise revenue and manage assets autonomously.
Section 77 (1) of the Local Government Act establishes these
rights while limiting property use to service provision.
Local governments are also given the right to initiate
entrepreneurial activity, but under different conditions than
private enterprise. These conditions are to avoid conflicts
between different governmental activities and keep public
interest as the primary objective. Local governments may
engage in entrepreneurial activity, then, only as long as all
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compulsory activities are provided and public property is
not endangered.  To this end, Hungarian legislation distin-
guishes between public property which must be protected
against the mechanisms of the market and that which may
be involved in entrepreneurial activity by local governments.
 Section 78.2 of the Local Government Act defines
local governments’ core assets, management of which must
be separately reported. The basis of this distinction lies in
the assets’ functions (economic development, service provi-
sion, etc.).
Section 79.1 of the Local Government Act states that
core assets are those directly involved in the discharging of
obligatory duties or the exercise of public authority.
 According to Section 79.2, core assets may not be:
• sold;
• encumbered with debt;
• invested in enterprise;
• used for any purpose not defined by law.
Assets may be declared core assets by law or decree.
2.2.2 Core Assets
Most core assets are non-negotiable and may not pass into
ownership by any other body than the local government in
question, not even to another local government.
According to 79.2.a of the Local Government Act, core
assets include roads, squares and parks—with some ex-
ceptions in the case of the capital city. The Property Trans-
fer Act of 1991 includes the following in its list of non-
negotiable assets:
• public waters and waterworks;
• archives related to the operation of the local govern-
ment and its institutions.
Local government decrees may make other assets
non-negotiable.
 There are three groups of core assets that are limitedly
negotiable:
• as defined by Section 79.2 of the Local Government
Act—public institutions, utilities and buildings;
• as defined by the Property Transfer act—historic build-
ings, territory subject to nature conservation, public
waters, museum property;
• as determined by Section 79.2.b of the Local Govern-
ment Act—real and movable property determined by
the local government.
Restrictions on limitedly negotiable assets are fixed by
law or decree. These restrictions require the consent of a
third party for the conclusion of sale or turnover of proper-
ty, as follows:
• For the sale of historic buildings, or for their use as col-
lateral, the consent of the relevant minister is required.
• For the use or turnover of protected land, the relevant
minister’s authorization is required.
• Public water utilities may only used for public service.
• For the sale or turnover of museum property, the ap-
proval of the minister of culture is required.
Other limitations may be regulated by government
decrees which set conditions for other property transfers.
While law or decree may declare assets to be core assets,
the reverse is not the case.  Changing the status of an asset is
possible only when an asset’s function changes. The status
of a road, for example, may change as the urban plan of a
settlement is developed. Similarly, a public square may be
zoned for construction. Further restrictions, however, come
to bear on this process.
2.3 Property Transfer Process
Acquisition of property by local governments takes place in
several forms. Most simply, by purchase as regulated by the
Civil Code. This was not common, however, during transi-
tion in Hungary. When the local government system was
established in 1990, most assets were transferred from the
central government to serve as the economic basis of self-
government.
 Most such transfers were made by the Local Govern-
ment Act of 1990, later by the Property Transfer Act of 1991.
 Although the transfer of property has not ceased, a sig-
nificant portion of properties to be transferred have already
been turned over to local government.
2.3.1 Property Acquisition by Virtue of Law
Ex lege acquisition of property was ordered by the Local
Government Act of 1990 and by the Property Transfer Act
of 1991. Three groups of property may be designated as
objects of ex lege acquisition.
1) Section 107.2 of Local Government Act determined
the first group of property objects transferred to local
governments—all state-owned property previously man-
aged by councils, such as:
• real estate;
• forests;
• waters, with the exception of protected areas, build-
ings or art monuments;
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• cash;
• securities.
This property was transferred by the Local Government
Act of 1990 and was not regulated by the Civil Code. It was
an occasional act changing the property nexus of significant
groups of property.
2) The second group of property transferred ex lege to lo-
cal governments was particular—the property of the
common councils of several settlements. Under the So-
viet system, certain groups of settlements were controlled
by a joint council. In the process of reform, many set-
tlements were divided out of these groups. Property
belonging to these joint councils, then, had to be shared
accordingly. The representative bodies of such settle-
ments were given until December 31, 1990 to settle
these issues.
Because the Local Government Act did not regu-
late the sharing of previously jointly-owned property,
this was regulated by the Civil Code. Property was trans-
ferred proportionally, stating that if in doubt, property
shares of the co-owners were equal.
3) A third group of property transferred ex lege to local
governments was regulated by the Property Transfer Act.
These objects were tenements and other structures man-
aged by councils’ communal management enterprises.
Such properties, with some exceptions, were transferred
to the local government in whose territory they were
found.
Flats and buildings managed by organs of the state re-
mained state property. If a building managed by a commu-
nal management enterprise was used by local governments
itself or by its public enterprise or institution, it was trans-
ferred by the property transfer committee. Tenements and
other structures co-managed by communal management
enterprises or other state organs (for example, flats managed
by a communal enterprise in a state-owned building) were
not transferred to local governments.
Overview of objects of property transferred ex lege to
local governments:
1) As of September 30, 1990
• public roads and their facilities including subways,
overpasses, bridges, sidewalks and bus-stops;
• public parks, playgrounds and playing-fields;
• public squares and public works of art;
• public cemeteries;
• cultural institutions;
– kindergartens;
– primary schools;
– student hostels;
– libraries;
– cultural centers;
– central workshops;
– artist colonies;
– museums;
– theatres;
– music schools;
– youth camps;
– pedagogic councils;
– pedagogic institutes;
– specialized secondary schools including those
for part-time students;
– vocational schools;
– specialized schools for health;
– educational institutes and student hostels for
the handicapped;
– archives;
• health and social welfare institutions;
– panel doctor’s offices;
– panel doctor’s offices for children;
– medical specialists’ offices;
– maternity centers;
– nurseries;
– housing and organizations for the elderly;
– homes for the handicapped;
– family-assistance centers;
– regional health-care facilities including hospi-
tals, clinics, sanatoria and blood banks;
– homes for children;
– homeless shelters;
• sports institutions;
– sports halls;
– centers for leisure;
– sports fields;
– swimming pools;
• other institutions;
– tourist offices;
– continuing education centers;
– fee-collection offices ;
– zoos;
– driving schools;
– local government offices;
• tenements;
• lands;
• forests and waters;
• cash and securities.
2) As of September 1, 1991
• tenements and other structures.
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2.3.2 Property Acquisition
through Property Transfer Committees
The Local Government Act authorized the government to
establish property transfer committees in counties and in
the capital. These committees administrated the following
properties:
• state-owned lands, forests, real estate and waters as de-
fined by the Property Transfer Act;
• protected territories, buildings, structures and other
monuments;
• public utility facilities;
• the assets of public enterprises established by councils.
The basic principles of the Property Transfer Act were
as follows:
• The property of dissolved councils became local gov-
ernment property, transferred without recompense. This
included all properties managed by councils and their
organs as well as institutions and public enterprises
founded by the council for public service provision.
• Local governments were expected to agree on the prop-
er transfer of property, with the ultimate authority in
the hands of the committee.
• Property was transferred according to the requirements
of managements and assigned responsibilities.
• Local governments were not required to accept owner-
ship of transferred property if its management or main-
tenance would incur extra costs.
• The process of recording real estate ownership in the
land registry was simplified.
2.4 Transfer of Different Types
of Property
2.4.1 Buildings
Buildings used by local governments were transferred to the
respective government Some buildings were used by several
government institutions or enterprises, and transfers were
then supervised by the transfer committee. Many buildings
which were only partly used by a local government were
entirely transferred. If a building used by a local govern-
ment was not used to provide services, and the competent
minister asked for management rights, the committee did
not transfer ownership to the local government. The princi-
ple here was that property must be owned by the organiza-
tion responsible for public service or public authority.
2.4.2 Monuments
The Local Government Act declared monuments to be the
property of the local government. Such properties were trans-
ferred if the local government’s legal predecessor (council or
organization) had owned the specified monument. The ap-
proval of the environmental minister was also required, as
regulated by the 1985 Treaty of Granada (“On Protection
of European Architectural Heritage”).
Monuments which had been managed by joint coun-
cils were transferred to the local government if significant
investment had been made since January 1, 1975 or if sever-
al local governments used the monument.
2.4.3 Protected Territories
Special regulations had to be applied to ensure the protec-
tion of certain territories of national interest regardless of
their ownership. In some cases the high cost of maintenance
or the need for special expertise relegated ownership to the
central government. If the environmental ministry deemed
this necessary, the local government could claim compensa-
tion.
2.4.4 Land
The Local Government Act transferred lands and forests
previously managed by councils and their institutions to lo-
cal governments. The Property Transfer Act regulated transfer
of lands and forests managed by public enterprises, in urban
areas or used by cooperatives.
Lands managed by public enterprises include:
• construction sites and lands under cultivation;
• companies involved in public enterprise activity;
• lands managed by public enterprises, public squares and
public utilities.
Urban lands not specifically slated for state ownership
were transferred to the respective local government. Excep-
tions were determined by the State Property Act as follows:
• vacant lots in urban areas managed by the central gov-
ernment;
• lands attached to another unit (such as the garden in
front of a factory);
• vacant lots managed by state enterprises in the process
of being privatized;
• vacant lots in urban areas in the case that a building
permit was issued before the Property Transfer Act went
into effect.
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All lands not managed by enterprises included in the
list of exceptions were transferred to local government. If
the terms of the Property Transfer Act were met, commit-
tees had no discretion over their transfer. An application
process was created so that local governments could know
exactly what properties were in question. Managers of pub-
lic utilities could also apply to the committee to continue
their management responsibilities under the new ownership.
The committee was required to define management rights
and restrictions.
Section 108 of the Civil Code states that a real estate
owner is required to allow authorized bodies to temporarily
use the property to the extent necessary for the performance
of their professional tasks.
The Civil Code further gives owners the right to com-
pensation based on any hindrance, restriction or damage to
property. Special rules were applied to properties of primary
significance in the capital. The capital’s property transfer
committee received applications from district governments
for the transfer of such properties.
2.4.5 Compensation for Land in Urban Areas
If urban real estate managed by state-owned companies was
sold, the local government was entitled to 50% of the pur-
chase price. If the land was left to a commercial entity, the
local government was entitled to the entire value. The same
rule was applied in cases when vacant lands managed by
state-owned companies were given to a company and the
Property Transfer Act did not allow property to be trans-
ferred to local governments. This rule was applied when a
state-owned company in transition left only a portion of its
real estate to the transformed company.
Another rule was applied if the entire state-owned com-
pany was transformed. The Transition of Companies and
Economic Organizations Act determined that local govern-
ments with territorial competency were entitled to a share
equivalent to the value of urban land belonging to the com-
pany being privatized.
Special regulations in the Property Transfer Act were
applied in the capital. The value of urban lands were give
either to the city government or district governments or
shared 50–50% between them.
2.4.6 Property of Public Enterprises
and Public Utilities
Section 107.1 of the Local Government Act regulates the
transfer of the following properties to local governments:
• property of state-owned public service providers;
• property of budget agencies;
• shares deriving from the transformation of state-owned
organizations;
• public utility facilities and equipment in urban areas
except those exclusively held by the state;
• property of state-owned economic organizations
established for public service provision by councils and
being under councils’ supervision.
Economic organizations are described in the Civil Code.
Their economic activities were enumerated in the State-
Owned Company Act of 1977.
Public companies were transferred to local governments
if the companies:
• were established by the legal predecessor, the council;
• were established by ministers and transferred to a
council;
• were under a council’s supervision when the Local Gov-
ernment Act went into effect (companies which had been
nationalized).
Activities of public companies transferred to local gov-
ernments:
• water, sewage, public baths;
• central heating and hot water supply;
• public sanitation;
• maintenance of gardens and parks;
• chimney-sweeping;
• burials;
• communal and real estate management;
• cinemas and other cultural services.
A) General Rules Concerning Transfer
of Public Companies to Local Governments
Generally, all property owned by public companies was trans-
ferred to local governments except for monuments, nature
reserves near settlements and buildings previously owned by
churches.
The Property Transfer Act distinguishes between equip-
ment and facilities owned by public utilities and other prop-
erty known as “non- public utility” property. This second
group includes:
• property necessary for a company’s activity (such as a
cinema hall), called “operational property” by the Prop-
erty Transfer Act;
• line facilities;
• rights of property value;
• property connected to entrepreneurial activity.
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The Property Transfer Act transfers ownership of pub-
lic utilities to the local governments of the settlement where
the service is provided. In cases where the local government
did not apply for exclusive ownership, property was trans-
ferred either to surrounding governments or to the higher
(county) level.
From among objects of “other property,” operational
property could be exclusively transferred to the concerned
local government. Objects of operational property involved
in service provision in several settlements were transferred
to group of settlements’ governments or the county govern-
ments.
Rights of property value, shares and entrepreneurial
property were transferred to local governments by agreement.
Without such an agreement, property transfer was realized
proportionally to the benefit to the given public service. If
property of public utilities was transferred to county gov-
ernment, rights of property value, shares and entrepreneur-
ial property were transferred to county government in pro-
portion to the service provided by the public utility.
Property transfer committees had to make individual
decisions on the maintenance of the public company, on the
transfer to local governments of the public utilities managed
by the public company and on the transfer of the other ob-
jects of property of the public company. Consequently,
local governments could agree on each property element one
by one.
Because of the special activities of certain companies
previously owned by councils, their location or specific safe-
ty concerns, special rules were applied to the transfer of their
property
B) Special Rules Concerning Transfer
of Public Companies Satisfying
the Needs of Several Local Governments
1) Transfer of Public Utilities
Property transfer distinguishes between utilities serving
one or multiple communities. Utilities serving a single
community are transferred to the settlement in ques-
tion. In the second case, the application process through
which settlements could apply for partial ownership of
a utility were administrated by the property transfer com-
mittee. If a local government did not apply for partial
ownership Section 107.6 of the Local Government Act
called for an agreement between settlements in ques-
tion.
2) Transfer of “Non-public Utility” Property
According to the Property Transfer Act, such property
must be transferred if the following conditions are met:
• The property exclusively serves the needs of a sin-
gle settlement.
• The property can be technically separated from the
council’s property.
• This separation does not jeopardize service provi-
sion in other settlements.
• The local government applies for it.
The same rules were applied if a public company did
not manage public utility. In such cases, the regulation con-
cerned the part of the property having a direct role in service
provision.
If all these conditions were not met, Section 107.6 of
the Local Government Act transferred the property to the
local government of the settlement. If concerned settlements
could not come to an agreement, property was resolved into
joint ownership or transferred to the relevant county gov-
ernment.
If all the above mentioned conditions were not met at
the same time, not public utilities had to be transferred to
local governments applying Section 107.6 of Local Govern-
ment Act. If the concerned local governments could not agree
on it, property was transferred to joint ownership of settle-
ments or county self governments. If a public company
founded by a council was transformed into a commercial
enterprise, ownership of shares was transferred to local gov-
ernments in the same way.
C) Special Rules Concerning Transfer
of Certain Objects of Property
of Council-owned Companies
In order to avoid conflicts between local governments and to
assure the safe functioning of public companies, special rules
were applied to the transfer of property of public companies.
Upon request by a local government, a decision was
made by a property transfer committee on transfer of public
and open baths used and managed by public companies or
councils.
The property of a public company providing commu-
nication (traffic) service ex lege had to be transferred to the
local government.
A cemetery managed by a council or public company
and located on state-owned land had to be transferred to the
settlement government (or district government in the capi-
tal—where the rules of burial could be regulated by a city
government decree).
The property transfer committee supervised the trans-
fer of public railways (including tram, metro, suburban rail-
way and funicular) and trolley-buses as well as their facilities
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to the relevant local government. If the facility connected or
crossed several settlements, it had to be transferred to the
local government who managed and maintained the system.
A building or part of it managed by the communal
management company of a local government and used by a
public company from another local government had to be
transferred to the local government that maintains the pub-
lic company which uses the building. This rule was based on
the principle that property being necessary for the provision
of a public service had to be transferred to the local govern-
ment providing the service. This provision did not cause
problems in cases when a public company provided service
only in one settlement or in the capital. The situation was
different if the public company provided services in several
settlements, as the local government supervising the public
company does not always own the property. If the owner-
ship of the building managed by the communal manage-
ment company of a local government but used by a public
company had been transferred to the ownership of the com-
munal management company, this would have contradict-
ed the purpose of the property transfer. Consequently, deci-
sions on transfer could have been made only after the decision
on the transfer of the public company’s property was made
and the local government’s founder’s right was designated.
Local governments exercising founder’s rights were entitled
to ownership of the public company’s property, consequently
ownership of the building used by public company (but
managed by communal management company) had to be
transferred to these local governments in proportion to the
benefit of a specified public service.
D) Special Rules Applied to Transfer
of Property of Public Companies
Functioning in the Capital City
Generally, the Property Transfer Act deemed that a public
company owned by a city or district council must be trans-
ferred to the local government exercising founder’s rights.
There were three exceptions:
 If a council-owned company provided services in more
than one district, the property transfer had to based on agree-
ment between all districts concerned. If no agreement could
be reached, ownership would be resolved proportional to
the service beneficiaries.
 If a council-owned company provided services for oth-
er settlements or districts, the company would be jointly
owned by the effected settlements.
National roads and their facilities, bridges, subways and
over passes—except those belonging to the national high-
way system—were transferred to the capital city government.
E) Transfer of Property
of Communal Management Enterprises
These enterprises were in a special situation. The property
they owned or managed could be categorized into two
types: registered property and committed property. Com-
mitted property included flats and other real estate the
management of which was assigned to a council. These
committed properties were transferred ex lege to the local
government.
Registered property of a communal management enter-
prise was generally also transferred ex lege to the local gov-
ernment, but its territorial competence depended on the
location of the object. If a building was used by a communal
management enterprise, it had to be transferred applying
the special rules on property of public companies.
 Undeveloped land owned by communal management
enterprises was also generally transferred to the respective
local government. Specified forests and parks were trans-
ferred to the capital city government.
2.4.7 Public Waters and Water Systems
Smaller water courses touching the administrative bound-
aries of local governments were transferred to these govern-
ments. Some smaller branches of the Danube with a less
significant role in transport were also transferred to local
governments.
Natural standing waters were transferred to the relevant
local government as long as the waters were not in direct
connection with waters in another jurisdiction. Certain larger
and more important lakes were not transferred to local gov-
ernments due to their important role in water management
and ecology. Waters forming the boundaries of the country
were not transferred.
Waters and waterworks are considered core assets of a
local government and therefore nonnegotiable.
2.4.8 Regional Water Utility Companies
Because of their larger territorial scope, regional water sys-
tems were generally not transferred to local governments.
2.4.9 Transfer of Other Objects of Property
Council-owned movable property was transferred ex lege to
local governments by Section 103.3 of the Local Govern-
ment Act.
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 Special rules regulated the transfer of museum pro-
perty. Previously, all museum-value objects had been state-
owned.  Property was then transferred, if possible, accord-
ing to the will of the donor. Otherwise, property was trans-
ferred only if it had been purchased directly by the council.
2.5 Special Problems
of Property Transfer
2.5.1 Local Government Compensation
Property transfer, as regulated by the Local Government Act
and the Property Transfer act, formed part of the process of
privatizing the socialist-era command economy and form-
ing the economic basis for self-government.
The transformation of state-owned companies was reg-
ulated by the Privatization Act of 1989, following the Act
on Economic Societies of 1988, which had fixed forms of
incorporation and joint ownership. Under the Act on Tran-
sition of Companies and Economic Organizations, a part of
the value of urban lands owned by state companies were trans-
ferred to local governments. Thus, the state income derived
from privatization were shared with local governments.
In many cases, however, companies being privatized were
bankrupt and their only value was the value of the urban
lands. If the land value was contributed to the transformed
company’s capital, the entire amount was received by the
local government. Several times between 1991 and 1992,
local governments had required the courts to force the central
government to turn over this value. Starting in 1992 other
systems of calculating privatization value were used. first by
comparing a company’s value to the value of land owned by
the company. The Central Budget Act of 1995 fixed a per-
centage share deriving from privatization.
2.5.2 Property Previously Owned by Churches
The rapid transfer of property previously owned by church-
es was a priority. Property previously owned by churches
but state-owned in 1990 could not be transferred to local
governments. Property confiscated from churches in 1948
had already been transferred to local governments.
Churches received only a part of the previously-owned
property. Property were returned if they were used for reli-
gious activity, education, social welfare, healthcare or cul-
ture. Churches were required to file claims which were con-
sidered by the minister of culture. If a claim was approved,
the minister called the property manager to make an agree-
ment with the church on the property transfer. If no agree-
ment could be reached, a joint committee of church and
government delegates arbitrated.
In some cases property previously owned by churches
had already been transferred to local governments. In such
cases the local government was forbidden to sell or borrow
against the property until its status had been finalized. If
local government property was transferred to churches, the
local government received compensation. Property was to
be returned within ten years.
Churches could make agreements directly with local gov-
ernments, without central government involvement. In such
cases, the minister of culture had to be informed on the final
agreement.
2.6 Property Transfer Committees
2.6.1 Regulation of Property Transfer Committees
Section 107.3 of the Local Government Act authorized the
government to establish property transfer committees in or-
der to transfer:
• state-owned lands, forests, other real estate and waters
determined by Property Transfer Act;
• all protected lands and monuments;
• public utility facilities;
• the assets of public enterprises.
Governmental decree 63 of 1990 on property transfer
committees established these committees and determined
their administrative structure and procedures.
Property transfer committees were formed of 13 mem-
bers determined by the minister of the interior. In order to
increase efficiency, three or more members could make de-
cisions. In 1996, the government reduced the membership
of the committees to 5.
Committees first informed local governments of the
objects of property in question. A local government could
declare its intention to take possession of a given property or
agree to its transfer to another local government. Local gov-
ernments would then establish work groups to assign values
to the properties.
2.6.2 Committee Functioning
Significant differences in regulation and practice led to sev-
eral problems. The committees were often not sufficiently
prepared for the work they were assigned. They lacked back-
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ground in administration. The legislature itself left room for
errors, as well. A reliable and exact inventory of property
was lacking. Local governments often were successors to
councils which had no property of their own.
 Although the government decree stated that local gov-
ernment employees should assist in the activity of the com-
mittee, this often did not happen. The decree stated that
local government work groups should provide estimates,
record properties and prepare for committee sessions. Local
governments often did not have sufficient personnel with
necessary expertise to complete tasks assigned to them. Lo-
cal governments received no professional or financial assis-
tance in the formation of work groups.
Property transfer committees were assisted by work
groups consisting of civil servants of the local government,
but the committees could not influence the work groups’
activities. In theory, the committees had an administrative
staff, but in practice the committee could not direct this staff.
The civil servants who formed the work groups, meanwhile,
had to fulfill their duties in addition to their functions in the
government offices.
Preparation of the property transfer process was insuffi-
cient due to the failure of the land registry. The amount of
cases which had to be registered with the office bogged down
the registry. As privatization was happening at the same time,
the changes in ownership were rapid and often confusing.
This was especially the case in the capital, due to the two-
tier system of local government. Major problems occurred
when two levels of government simultaneously took owner-
ship of an object and it could not be recorded in the land
registry in time.
2.7 Local Government Ownership
Local governments have the same ownership rights as any
other entity, limited only by Section 80.3 of the Local Gov-
ernment Act, which states that any entrepreneurial activity
must not endanger the discharge of their mandatory func-
tions.
 The exercise of ownership rights is determined by the
representative body. By decree, a local government may des-
ignate certain objects to be sold, borrowed against or used
for other purposes only if voters agree through referendum.
 Through ownership status, local governments are en-
couraged to provide better and better services to the local
populous, while entrepreneurial activity strengthens their
independence.
T R A N S F E R  O F  M U N I C I PA L  P R O P E R T Y  I N  H U N G A R Y
42 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
F R O M  U S A G E  T O  O W N E R S H I P
ANNEX
Competencies of Local Governments
Table 2.A1
Competencies of Local Governments
Functions All Municipalities Regional/District or Central or State
(Alone or in Associations) Urban Governments Territorial Administration
E D U C A T I O N
1. Pre-school ✓
2. Primary ✓
3. Secondary ✓
4. Technical ✓
5. Other
S O C I A L  W E L FA R E
1. Nurseries ✓
2. Kindergartens ✓
3. Welfare homes ✓
4. Personal services for the elderly ✓
and handicapped
5. Special services (for the homeless, ✓
families in crisis, etc.)
6. Social housing ✓
7. Other
H E A LT H  S E R V I C E S
1. Primary health care ✓
2. Health protection
3. Hospitals ✓
4. Public health ✓
C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E ,  S P O R T S
1. Theaters ✓
2. Museums ✓
3. Libraries ✓
4. Parks ✓
5. Sports, leisure ✓
6. Cultural centers ✓
7. Other
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Table 2.A1 (continued)
Competencies of Local Governments
Functions All Municipalities Regional/District or Central or State
(Alone or in Associations) Urban Governments Territorial Administration
 P U B L I C  U T I L I T I E S
1. Water supply ✓
2. Sewage ✓
3. Electricity
4. Gas
5. Central heating
6. Other
E N V I R O N M E N T,  P U B L I C  S A N I TAT I O N
1. Refuse collection ✓
2. Refuse disposal ✓
3. Street cleansing ✓
4. Cemeteries ✓
5. Environmental protection ✓ ✓
6. Other
T R A F F I C ,  T R A N S P O R T
1. Roads ✓ ✓
2. Public lighting ✓
3. Public transport ✓ ✓
4. Other
U R B A N  D E V E LO P M E N T
1. Town planning ✓
2. Regional/spatial planning ✓
3. Local economic development ✓ ✓
4. Tourism ✓ ✓
5. Other
G E N E R A L  A D M I N I S T R AT I O N
1. Authoritative functions (licenses, etc.) ✓ ✓
2. Other state administrative matters
(electoral register, etc.) ✓ ✓
3. Local police ✓
4. Fire brigades ✓ ✓
5. Civil defense ✓ ✓
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Transformation of
State and Municipal Property in Latvia
Ta l i s  L i n k a i t s
1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN LATVIA
Article 101 of the Latvian Satversme (Constitution) stipu-
lates that any Latvian citizen enjoys the right to elect local
governments in compliance with the law. Despite complica-
tions related to administrative-territorial reform and munic-
ipal financing, local governments have developed into an
effective political and administrative instrument.
1.1 Levels of Government
When Latvia regained its sovereignty in 1991, it inherited
the administrative division of its territory as established in
the Soviet period. This division was based on communist
organizational principles; it was not intended to promote
democracy. The territorial division of municipalities did not
reflect the administrative-territorial structure developed over
a longer historical period, but was based on the borders
between collective farms and other Soviet-designed entities.
After regaining independence, city, town and pagast
(parish) governments have expanded, and their independence
and responsibility have increased. However, apart from mi-
nor changes, the administrative-territorial division of mu-
nicipalities has remained as before.
1.1.1 Division of Municipalities in Latvia
The Law on Local Government, passed on May 19, 1994,
established two levels of sub-national government in Latvia—
local and regional.
Local government ensures the implementation of func-
tions as determined by law, as well as tasks assigned by the
Council of Ministers and voluntary initiatives of municipal-
ities aided by its council—an elected body representing cit-
izens—and institutions established by it, taking into account
the interests of the state and the inhabitants the respective
administrative-territorial unit.
Regional government, aided by a council—a represen-
tative body delegated by local authorities—ensures the im-
plementation of functions determined by law, as well as those
functions delegated by local governments and institutions
established by it, taking into account the interests of the state
and the inhabitants of the administrative territory of the re-
spective region.
The Law on Administrative-Territorial Reform passed
on October 21, 1998 called for the formation of novadi (dis-
tricts) and apriòíi (regions)—municipalities of a larger scale
to be established through administrative-territorial reform.
A novad is an administrative-territorial unit established as a
result of uniting parishes and cities under a single local gov-
ernment. An apriòíi (a region) is an administrative-terri-to-
rial unit consisting of districts, towns and parishes, and cit-
ies, except for Riga—the capital city of Latvia. Upon
completion of administrative-territorial reform, the follow-
ing administrative territories will exist in Latvia: apriòíi, no-
vadi, pagasti, towns and cities, and the capital city of Riga.
The planned deadline for the implementation of the admin-
istrative-territorial reform is November 30, 2004.
Activities of municipalities are supervised by the mu-
nicipal affairs authority, a body authorized by the Council
of Ministers, a public civil institution subject to the minister
for special assignments in state reforms implementing the
tasks stipulated by regulatory documents on municipal is-
sues, developing strategy for municipality development and
organizing the implementation of the municipal reform.
The governmental institutions and officials supervising
the legality of the activities of the municipalities according
as stipulated by law must report any breaches of the consti-
tution or the law to the municipal affairs authority.  Munic-
ipal operations and their financing are monitored by the state
audit office.
1.1.2 Representative Bodies
The representative bodies of cities, towns and regions are
councils called dome. Parish councils are called padome. The
number of councilors ranges from seven to fifteen (with sixty
for the City of Riga). Council-members are elected through
universal suffrage. Regional councils are not elected directly,
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but formed of delegated representatives of local governments.
Councils have no distinct executive body.
1.1.3 Heads of Local and Regional Government
The chairperson of a council is the political head of the local
government. He/she is elected by the councilors of the re-
spective council by secret vote.
The chairperson of a city or parish council has the fol-
lowing duties:
• Conduct the work of the council and coordinate the
review of committee activity.
• Represent the council in relations with state and other
local authorities.
• Represent the council in court without any special au-
thorization.
• Issue proxies, sign agreements and other legal documents
on behalf of the council.
• Conduct the work of the financial committee.
• Issue binding directions for council staff.
• Propose a review of issues by the council and in com-
mittees.
• Prepare for review of applications submitted by state
institutions and officials.
• Bear personal responsibility for the execution of court
decisions in cases where the council is one of the parties.
• Present proposals on the dismissal of officials of state
institutions located in the administrative territory of the
local government.
• Fulfill other duties delegated by law or according to reg-
ulations of the respective local government and deci-
sions of the council.
The political head of the local/regional government does
not receive direct tasks from the government.
1.1.4 Chiefs of Administration
The chief of local administration is the executive director.
He/she is appointed by the council upon proposal by the
chairperson. The executive director of the local government
has the following duties:
• Organize the implementation of binding regulations and
other regulatory documents issued by the council.
• Give orders to the heads of local government institutions.
• Prepare proposals to the council concerning the cancel-
lation of illegal decisions by local institutions.
• Suggest to the council the appointment or dismissal of the
heads of local government institutions and enterprises.
• Submit proposals to the council concerning the estab-
lishment, reorganization and dissolution of local gov-
ernment institutions and enterprises.
• Manage municipal property and financial resources;
conclude business transactions with legal entities and
individual persons in accordance with the procedure and
framework determined by the council.
• Organize the establishment of the socio-economic de-
velopment plan, the general regional planning of the
territory and the draft budget of the respective munici-
pality.
• Perform other duties stipulated by the regulation of the
respective local government and decisions of the council.
1.1.5 Powers and Responsibilities
The permanent functions of municipalities are as follows:
• Organize municipal services for residents (water supply
and sewage networks, heating, collection, disposal, stor-
age or processing of household waste, collection, dis-
posal and purification of sewage).
• Provide maintainance and sanitation in its administra-
tive territory (construction, reconstruction and mainte-
nance of roads and squares; provision of lighting in
streets, squares and other public territories; supervision
of the collection and disposal of industrial waste, anti-
flood measures, formation and maintenance of ceme-
teries and places for burial of dead animals).
• Determine procedures for the use of public forests and
waters unless otherwise provided by law.
• Provide for residents’ education (securing rights to pri-
mary and general secondary education).
• Support culture and promote traditional cultural val-
ues and the development of creative activities (organi-
zational and financial assistance to cultural institutions
and activities).
• Secure access to health care.
• Ensure social assistance for needy families, the elderly,
the homeless and other socially vulnerable persons.
• Administrate over adoption, trusteeship and guardian-
ship issues.
• Render housing support to residents.
• Promote entrepreneurial activity to prevent unemploy-
ment.
• Issue permits and licenses on entrepreneurial activity as
stipulated by law.
• Ensure public order; fight heavy drinking and profligacy.
• Supervise urban planning in accordance with the devel-
opment plan of the respective administrative-territorial
unit.
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• Register public records.
• Collect information necessary for national statistics.
• Organize elections.
• Participate in implementing civil defense measures.
• Organize public transport services.
• Ensure the representation of local authorities in regional
health insurance institutions.
• Organize the development of teacher training and the
methodology of educational activities.
The last three functions shall only be performed by cit-
ies’ self-government bodies. The legal basis of the internal
structures of local/regional authorities is regulated by the
council.
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Statistical data
The Republic of Latvia covers a territory of 64,589 sq. km and has a population of 2,351,000. The population density
is 36.4 persons per sq. km.1
There are 26 regions and 548 municipalities altogether: seven cities, 62 towns, 10 districts, 469 parishes and 26
regional governments.2
Smallest towns by population: Durbe (Liepaja region) 465 inhabitants
Subate (Daugavpils region) 1,013 inhabitants
Piltene (Ventspils region) 1,217 inhabitants
Smallest parishes by population: Kalncempji (Alüksne region) 392 inhabitants
Jûrkalne (Ventspils region) 394 inhabitants
Lazdulejas (Balvu region) 396 inhabitants
Zvarde (Saldus region) 400 inhabitants
Ipiki (Valmieras region) 397 inhabitants
Largest parishes: Dundaga (Talsu region) 559 sq. km
Ance (Ventspils region) 392 sq. km
Targale (Ventspils region) 365 sq. km3
Breakdown of Latvian municipalities by the number of inhabitants
In 71% of the municipalities, the number of inhabitants is below 2000, but the total number of inhabitants living in
these municipalities accounts for only 15% of the total population in Latvia. In such a situation, the financial resources
are scattered among the many small municipalities thus resulting in an even more inefficient use of the scarce resources.
In 2000, the amount of the mutual settlement of accounts between municipalities reached 5.9 million lats4 .
Due to their small scale, many municipalities have little revenue of their own. For instance, in 1999 the budget
revenues of 33 municipalities, apart from special purpose subsidies, did not exceed 50 thousand lats. A small municipal-
ity is not capable of concentrating financial resources. The municipalities where, apart from the special purpose subsi-
dies, the yearly revenue does not exceed 100 thousand lats have problems attracting investment, and there are more than
200 such municipalities in the country. Municipal revenues per inhabitant differ by 1000, even 2000%.
Breakdown of municipalities by municipal revenues
In small municipalities, administrative expenses per inhabitant exceed expenses the larger municipalities. For instance,
among rural municipalities with more than 10 thousand inhabitants, the expenses of local authorities are 13.3 lats per
inhabitant, whereas in the group of local authorities where the number of inhabitants is less than 700, administrative
expenses of municipalities amount to 24.7 lats per inhabitant. In 1999, there were 24 municipalities in this country,
where the expenses of the executive and legislative authorities exceeded the tax revenue of the respective municipality.
Usually, the administrative territories with a small number of inhabitants do not have adequate infrastructure for
the implementation of the functions assigned to municipalities. 86% of municipalities have not developed and legally
accepted development plans for their territories. This factor prevents the attraction of investment, restructuring of their
operations and creation of new jobs. The situation with respect to municipalities is specific in Latvia, as half of the
population (50%) has only one local government, while the other half has both local and the regional government.
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2. DEVOLUTION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
IN LATVIA
2.1 Types of Property
2.2.1 Land, Forests and Water Resources
2.2.1.1 Land
Municipalities may own land. The law5  stipulates that dur-
ing land reform (see Section 4 on the background of land
reform), the following categories of land shall be entered in
the land registry in the name of a municipality:
1) Land owned by a municipality as of July 21, 1940,6  in
its current administrative territory and woodlands (even
if in other administrative territories), except:
• land transferred to individual persons or legal enti-
ties as compensation for previously-owned land;
• land assigned to individual persons for permanent
use or reserved with the right to ownership;
• land where state-owned buildings, enterprises, state-
owned property being privatized are located.
2) Land owned by individual persons or legal entities as of
July 21, 1940, if the above persons or entities have re-
ceived compensation for the land, have not claimed the
restitution of their ownership rights to the land, or the
restitution of ownership rights to the land has not been
stipulated by law, in the following cases only:
• if buildings and constructions owned by a munici-
pality are located on this land;
• if in view of applications submitted by local au-
thorities during land reform, the respective land
plots have been allocated as building sites for new
buildings, as well as for the implementation of the
functions of local governments in the approved plan
of a parish or city or the land utilization plan (if
such plans have not been drafted or approved yet,
the necessity and scale shall be arbitrated by the
ministry of finance and the ministry of environ-
mental protection and regional development);
• if there are residential houses on this land contain-
ing privatized apartments.
3) Land owned by the state as of July 21, 1940, if the fol-
lowing facilities are located on this land:
• buildings housing companies owned by a munici-
pality;
• privatized objects of municipal property or build-
ings owned by a municipality or municipal compa-
nies;
• apartment houses in which apartments have been
privatized.
4) Land where streets have been built using state or mu-
nicipal funding and owned by the municipality.
5) Land located in the current administrative territory of
municipalities and owned by the rural municipalities as
of July 21, 1940, except:
• land transferred to the ownership of an individual
or legal entity as compensation during land reform;
• land transferred to an individual person for perma-
nent use or reserved with the right of ownership;
• land containing state-owned buildings, state-owned
enterprises or privatized state-owned property.
After land reform is completed, the state is entitled to
enter ownerless land in the land registry in the name of the
state.
The state may engage in transactions with land accord-
ing to the laws regulating the privatization of state-owned
and municipal land, as well as general transactions with the
land owned by the state and municipalities. These laws limit
the range of land purchasers, but do not stipulate any spe-
cial regulations for land sale or transfer that differ from those
applicable to the state.
Types of Land Privatization
There are three types of land privatization:
1) Restitution of land ownership rights to former landown-
ers or their heirs—there is a general procedure for this
(found in the Law on Land Privatization in Rural Areas
and the Law on Land Reform in Cities and Towns) and
certain special procedures (ownership rights for religious
organizations, for example, were restored under a spe-
cial law).
2) Transfer of ownership rights to land through payment.
3) Privatization of land to which the state or a munici-
pality is entitled.7
1) Restitution of Land Ownership Rights
to Former Landowners or Their Heirs 8
Pursuant to the Civil Code, those who owned land on
July 21, 1940 or their heirs could recover their land
ownership rights on the basis of a personal application
(complying with deadlines and restrictions as stipulated
by law).
The previous owners received ownership rights to
their land, ownership rights to land of equal value
within the parish or region or compensation in equal
forms.
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2) Transfer of Ownership Rights
to Land through Payment
Ownership rights to land through payment may be trans-
ferred to persons to whom it has been allocated for per-
manent use, if they are performing the duties of land
users as stipulated by law and if the ownership rights to
this land have not been restored to its former owners or
their heirs.
The total area of transferred land may not exceed
150 hectares, 50 hectares in woodland areas. Issues on
allocating larger area of land and woodland are decided
by the Central Land Commission on the basis of the
recommendation of the land commission of the respec-
tive parish.
The government stipulates a uniform procedure for
calculating and making payments.
Municipalities and their institutions compile and
review applications for land privatization and make
decisions according to the procedure stipulated by law.9
Land Transactions 10
Transactions may be conducted only with land
whose owners are entered in the land registry. Any trans-
actions resulting in a change of ownership, as well as
testamentary inheritance, sale or transfer of pledged land
or investment of land as a share capital of a company,
are deemed land transactions.
In Latvia, land may be acquired by:
1) Latvian citizens;
2) the state and its municipalities or publicly-owned
companies;
3) religious organizations, if they have been operating
in Latvia for at least three years since the moment
of their registration;
4) a company listed in the enterprise registry, on the
following conditions:
a) More than half of its capital is owned or
jointly owned by Latvian citizens, the state or
municipalities, jointly or severally.
b) More than half of its capital is owned or
jointly owned by individual persons or legal
entities from countries with whom Latvia has
concluded international agreements on invest-
ment promotion and protection before Decem-
ber 31, 1996; or to individual persons or legal
entities from countries with whom Latvia has
concluded international agreements after
December 31, 1996, if the agreements provide
for the rights of individual persons and legal
entities registered in Latvia to acquire land in
the respective country.
c) It is a public joint stock company and its shares
are listed on the stock exchange.
Other individual persons or legal entities may ac-
quire land subject to restrictions stipulated by law. They
cannot acquire the following:
• land in areas near state borders;
• land in the protected sand dunes along the Baltic
Sea and Riga Gulf, in protected public waters,
unless sited for construction in the parish develop-
ment plan;
• land in state reserves;
• agricultural and forest land in the parish develop-
ment plan.
Should other persons or entities as described above
wish to acquire land, they must submit an application
to the local government indicating plans for use. A deed
must be included with the application, except for in cases
where government institutions privatize land for the
state’s use.
These applications are reviewed by the chairman of
the local government council. If the proposed use does
not contradict the parish plan, in compliance with the
regulations on territorial planning issued by the Coun-
cil of Ministers, and if in compliance with legal owner-
ship restrictions, the chairman may approve the appli-
cation within 20 days.
If the parish plan has not been approved or taken
legislative effect, the chairman must consult with the
ministry of environmental protection and regional de-
velopment. The ministry has two weeks to make a deci-
sion. A deed of transaction will only be considered valid
if this ministerial approval is enclosed with it. The par-
ish government sends these documents to the state land
service. If an application is not approved, interested par-
ties have the right to appeal.
Former landowners or their heirs, who claimed land
before June 21, 1991 and who have been registered in a
special register of unsatisfied claims, retain the right of
first refusal over the land to which their ownership rights
were not restored.
3) Municipal Land Privatization Procedures11
A special procedure is stipulated for the privatization of
land containing state-owned or municipal property
(companies or their structural units) designated for priva-
tization, land containing already privatized state-owned
or municipal property and state-owned or municipal
land without any buildings or structures.
T R A N S F O R M AT I O N  O F  S TAT E  A N D  M U N I C I PA L  P R O P E R T Y  I N  L AT V I A
52 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
F R O M  U S A G E  T O  O W N E R S H I P
s¡
A municipality implements privatization of land
containing municipal property designated for privatiza-
tion or already privatized. However, if the land con-
tains privatized state-owned property, privatization is
implemented by governmental institutions.
The new owners of privatized property retain the
right of first refusal over land owned by the state or
municipalities on which their respective objects are lo-
cated.
If the entity who holds the right of first refusal does
not exercise it, the entity has lease rights, and the plot
must not be confiscated.
Land must be sold for a price not less than the ca-
dastral value of the land, determined in compliance with
the Council of Ministers’ regulations on land valuation.
The institution performing privatization determines the
price of a particular plot. Payment for privatized land
shall be transferred to the privatization funds of the state-
owned or municipal property.
2.2.1.2 Woodlands and Forests
The woods growing on a piece of land are the property of
the landowner and must be privatized along with it.12
Approximately 50% of woodland in Latvia is owned by
the state; the remainder being private property of individual
persons or legal entities, which acquired the land during land
reform. Municipalities are considered private owners who
must comply with provisions of special laws regarding the
use of woods.
The use of private woods is restricted by regulations on
forest protection and hunting,13  as well as other special laws.
The state land service supervises the use of all woods
and forests in Latvia. It is responsible for the implementa-
tion of a uniform wood policy in all woods, supervises the
compliance with regulatory documents and implements sup-
port programs to ensure sustainable forestry. The state joint
stock company Latvijas Valsts Mezi (Latvian State Woods)
manages and maintains state-owned woods and performs
the functions of the owner.
The Forestry Law stipulates that forests are an ecosys-
tem in all stages of development, dominated by trees at least
seven meters in height, with a current or prospective foliage
projection of at least 20%. Woodlands are lands containing
forests, objects of wood infrastructure, as well as occasional-
ly flooded open spaces, bogs and glades, located in or ad-
joining a forest.
Any person enjoys the right to stay and freely move in
state-owned or municipal forests. In other woods, these rights
may be restricted by the owner or lawful possessor.
A municipality, following a proposal from the state land
service or an institution of environmental protection, in the
interest of fire safety or the protection of wild plants and
animals, may restrict the rights of individual persons to stay
and freely move in the woodlands.
If the rights of an individual person to stay and freely
move are restricted, it is the duty of the owner or lawful
possessor to mark affected territory with clearly visible sig-
nage.
Woodland owner (including municipalities) must ob-
tain a permit from the state land service for the following
activities: 1) logging, 2) building or reconstruction of ob-
jects which may affect the forests, 3) the building of roads
for forestry, 4) the procurement of reproductive material from
the wood, 5) the use of mineral fertilizers and pesticides.
A municipality may conduct transactions with and con-
fiscate woodlands according to the same terms and condi-
tions as land transactions.
2.2.1.3 Waters
Latvia contains public and private waters. Public waters are
those along the seacoast as wells as the lakes and rivers listed
as public in the annex to the Civil Code.14  The list of public
waters may be amended by legislative process only. Losses
thus incurred by the owner shall be compensated by the
state.15
Public waters are the property of the state—they are
not subject to sale or transfer. Private waters are all other
waters owned by individual persons or legal entities, includ-
ing municipalities. Water legislation applies to both surface
and subterranean waters.
Ownership rights to a river comprise:
1) ownership rights to the riverbed;
2) rights to use the river itself – fishing rights, the right to
use water power, etc.
Private waters, which extend across or adjoin land plots
of several owners, are in the jointly owned. Underground
waters deemed mineral resources of national importance are
owned by the landowner.
During land reform in rural areas, both individual per-
sons and legal entities entitled to claim land, could also claim
waters (rivers, lakes, water reservoirs, canals, etc.) as well as
the land they occupy. Rights of land usage were document-
ed simultaneously with rights of water usage.16
Except for public waters, surface waters are to be priva-
tized along with the land in which they are contained.17
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Water transactions
Water transactions follow general procedures similar to those
governing land transactions.
 Any person is permitted the everyday use of public riv-
ers, insofar as this does not harm the public or infringe on
the rights of landowners.18  Any individual person or legal
entity may lease public waters, as regulated by the Council
of Ministers.
Public waters are leased on behalf of the state by:
1) The fishery authority of the ministry of agriculture, if
the body of water is leased for fishery purposes (subject
to prior agreement with the local government and the
regional environmental authority).
2) The local government in all other cases. Should the body
of water be contained in territories of several muni-
cipalities, they must mutually agree on leasing pro-
cedures.
Public water bodies are leased for the purposes of
industrial fishing, fishing as a hobby—angling, or fish
farming.
After an agreement with the fishery authority and
regional environmental authorities of the ministry of envi-
ronmental protection and regional development, waters are
leased for the following uses as well:
1) protection of objects of cultural and natural heritage;
2) procurement of drinking water and procurement of
water for special purposes;
3) scientific research;
4) recreation and water sports;
5) water power;
6) transport;
7) mining of peat and mineral resources;
8) construction and maintenance of hydrotechnical struc-
tures.
If the body of water is intended for industrial fishing, a
special lease agreement on the rights of industrial fishing is
concluded in addition to the lease agreement. The transfer
of usage rights and industrial fishing rights to other individ-
ual persons or legal entities is forbidden.
After an agreement with the fishery authority, the su-
pervision of fish resources and the lease of the industrial fish-
ing rights may be delegated to municipalities.19
The conditions related to the principle of free access
must be included in the lease agreement and the regulations
of use and maintenance of the body water.
The lessee of the public water body has no right to charge
fees for the above uses of public waters. The lessee may charge
for additional services to ensure. Charged services must be
stipulated in the lease agreement.
Charges for the lease of bodies of water must be calcu-
lated on the basis of the surface, its use and other socio-
economic factors.20  If the water body and the industrial fish-
ing rights are leased simultaneously, the lease payment is
divided into a payment for the water body lease and pay-
ment for the industrial fishing rights respectively.
Resources from the total amount charged for the lease
of the industrial fishing rights or their auction, and the use
of the rights of industrial fishing are distributed as follows:
• 70% of the total must be transferred to account of the
fishery authority.
• If the lease payment has been made to a municipality,
30% of the total must be transferred to a special munic-
ipal account for the organization and management of
fishing.
• 30% of the total amount collected by the fishery au-
thority or the institutions of the ministry of environ-
mental protection and regional development must be
transferred to the account of the above institutions.
Use of water is divided into:
1) the general use of water, for which no permit is required;
2) the special use of water, for which a permit is required—
the procedure for its issuance is regulated by the Coun-
cil of Ministers.
The special use of water means21  activities affecting the
quantitative or qualitative indicators of both surface and un-
derground waters, in any of the following conditions:
1) The amount of sewage waters in a particular place of
their outflow exceeds 5 m3 in 24 hours.
2) Extraction of underground waters exceeds 10 m3 in 24
hours.
3) Mineral waters are extracted for reasons other than per-
sonal use.
4) The hydro-regime of a body of surface water body is
affected, or surface water consumption exceeds 20 m3
in 24 hours.
5) The above amounts are not exceeded but a material
impact on the environment could occur due to water
extraction or emission.
In this respect any individual person or legal entity that
extracts waters or uses them in their business operations may
be a water user. A permit for the use of water certifies the
right to use water and stipulates the types of uses, amounts,
timelines, as well as duties of the water user regarding water
protection.
The person or entity requesting a permit must submit
an application to the regional environmental authority, filled
in and approved by the local authorities, for receiving a per-
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mit for the use of water. The municipality has the right to
request the cancellation of the permit or to require amend-
ments to it.
2.2.2 Mineral Wealth
Before Latvia regained its independence, mineral wealth was
owned by the state. In 1992, the Civil Code of 1937 was
reenacted, including the provision that the riches of the earth
and all mineral resources thereof are owned by the land-
owner. Despite public discussions, the same provision was
retained in the Law on Mineral Wealth, passed in 1996.
Mineral wealth is the possession of the landowner.22
Any person eligible to acquire land may become the owner
of riches included therein.
Principles of mineral wealth:
1) Mineral wealth shall be used for the benefit of the land-
owner, the state and the public simultaneously.
2) Mineral wealth shall not be included in the cadastral
value of the land, and no property tax shall be levied on
it.
3) Landowners and individual persons to whom land has
been transferred for permanent use may extract encoun-
tered mineral resources without a permit and free of
charge only for personal use.
4) Activity must be in compliance with the regulations for
the preservation of protected territories, objects and cul-
tural heritage.
5) In order to ensure the efficient use and preservation of
mineral wealth, the state and municipalities have the
right to suspend, limit or terminate the use of minerals
according to the procedure stipulated by law.
The law23  stipulates the following users of mineral
wealth: 1) landowners, 2) a person to whom the land has
been allocated for permanent use, 3) a legal entity or indi-
vidual person, as well as a foreigner or a foreign legal entity,
who has concluded an agreement with the landowner.
Supervision of the Use of Mineral Wealth
Regardless of the ownership of mineral wealth, the follow-
ing authorities supervise its use on behalf of the state:
1) the ministry of environmental protection and regional
development and the state geological service (an insti-
tution reporting to the ministry that ensures efficient
use of the riches of the earth and the state geological
supervision of the riches of the earth);
2) the ministry of the economy;
3) local governments of parishes and cities.
The ministry of the economy organizes issues per-
mits and supervises hydrocarbon research and extrac-
tion.
The roles of local governments are outlined below:
1) According to the procedure stipulated by the Coun-
cil of Ministers and in the amounts determined by
the ministry of environmental protection and re-
gional development, local governments issue per-
mits for the use of frequently encountered mineral
resources (clay, sand, grit, peat) within yearly quo-
tas and limits. If a mineral deposit is located in the
administrative territory of several parishes and cit-
ies, permits are issued by the state geological ser-
vice.
2) Local governments control the recultivation of min-
eral deposits.
The expenses incurred as a result of the implementa-
tion of the functions delegated to municipalities are covered
by the payments received for permits. The Council of Min-
isters stipulates the amount and procedure of payment.
Permits for the use of the riches of the earth are issued
to the local governments free of charge with respect to the
land owned by them or the state-owned or municipal lands
transferred to them for permanent use. If mineral resources
are intended for the maintenance of roads, territorial im-
provement, or maintenance to buildings owned by the re-
spective municipalities, permits are issued on the basis of
application by municipalities and in compliance with the
stipulated amounts of extraction.
It is forbidden to sell, give away, pledge or exchange a
permit. In the event the users of the mineral wealth change,
the previous permit loses effect, and the new user must ob-
tain a new permit.
For state-owned or municipal land areas, permits are
issued by tender or auction. Any legal entity or individual
person, as well as foreign legal entities and individual per-
sons may participate.
Landowners (except the state and municipalities) issue
permits for the use of the mineral wealth on their property.
This procedure does not apply to mineral resources of na-
tional importance (hydrocarbon, crude oil, natural gas, un-
derground waters) and their deposits, as well as land areas of
national importance. Landowners may transfer their rights
to other legal entities or individual persons by concluding
an agreement—a prerequisite for receiving a permit for the
use of mineral wealth.
The general tender, auction and licensing procedure is
controlled by the Council of Ministers.
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2.2.3 Utility Companies
Municipalities may own public utility companies, which
provide services in line with municipal functions. Municipal
enterprises and companies provide water and sewage services,
central heating and street lighting. Power supply, gas and tele-
communications companies were established as state-owned
enterprises and have been gradually privatized. Because of
the country’s small size, establishing municipal enterprises
for such services was deemed economically ineffective.
There are no special terms and conditions stipulated by
law for the privatization of public utility companies, they
may be confiscated like other business enterprises.
So far, none of the significant municipal public utility
companies have been privatized. Liepajas siltums (Liepa-
ja Heat), the heating company owned by the city of
Liepaja, was the first energy monopoly that went in-
solvent in 1997. Poor management and inadequate
tariffs caused the insolvency. Through the insolvency
procedure, the company has been restructured and its
debts sold. In 2001, the creditors approved an invest-
ment program of 8.3 million lats. It is scheduled to
regain solvency in 2003, with more than 75% of the
capital to be sold to private investors.
2.2.4 Other Companies, Enterprises
and Commercial Assets
Municipalities may own business enterprises, shares in pri-
vate companies or enterprises with state capital. A munici-
pality decides on the decrease or increase of its participation
in such companies subject to their performance.
Pursuant to the law, privatization is a mix of activities
which result in changes of ownership of municipal enter-
prises, companies, real estate or equity shares owned by a
municipality—from ownership by a municipality to owner-
ship by individual persons or legal entities—where the share
owned by the state or municipality is less than 75% and
which is not the state or a municipality, or a state-owned or
municipal enterprise.24
Different laws regulate the privatization of different
properties. The privatization of enterprises, companies, eq-
uity shares and also real estate and land is regulated by the
Law on Privatization of State-Owned and Municipal Prop-
erty; privatization of apartments by the Law on Privatiza-
tion of State-Owned and Municipal Residences. Alienation
of real estate, which in principle could be considered priva-
tization, is regulated by the Law on Alienation of State-
Owned and Municipal Assets.
Besides, special laws regulate various details of the priva-
tization process. For instance, the Law on Transformation
of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises stipulates the
procedures for transformation and privatization of munici-
pal enterprises; the Law on Privatization Commissions of
State-Owned and Municipal Property provides the proce-
dures for the establishment and activities of a privatization
commission on municipal property; the Law on Privatiza-
tion Funds of State-Owned and Municipal Property stipu-
lates the procedures for use of resources generated by priva-
tization. On the basis of laws issued by the Council of
Ministers, a number of regulations control different meth-
ods of privatization and specific issues of the privatization
process; they are also binding on municipalities.
The current law controlling the privatization of munic-
ipal property is based on the principles stipulated by 1992
Law on Privatization Procedures for State-Owned and
Municipal Property (hereinafter, the Old Privatization Law).
Privatization is being implemented “from bottom to
top,”25  i.e., any individual person or legal entity may initiate
the privatization of an object.26  It is the municipality’s task
to compile the received proposals and make a decision on
the designation of particular objects for privatization. The
role of the municipality in the commencement of privatiza-
tion is proactive—the legislative body has not literally given
municipalities the right to initiate the privatization of its own
property and make a respective decision. However, such in-
terpretation of the law limits the rights of municipalities.
Interpreting this provision in a logical and broader sense,
any individual person and legal entity may initiate the priva-
tization of an object, including the owner of the object (who
in the sphere of private law is also a legal entity), should
have such rights.
However, this is not the only condition of municipal
passivity which to survive the Old Privatization Law. Before
October 24, 1996, when amendments were made to the law,
it did not provide the municipality an opportunity to deter-
mine the general principles of privatization. Now, when
making a decision on the designation of an object for priva-
tization, the municipality is entitled to stipulate the basic
principles of privatization.
After an object has been designated for privatization,
the entity or person enjoying the right of first refusal may
apply within one month; within two months, creditors of
the enterprises or companies to be privatized may submit
their claims.
The subjects enjoying the right of first refusal are as
follows:27
1) the owner of the land plot where the object is located (if
the area of this land plot is more than half of the territo-
ry occupied by the object);
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2) the lessee of the object, if the lease is for more than a
year, the lease agreement is registered according to the
procedure stipulated by law, and the lessee has no lease
debts;
3) a co-owner of the object, if the municipality intends to
sell part of their joint property.
The entities retaining the right of first refusal have sev-
eral advantages over other candidates. These advantages dif-
fer also from the mechanism of exercising the right of first
refusal as stipulated by the Civil Code. First, it is not com-
pulsory for the entities retaining the right of first refusal to
submit a privatization plan for the object. The second and
most important benefit is the right to purchase the object
for the initial or value-based price (instead of an auction
price as would be the case if the Civil Code were applied).
Thirdly, if the landowner exercises the right of first refusal,
he may choose to pay the entire purchase price in privatiza-
tion vouchers.28
Within the terms stipulated by the municipality and at
least two weeks after the announcement has been published
in the official newspaper, any individual person or legal en-
tity may submit a privatization plan for the object to be priva-
tized. No later than a month after the deadline, the munic-
ipal council reviews the submissions and may decide between
the following options:
1) to approve one of the submitted privatization plans;
2) to reject all submissions and set forth a new term for the
submission of plans;
3) identify the fact that no privatization plans have been
submitted and a) set forth a new term for the submis-
sion of plans or b) ask the privatization commission to
draft a privatization plan of its own.
A privatization plan consists of a description of the ob-
ject to be privatized, privatization conditions and the sequence
of privatization measures. It must be approved by the mu-
nicipality. In essence, the municipality, as the owner, should
be entitled to stipulate the conditions of sale; however, the
law is designed on the principle of privatization ‘from the
bottom.’ This manifests itself in the process of drafting the
privatization plan as well: initially, the municipality itself
may not draft the plan; it must review all submitted plans,
approve one or reject them all, and only in that case may the
municipal privatization commission draft a privatization plan
reflecting the interests of the municipality.
On the other hand, in order to prepare for the privati-
zation of the object qualitatively and develop a well-consid-
ered privatization plan, the prospective bidder would need
comprehensive information about the object to be privatized
and the possibility to visit it. The law, however, is not ex-
plicit enough to prevent officials from refusing access to
important information related to the operations of the ob-
ject. Article 38 of the law states that: “any entity interested
in an object to be privatized has the right to be acquainted
with information regarding the structure of assets and liabil-
ities, business operations, as well as the status of its property
according to the procedure and in the amount stipulated by
the municipality.”
The municipality may approve a conditional privatiza-
tion plan. If these conditions are not fulfilled within the term
set forth by the municipality, the approval of the plan be-
comes invalid.29
After the approval of a privatization plan, the object’s
alienation process may begin. Within a week after the ap-
proval, the municipality offers the object for sale to the sub-
jects entitled to the right of first refusal, under the terms and
conditions contained in the privatization plan. If the subject
entitled to the right of first refusal fails to give a positive
answer within two weeks, his right of first refusal expires.30
If the person entitled to the right of first refusal has not
exercised its right, the municipality may commence the ac-
tivities described by the privatization plan: announcement
of its auction, establishment of a private company, conclu-
sion of the purchase agreement, etc. Prior to the privatiza-
tion or conclusion of the purchase agreement, it is impera-
tive that the prospective bidder confirm solvency, freedom
from tax debts or debts against the object to be privatized.31
The ministry of the economy has a restrictive role in the
privatization of municipal property. Within ten days, the
ministry must be notified of the establishment of the mu-
nicipal privatization commission, changes to it or its liqui-
dation.32  The ministry of the economy reviews disputes on
the composition of the commission.
Within two weeks after the approval of the privatiza-
tion plan, the approved plan together with duplicates of the
documents certifying the legality of the actions of the mu-
nicipality during the object’s privatization and reflecting the
facts mentioned in the privatization plan must be submitted
to the ministry.33
Within a month after the receipt of the documents from
the municipality, the ministry approves of the privatization
plan or, on discovery of failure to comply with the require-
ments of the process, suspends the municipality’s decision.
 The ministry of economy’s rights generate additional
risks to the participants in the privatization transaction, par-
ticularly to the person entitled to the right of first refusal,
who might have already concluded a purchase agreement,
had it not been necessary to wait for the ministry’s approval.
There have been cases when municipalities fail to submit a
privatization plan to the ministry of the economy within the
two weeks stipulated by law, whereas the ministry may make
its decision within a month after all required documents have
been received. The considerable amount of work at the min-
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istry of the economy should also be taken into account: in
2001, the ministry reviewed 494 privatization plans.34
Resources from the privatization of municipal property
are not transferred to the budget of a municipality, they are
accrued in a special non-budget fund—the Municipal Prop-
erty Privatization Fund—and the council of the respective
municipality must approve the planned program for its use
and the actual use of its funds. Although the purpose of
establishing such a fund was the allocation of income from
privatization for entrepreneurial development within the ter-
ritory of the municipality, the municipality may deal with
these resources at its own discretion and allocate them to
serve any acute needs.
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2.3 Scale of Municipal Property
by Major Groups
According to the information of the state land service, com-
piled at the beginning of 2002, municipalities own 23,176
plots of land covering a total area of 90,999.2 hectares.
58,220 plots covering a total area of 293,273.3 hectares had
been transferred to municipalities at the beginning of 2002.
The overall number of plots transferred to municipalities
forms 13.5% of the country’s land properties. Whereas the
total area of the real properties transferred to municipalities
accounts for only 5.9% or 384,272.5 hectares of the owned
land in the country.
Table 3.1
Land Breakdown by Target Groups of Real Estate Use
(as of the beginning of 2002)
Purpose of Number of Area Number of Cases Area Total Number of Area
Real Estate Use Properties Owned [ha] Where [ha] Properties [ha]
by Municipalities Municipalities in the Country
Use the Land
Agriculture 830 782.7 1,672 15,382.4 28,943 45,896.9
Forestry 342 6,546.2 233 4,552,1 1,658 21,935.1
Water supply 18 120.9 844 1,655.3 149 12,713.3
Mining 41 134.5 383 582.6 621 1,608.2
and quarrying
Fishing industry 3 8.2 2 60 400 493
Residential houses 298 133 336 2,423 19,741 3,697.3
Apartment houses 1,400 552.9 563 350.3 3,228 1,277.4
Office buildings 111 141.4 554 282.8 871 383.2
Administration, 226 514.9 835 2,094.2 1,613 4,471.5
health care,
education,
culture, sports
and other social
facilities
Industrial 835 167.2 174 144.9 981 1,713.1
facilities
Traffic infra- 377 737.5 1809 4,088.6 2,691 10,170.3
structure facilities
Networks and 141 201.6 874 192.6 363 653.1
facilities of
public utilities
National defense 4 3.2 181 959.7
facilities
Sea harbors 28 109.2 5 18.1 193 835.9
and terminals
Other objects 22 145.8 236 127.1 333 257.2
Total 2,376 9,099.2 5,820 2,973.3 60,366 6,458,865.2
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Municipalities own more apartment houses than any
other kind of property, while forestry properties cover the
largest area. Among properties used by municipalities, the
greatest number is in traffic infrastructure facilities, while
agriculture is the largest group by area.
At the beginning of 2002, municipalities owned equity
shares in 1,073 enterprises and companies (in various
amounts up to 100%). Such enterprises and companies ac-
count for 0.83% of the total number of enterprises and com-
panies registered in Latvia. By the beginning of 2002,
165,946 enterprises and companies had been registered, and
129,304 were active (i.e., they had not been liquidated).
Income from privatization accounts for the greatest share
of non-tax revenues in the municipal budgets. According to
Table 3.2, municipal revenue from privatization has tended
to increase each year. However, in 2001 and 2002, the rev-
enue decreased due to the completion of most large-scale
privatization.
Municipalities have increased the amount of real estate
sold each year, from 340,000 lats in 1998 to 657,000 lats in
2001. In the first half of 2002, the amount of the real estate
sold already exceeded the estimate for the whole of 2002.
The sale of land has proceeded on a smaller scale, but
land sales have tended to increase as well, reaching 174,000
lats in 2001.
Table 3.2
Municipal Revenues from Privatization and Sale of Real Estate and Land
[In Thousands of Lats]
Revenue Breakdown 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002
(first half) (estimate)
Revenue from the sale 340 527 592 657 676 588
of municipal real estate
Revenue from the sale of land 56 82 180 174 89 416
Revenue from privatization 6,165 8,768 15,522 11,526 3,932 10,969
In general, municipal revenues from privatization and
sale of real estate and land form only a small part of the
budget; only 2%, for example, in 2002.
2.4 Transfer of State-owned Property
to Municipalities
Its territory, property and finances form the economic base
of each municipality. Article 76 of the Law on Local Gov-
ernment stipulates that the economic basis for a local gov-
ernment is its property and assets as well as financial resources.
Municipal property is distinct from state-owned property,
and a municipality may dispose of it independently, in com-
pliance with procedures stipulated by law.
One of the first conceptual documents passed by the
Latvian Parliament on independence was a decision on the
basic principles for the conversion of state-owned property,
part of the larger transition of the economy. Municipal own-
ership grew out of this movement.
The declaration of March 20, 1991 stated that all prop-
erty not owned by individual persons, cooperative organiza-
tions or nongovernmental organizations was the property of
the state. This nationalization was the first step in restitu-
tion, privatization and the creation of local government.
 Parliament also stipulated that transfer of state-owned
property to municipalities shall be without compensation
and subject to request from municipalities, with the final
decision made by the Council of Ministers.
The principle that a municipality must have its own
property has never been disputed in Latvia. Already on Sep-
tember 26, 1990, one of the first parliamentary laws (the
Law on Entrepreneurship) contained the principle that a
municipality may conduct business activities to the same
extent and by the same resources as other subjects of law
(individual persons, the state, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, religious organizations, legal entities established by the
above). The law stipulated that all entrepreneurs have equal
rights in their operations.
Individual persons, legal entities, the state and munici-
palities have the right to freely choose forms of entrepre-
neurship. Municipalities have the right to establish munici-
pal enterprises, limited liability companies and joint stock
companies 100% owned by the municipality, as well as to
participate in the establishment of companies with mixed
public and private equity. A special law regulates each form
of entrepreneurship in more detail. The Law on Municipal
Enterprise, passed in March 1991, regulates the procedures
for founding, operating, reorganizing and liquidating a mu-
nicipal enterprise. It stipulates that a municipal enterprise is
an independent business unit with the status of a legal enti-
ty, which conducts business for the benefit of the economic
and social development of the respective territory. The mu-
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nicipal enterprise is liable for all its assets, whereas the mu-
nicipality is liable for the enterprise.
On the basis of the parliamentary decision on the con-
version of state-owned property, the Council of Ministers
passed decision 171 on July 1, 1991, which regulated the
large-scale transfer of state-owned property to municipali-
ties. Pursuant to this decision, the government declared that
all state-owned property that is financed from a municipal
budget or included in the municipal balance sheet shall be
deemed municipal property. In the event that the particular
property is necessary to ensure the interests of the state, it
must be retained by the state.
The procedure for the transfer of the state-owned prop-
erty supervised by the ministries was as follows:
1) The ministry shall draft lists of state-owned property in
each region and city to be transferred to municipalities
and submit them to the municipal department of the
Council of Ministers.
2) The municipal department shall group the lists by re-
gion and city and send them to the respective munici-
palities.
3) The local governments review the lists drafted by the
ministries, agree or reject the objects listed, and prepare
proposals on the transfer of state-owned property not
included on the lists.
4) Municipalities send their decisions to the municipal
department, which compiles them and prepares a draft
decision of the Council of Ministers on the transfer of
state-owned property to municipalities.
5) In case of dispute, the municipal department shall or-
ganize a meeting of the interested parties. If no agree-
ment can be reached, the municipal department shall
propose that the issue be decided upon by the Council
of Ministers, taking into account the opinion of the
commission on national property protection and con-
version.
6) On the basis of the government’s decision, the minis-
tries transfer the property to the selected municipalities.
The transfer of the state-owned agricultural enterprises
was organized in an even simpler way:
1) Municipalities draft a list of objects they are interested
in and submit it to the agricultural enterprise.
2) A decision on the transfer is made by the administra-
tion of the state-owned agricultural enterprise.
3) If there is no dispute, the transfer of the state-owned
property takes place after the municipality makes its de-
cision. In case of dispute, the municipal department or-
ganizes a meeting of the interested parties. If no agree-
ment can be reached, the municipal department pro-
poses that the issue be decided upon by the Council of
Ministers.
4) By December 1, 1991 municipalities compile data about
the property transferred to them and submit it to the
municipal department and the ministry of agriculture.
From July 22, 1991 to August 2, 1993, the Council of
Ministers issued 21 decrees, whereby a large part of state-
owned property was transferred to municipalities. The main
practical problem the government had to deal with at that
time was the fact that governmental institutions were will-
ing to get rid of unprofitable objects, but municipalities
wanted to take over objects with high profitability. The large-
scale process of separating state-owned property and munic-
ipal property was completed in December 1994 when the
above decision of the government was cancelled.
The privatization process in Latvia was first commenced
in the trade and service industries. Such a sequence was log-
ical: trade, public catering and service enterprises were small,
not requiring big investments. The capital turnover in these
companies was faster, and the level of risk was smaller. Their
purchase also required fewer resources.
On November 5, 1991 the Law on the Privatization of
Small Municipal Objects of Trade, Public Catering and Ser-
vices was passed. This law applied to objects which were
owned by municipalities (transferred from state ownership)
and which met at least one of the following three require-
ments:
• trade technology units with a sales hall not exceeding
100 square meters;
• public catering units with premises not exceeding 120
square meters and 30 seats;
• services with fewer than 10 staff members.
The practical implementation of the law soon demon-
strated that objects which did comply with the above pa-
rameters should also be deemed fit for privatization. On
February 25, 1992 the size limitations were removed from
the law.
The law provided for the following types of privatiza-
tion:
1) auction among the employees;
2) auction to selected bidders;
3) general auction (excluding the state);
4) direct sale to employees;
5) open direct sale (excluding the state).
Only the fixed assets and current assets of the object
could be privatized, while the buildings in which they were
located were leased to the privatizing agent for five years. If
during this period the privatization agreement was abided
by, the privatizing agent could purchase the building(s). Ini-
tially the right of first refusal was assigned to employees on
the condition that they had worked in connection with the
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object for at least five years. On February 25, 1992 this pro-
vision was cancelled.
The practical application of the law demonstrated that
apart from assigning municipalities the right to conduct priva-
tization, incentive and control mechanisms should be creat-
ed simultaneously. There were some municipalities where
the privatization of small objects proceeded in an organized
manner, with a uniform approach both with respect to the
selection of privatization methods and the sale price. In oth-
er municipalities, where the municipal bureaucracy was close-
ly linked with local business circles, the selection of objects
to be privatized was biased. In July 1992, in order to put
moral pressure on municipalities, Parliament authorized the
government “to improve the provision of inhabitants with
food products.” On the basis of the above authorization, a
special governmental commission was established which dealt
with the de-monopolization of trade and privatization. The
commission was entitled to request that municipalities draft
privatization plans for particular cases. In some cases, the
commission initiated criminal proceedings against munici-
pal employees.
This law expired on July 5, 1994, when general privati-
zation regulations were applied to the privatization of mu-
nicipal trade, public catering and service enterprises.
In order to ensure information flow between munici-
palities and government institutions, municipalities were
allowed to send a representative to the commissions arbi-
trating the privatization of state-owned enterprises. This also
allowed municipalities to influence privatization regulations.
In 1994, this relationship was cancelled when the govern-
ment established a central privatization agency.
For municipalities, the most important benefit of the
privatization of the state-owned enterprises was financial.
Pursuant to the Law on Privatization Funds for State-Owned
and Municipal Property, the municipality receives 10% of
the resources generated through privatization. This moti-
vates municipalities to support the privatization of state-
owned enterprises. Moreover, the generated resources can
be used for the support of the local private companies and
job creation.
A feature of property reform in Latvia was the initial
separation of the ownership of buildings from the owner-
ship of the land on which they stand. Only after the Civil
Code was reactivated in 1993 were these rights reunited.
Therefore, land reform proceeded separately from the priva-
tization of buildings and enterprises.
 Land reform began with the restoration of ownership
to pre-WWII owners. For the purposes of reform, land was
categorized either as urban or rural.35
Reform was implemented in a way that intended to
maximize common interests between the public, former
owners, their heirs, current land workers and prospective
owners and managers. Land reform was financed by the
state.
In order to coordinate the activities of land reform and
ensure its legality in compliance with the Law on Land Com-
missions, the Saeima established a central land commission;
municipalities established city or parish land commissions
respectively.
The implementation of land reform in cities and in ru-
ral areas differed:
• In rural areas, land reform began a year earlier (the dead-
line for the submission of applications was June 20, 1991),
and there were more restrictions than for urban land.
• During land reform in rural areas, the Civil Code was
reapplied, considerably extending the range of the pro-
spective heirs of the former landowners.
• Only in rural areas were there separate cases when the
property compensation vouchers were exchanged for
cash.
• In cities, land reform began a year later (the deadline
for the submission of applications was June 20, 1992).
• Unlike in rural areas, the restitution of land ownership
rights in cities was not subject to the condition of per-
manent use of the land.
• In cities, ownership rights were primarily restored with
respect to old borders.
Until 1940, the state and municipalities owned consid-
erable areas of land (approximately 25%), as well as up to
50% of woodland; beyond that, some urban land was not
registered in the land registry.
During land reform:
1) Large areas of the former state-owned and municipal
land were transferred as an equivalent compensation to
those persons for whom land ownership rights could
not be restored in line with respect to old borders.
2) The state and municipalities could retain land not
claimed by former owners.
3) When determining whether land was owned by the state
or a municipality, the key criterion was the ownership
of the buildings located on the land.
4) Disputes arising during the course of land reform were
resolved by the central land commission or the court.
In 1938, Riga had 6,800 hectares of woodland within
its administrative borders and 78,130 in other regions of the
country. In 1999, the city had restored ownership of 5,819
hectares of woodland within its administrative borders and
approximately 50,000 hectares outside the borders. The Riga
municipality is the second largest public owner of woodland
after the state.
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Land reform in rural areas proceeded in two stages: the
first stage from 1990 to 1996, the second from 1993 in-
tended to be completed by 2005.
During the first stage of land reform, beginning June
20, 1991, former landowners, their heirs, all current users
of the land and the other claimants submitted applications
for the use of land in rural areas. After review of the applica-
tions, a land utilization plan was developed for each parish,
and subject to that, further decisions on the transfer of land
for permanent use were made, and borders of the allocated
land were allotted on the spot.
In each parish, a land commission was established with
the following functions:36
1) Register, compile and analyze applications for land, and
submit their decisions to the head of the parish land
utilization agency for implementation.
2) Review and adjust the parish land utilization plan and
submit it to the parish council for approval.
3) Resolve land disputes within the framework of its com-
petence.
4) Issue opinions on land ownership rights; make decisions
on land ownership compensation matters and land use
rights, as well as make decisions on the restitution of
land ownership rights, transfer of land to the ownership
for payment, as well as on determining the amount of
payment.
5) Review unsatisfied claims.
6) Review proposals for the further use of unclaimed land.
7) Issue statements on the initial data for the calculation of
land tax.
8) Review proposals for the use of the communal land of
the parish.
9) Make decisions for the purposes of the use of land to be
sold to legal entities, and on areas where land is to be
used for business.
10) Approve the scale of land plots and their borders, if the
corroboration request on the registration of the build-
ings in the land registry was submitted prior to the en-
trance of the land in the land registry.
The activities of land reform were performed by the state
land service and funded from the state budget, except for
the marking of the borders of land transferred for use (the
responsibility of the state land service).37  It was the duty of
municipalities to control land use and protection.38
Municipalities also submitted applications on the allo-
cation of land for the needs of municipalities. Municipali-
ties claimed land for the following purposes:39
• common needs (maintenance of streets, squares, parks,
cemeteries, water systems, waste dumps, roads of local im-
portance, municipal utilities, cultural and social objects);
• maintenance of personal auxiliary farms;
• maintenance and construction of municipal buildings
and structures;
• other business activities.
Land was transferred to municipalities for permanent
use for the following purposes only: 1) agriculture, 2) for-
estry, 3) water supply, 4) manufacturing, 5) construction
and maintenance of objects of culture, education, health care,
sports, trade and other non-production spheres, 6) building
and maintenance of power transmission, communications
lines, transport and other public utilities, 7) establishment
and maintenance of streets, squares, parks, cemeteries, sani-
tation objects and other facilities of common use), 8) con-
struction and maintenance of residential houses, summer
houses and garages, 9) maintenance of specially protected
nature and cultural-historical heritage objects.
Both individual persons and legal entities could apply
for use of water systems and the land occupied by them. The
rights to use of the land were documented simultaneously
with the rights to use the waters.40
During the second stage of land reform the following
activities were performed:
1) Restitution of land ownership rights or transfer of land
without compensation.
2) Assessment of land not distributed during the first stage
of land reform, development and implementation of a
plan for its use.
3) Survey of the borders and territories of allocated land
and development of maps of used land plots.
4) Registration of land and other natural resources in the
cadastre and estimation of the value of the real estate.
When land reform started in cities, all land, including
woodlands and waters, within the administrative territories
of a city was transferred to its local government of at the
time ownership rights were settled.41
A land commission was established in each city with the
following functions42:
1) Notify the applicant in writing on receipt of the appli-
cation.
2) Compile and analyze applications for land and submit
decisions to the city council for preparing a land utiliza-
tion plan; issue opinions on land ownership or land use
rights and make decisions on land ownership compen-
sation matters. After borders have been surveyed and
the deed of the land border survey and the plan of the
land borders have been prepared, make decisions on the
restitution of land ownership rights; transfer land for
payment.
3) Review and adjust the land utilization plan contained
in the master plan of the city and submit it to the city
council for approval.
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4) Resolve land disputes within the framework of its com-
petence.
5) Cooperate with the land commissions of neighboring
parishes and cities on the issues of the land of suburbs,
green belts, common municipal utilities, transport and
communications lines.
6) Review proposals on measures for satisfying unsatisfied
claims, taking into account proposals from the land com-
missions of neighboring parishes and cities.
7) Review proposals on the further use of the unclaimed
land.
8) Issue statements on initial data for the calculation of the
land tax.
9) Make decisions on the purposes of the use of land to be
sold or acquired at auction to legal entities, and on the
area of the land to be used for business.
 City councils have the following duties:
1) Review the decisions of city land commissions received
by way of appeal on the restitution of land ownership
rights, transfer of land for payment and compensation
and make decisions accordingly.
2) Assign land for use.
3) Sell municipal land to individual persons and legal en-
tities.
4) Retain land to be reformed by the municipality.
Land reform in cities was conducted in three stages:43
1) receipt of applications for land;
2) restitution of ownership rights, planning of land use and
termination of land use rights;
3) transfer of land.
During the first stage, the former owners, current users
and other applicants submitted their applications for land.
As in rural areas, land ownership rights in cities were
restored both to Latvian citizens and foreigners, as well as to
legal entities who owned land in Latvia on July 21, 1940.
The law stipulated the following cases when the former
owners could not reacquire land in its original borders:
• If Latvian citizens have built or are building residential
houses on the land or had acquired residential houses
by June 20, 1992 according to the law.
• If the land had been allocated to a member of a garden-
ing society for planting an orchard, with the rights to
construction.
• If specially protected national natural objects are locat-
ed (wholly or partially) on the land approved by the
state committee of environmental protection.
• If they contain educational, cultural, sports, public util-
ity, transport or science facilities of national importance.
In such cases, ownership rights to the land shall be giv-
en to the state or respective municipality when the former
landowners or their heirs receive compensation.
A provision was included in the law,44  stipulating that
by decision of the city authority, if there are no suitable plots
within its jurisdiction, compensation shall be paid.  Such
decisions may be appealed in court.
2.5 The Process of Property Transfer
from State to Municipality
This section describes the procedure of state-owned property
transfer to municipalities in force in 2002. This procedure,
with minor changes, has been applied since 1994, when large-
scale transfer of property to municipalities was completed.
2.5.1 Legal Decisions Required
for Property Transfer
A decision on the transfer of state-owned property to a par-
ticular municipality is made by the Council of Ministers.
The Council of Ministers makes its decision on the basis of
a proposal prepared by the ministry or another public institu-
tion and a decision of the of the respective municipal council.
The legal basis for making such a decision differs for
each type of property.
•· Property possessed by state civil institutions45  may be
transferred to municipalities without compensation, un-
less it is necessary to the respective civil institution itself
or other state civil institutions for the implementation
of their tasks.46  A decision by the Council of Ministers
is necessary for the transfer of both immovable and
movable state-owned property to a municipality with-
out compensation.
• Communal objects which were excluded from the priva-
tization of state-owned enterprises and companies des-
ignated for privatization may be transferred to the local
government of the respective administrative-territorial
unit by decision of the Council of Ministers.47
• The Council of Ministers has the right to transfer to
municipalities all other movable and immovable state-
owned assets, as well as equity shares owned by the state
in companies.48
2.5.2 Time-frame of Property Devolution
In order to transfer property, a statement of intent from the
municipality to take the property and a decision by the Coun-
cil of Ministers on the transfer of the property are required.
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The institution authorized by the Council of Ministers and
the institution or person authorized by the municipality then
signs the deed. If the transferred property is real estate, build-
ings or equity shares in a company, information about the
change in ownership rights shall be registered with the land
registry or the enterprise registry.
Depending on the scale of the municipality, the bu-
reaucratic process takes from a week to two months.
Pursuant to the provisions of the rules of procedure of
the Council of Ministers, in order to pass, a decision of the
Council of Ministers must be publicly announced at a meet-
ing of state secretaries, then approved by the ministry of jus-
tice, ministry of finance and other relevant ministries. After
approval, the draft must be reviewed by the ministerial com-
mittee, and after the draft has been formalized, it must again
be approved by the Council of Ministers. This process often
takes from one to three months.
A prerequisite for signing a deed of transfer is the exam-
ination of documents certifying ownership rights of the prop-
erty to be transferred, inventory files, as well as examination
on by the institution taking over the property. The signing
of the deed normally takes place within two weeks and up to
one month after the decision of the Council of Ministers has
been passed.
Hence the time-scale for a transfer of state-owned prop-
erty is between seven weeks and six months.
2.5.3 Organizational and Institutional Setting
of Property Devolution
No special institutions have been established for the transfer
and takeover of state-owned property.
The institution that possesses the respective state-owned
property is responsible for the property transfer on behalf of
the state. The head of the respective institution establishes a
commission for the property transfer or appoints a staff
member to handle the issues of property transfer. In minis-
tries, this function is performed by the administrative de-
partment; in other institutions, by legal or technical struc-
tural units.
Also property takeover on behalf of a municipality is
organized by a municipal structural unit responsible for the
management of municipal property. In the largest munici-
palities, this function is performed by the authority of mu-
nicipal property affairs; in smaller ones, by the legal or tech-
nical service of the municipality. After property takeover,
these structural units also register property in the name of
the municipality with the respective registers.
2.5.4 Valuation and Assessment of Property
Since state-owned property is transferred to municipalities
without compensation, the issues of property valuation need
not be resolved in the process.
If a municipality intends to relinquish or sell the real
estate transferred to it, it must carry out the valuation of the
property itself; real estate must be sold at auction. The law
provides for the following special exceptions when real es-
tate may be relinquished or sold without auction:
• If the auction has been unsuccessful.
• If the residual balance sheet value of the movable assets
for sale is less than 500 lats.
• If the costs of holding an auction exceed the value of the
assets.
• If the right of first refusal to the real estate is retained by
the landowner.
Property valuation is organized by the Commission on
Privatization of Municipal Property privatization, a perma-
nently functioning commission for the privatization and
valuation of municipal property established by the munici-
pality.
During the course of valuation at first an objective au-
dit of the assets, liabilities and equity of the object is con-
ducted. No specific valuation methods are stipulated by law.
Normally the privatization commission invites a qualified
expert for the valuation of the object—a real estate company
if the object to be valued is real estate, property, or an audit-
ing or accounting firm if the object is a company.
If the property to be valued is not too complicated, its
valuation can be accomplished within one month.
2.5.5 Ownership and Value Registration
Institutions (the Enterprise Registry,
Cadastral Registry and Land Registry)
The Enterprise Registry
The enterprise register of Latvia is an administrative state
institution which registers enterprises (companies), their
branches and representative offices in the territory of Latvia,
as well as all amendments to the corporate governance doc-
uments; it also performs other activities as stipulated by leg-
islative acts. The enterprise registry registers mass media,
nongovernmental organizations, commercial pledges, dom-
inant interests and marriage contracts.
The enterprise registry is a legal entity operating under
the supervision of the ministry of justice, and its activities
are regulated by the Law on the Enterprise Registry and its
internal regulations approved by the Council of Ministers.
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Its head is the chief notary public of the state, who is ap-
pointed or dismissed by the Council of Ministers, following
a recommendation from the minister of justice. This insti-
tution consists of the main office, as well as eight regional
departments in the largest centers of Latvia. The main
office of the enterprise registry ensures the registration and
other functions in Riga, as well as organizes the work of the
regional departments.
Registration is the key function of the enterprise regis-
try. It ensures a uniform system of records about the regis-
tered objects. Pursuant to provisions in several laws, the en-
terprise registry registers the following objects:
• enterprises, their representative offices and branches;
• mass media;
• nongovernmental organizations and their associations;
• holding company agreements;
• concession agreements;
• representative offices of foreign firms;
• representative offices of foreign organizations;
• commercial pledges;
• marriage contracts;
• dominant interests in accordance with the Law on Hold-
ing Companies.
The second function of the registry is to control com-
pliance with the laws and regulations of the founding and
corporate governance documents submitted by the objects
to be registered.
Its third function is to provide information on regis-
tered objects.
The enterprise registry performs many other functions
assigned to it by several laws and regulations:
• reports to the respective state institutions on particular
breaches of law or submission of inaccurate information;
• publishes information on enterprises in the press as stip-
ulated by law;
• ensures mutual exchange of information with state and
municipal institutions;
• approves experts for the valuation of capital investment
in joint stock companies;
• issues penalty documents in cases of administrative
breaches;
• performs the functions of an administrator in enterprise
and company insolvency processes;
• commences enterprise and company liquidation pro-
cesses;
• receives annual reports from enterprises;
• deletes failed enterprises from the register.
The enterprise registry makes records in the respective
file within 30 days after the submission has been received.
For an additional fee, the enterprise registry makes the record
within one day.
The Cadastral Registry
The real estate cadastral registry was established pursuant to
the Laws on State Land Service, Real Estate Tax and Regula-
tions of State Real Estate Cadastral Registry approved by
the Council of Ministers, in order to develop a state-of-the-
art computerized registration system for real estate, lawful
possessions, use and tangible objects contained therein, which
would ensure the registration of ownership rights and reso-
lution of issues related to real estate tax.
Objects to be registered with the cadastral registry in-
clude real estate (land, structures and apartments), leases and
tangible objects forming the real estate—plots of land (whole
or partial), buildings and groups of premises.
The tasks of the cadastral registry are to compile, sys-
tematize, update and issue data on the following subjects:
• cadastral valuation and real estate tax administration;
• registration of ownership rights to real estate;
• providing necessary information to clients on the use of
real estate and its development;
• concluding real estate transactions;
• planning of national, regional and municipal economic
and territorial development;
• land utilization and environmental protection;
• preparation of state statistical information and state land
balance sheets;
• development and maintenance of the geographical in-
formation systems;
• ensuring the interests of holders of other registers and
information systems, etc.
a) Textual Section of the Cadastral Registry
The cadastral registry ensures the registration, mainte-
nance and updating of data on real estate, lawful pos-
sessions, use, lease, and tangible objects contained therein
in a definite administrative territory.
The cadastral registry has the following functions:
1) Input data from the decisions of municipalities and
land commissions, real estate registration docu-
ments, real estate survey and valuation files and
other sources.
2) Create mutually linked and compatible tables, ensure
historical data storage and prevent data duplication.
3) Regularly update information.
4) Select and provide data in various ways, including
on electronic data carriers.
5) Register the internal and external users of the ca-
dastral registry.
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6) Link with other registers and information systems.
7) Provide data to governmental and municipal au-
thorities necessary for land administration.
8) Calculate real estate tax.
9) Issue statistical surveys.
b) Graphic Section of the Cadastral Registry
The cadastral map is part of the Latvian map system. It
shows the objects of cadastre with the accepted symbols
in compliance with the cadastral map standard.
The cadastral map covers all territory of the Re-
public of Latvia, and serves as an overview of the loca-
tion of land plots, buildings, encumbrances on the real
estate usage rights, and leased objects in the territory.
The map shows the cadastral territory and borders of
cadastral groups, borders of land plots and their cadas-
tral symbols, outside contours of buildings and their
cadastral symbols, territories taken up by encumbranc-
es on the real estate usage rights and their symbols; leased
objects and their cadastral symbols, and borders of the
Republic of Latvia administrative-territorial division.
The state land service makes records all relevant doc-
uments received in the cadastral registry within five days.
The Land Registry
Land registries are public books established for the registra-
tion of rights to real estate. Land registry institutions are
part of judicial power, and the power to record ownership in
a land registry is held by judges.
Activities of the land registry institution are intended
for the protection of the rights of creditors, so that the regis-
tration of pledge rights in the land registry would be as se-
cure as taking movable assets as collateral. The land registry
system provides real security for liabilities. Each real estate is
registered as an independent plot of land in a separate land
registry folio; thus it becomes a mortgage unit and as such is
fully liable for all property rights recorded in this folio.
Pursuant to the Law on Land Registries, all real estate
recorded in land registries and the rights related to them are
registered. Land registries are available to anyone.
Land registries consist of folios. Each folio has four parts
where data on the following subjects is recorded:
1) real estate;
2) ownership of real estate;
3) encumbrances on real estate;
4) debts on real estate.
A separate folio in the land registry is opened for each
independent property. All rights, rights securities and re-
strictions, as well as modifications and deletions of these
rights, securities and restrictions on real estate are recorded
in the folio.
Only after a transaction has been recorded in the land
registry, does it take effect against third parties. Prior to be-
ing recorded the transaction does not entail property rights,
only a basis for acquiring such rights.
Land registry institutions are located in each region in
Latvia. Databases of all 28 land registry departments are
linked in the united computerized land registry—the cen-
tral database from which information on all properties re-
corded in the land registry in this country can be obtained.
The law stipulates that a judge shall take a decision on
making a record in the land registry within 30 days after all
relevant documents have been received. Upon payment of a
state fee ten times the regular one, the decision is made within
three days.
2.5.6 Disputes and their settlement
There are no institutions in Latvia whose functions would
include resolution of disputes between the state and munic-
ipalities. Transfer of state-owned property to the ownership
of municipalities is an unsolicited transaction on the part of
the state; likewise the municipality is sovereign in its rights
to decide on the necessity to accept the state-owned property
being offered. Hence, if one of the parties is not willing to
transfer or accept the property (when an official decision is
made), the process centers on negotiations to agree on terms
and conditions of the transfer. In some cases, as a result of
such negotiations, the state transfers resources for the mainte-
nance and management of a transferred property, or to cover
debt attached to the property.
After a formal decision has been made by both parties,
the interested party may claim compulsory enforcement of
the decision made in court; however, no such cases have oc-
cured. During negotiations where the interested officials take
part, conditions of property takeover are discussed. There
have been cases when after election, new mem-bers of a council
cancel the decision made prior to their mandate.
2.6 Management
of Municipal Property
2.6.1 Property Management
The Law on Local Government stipulates that a municipal-
ity may own land, waters, woods, movable assets, real estate,
financial and other resources.
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Municipalities enjoy the following wide scope of rights
pertaining to the management of their property:
1) to establish municipal enterprises;
2) to participate in companies of mixed equity;
3) to relinquish or sell movable and immovable assets
through their sale or investment;
4) to sell municipal enterprises and parts of thereof;
5) to sell equity shares owned by themselves both in com-
panies with mixed equity and fully owned by the mu-
nicipality;
6) to pledge property which is not needed for performing
regular functions;
7) to transfer property to the state without compensation;
8) to conclude deals and perform other activities pertain-
ing to private law.49
However, the right enjoyed by a municipality to man-
age its property independently does not mean that the mu-
nicipality may deal with it without any restrictions whatso-
ever. The law stipulates definite restrictions both regarding
the purpose of their activities and the procedure, thus limit-
ing the freedom of action of the municipality.
When making decisions on activity concerning its prop-
erty, the municipality must ensure the implementation of
its functions. These functions, listed in Article 15 of the Law
on Local Government are focused on providing services to
inhabitants, and for the most part these services are impor-
tant and specific, requiring know-how, experience and con-
siderable investments (for instance, education, sanitary main-
tenance of the territory, health care or social assistance).
Bringing profit by providing such services could affect the
interests of inhabitants in a negative way, since these servic-
es must be provided to the needy. Therefore, the provision
contained in Article 77 of the Law on Local Government
seems logical—the municipal enterprises providing services
to the inhabitants should not gain profit from their core
operations; however, should profit be generated, it is allo-
cated for the development of the enterprise.50
The implementation of municipal functions as a pre-
condition must be taken into account when municipal prop-
erty is relinquished or sold, including during privatization.
The municipality may not, for instance, privatize the only
waste-collecting enterprise without stipulating the conditions
for retaining the previous line of business operations, thus
creating the hazard of leaving the inhabitants without any
provider of such services at all.
The law also stipulates that a municipality has the right
not to designate apartment houses, hostels, social residential
houses and apartments for privatization as they are neces-
sary for the implementation of municipal functions.
The other restriction is the provision that the munici-
pality shall deal with its assets rationally and efficiently, in a
useful manner. This was stipulated both in the Law on Lo-
cal Government51  and the Law on the Prevention of the
Squandering of State and Municipal Assets and Financial
Resources.52  Moreover, the latter stipulates that the activi-
ties of municipalities and municipal enterprises shall be as
follows: the selected goal must be achieved with the least
necessary financial resources and assets; municipal assets shall
be sold or transferred for a maximum price. Hence, when
making a decision on the sale or relinquishing of property,
the municipality must consider both the opportunities of
further utilization of the property for the benefit of the in-
habitants, as well as options of how the sale price of such
encumbered property could be maximized.
Municipal institutions and enterprises where state-
owned or municipal shares jointly or separately exceed 50%
may not issue loans or give undertakings and guarantees,
except for cases when the respective municipality agreed to
the issue of such loans, undertakings and guarantees.
As regards the procedure, municipalities encounter re-
strictions with respect to decision-making—Article 49 of the
Law on Local Government provides for the right of a spe-
cially-assigned reform minister, authorized by the Council
of Ministers, to suspend the effect of individual decisions.
Decisions on the privatization of business property and sim-
ilar cases must be approved by the ministry of economy (the
ministry assesses the lawfulness of the privatization plan).
Sometimes municipalities are limited in the type of sale
they select. Article 78 of the Law on Local Government stip-
ulates as follows: “A municipality which has acquired real
estate on the basis of the right of first refusal, over the next
five years may sell it at public auction only.”
Latvian law does not provide for any special limitations
for the sale of particular groups of property (e.g., schools,
hospitals, etc.). At the same time, there have been no cases
when municipalities would commence the sale of such prop-
erty without reason. The fact that local governments are elect-
ed bodies and their decisions are public often prevents them
from making apparently unreasonable decisions. For in-
stance, the local government of Edole, a small town, intend-
ed to lease a complex of historical buildings (an ancient cas-
tle) to a wealthy Latvian businessman for 99 years. As a result
of protests from inhabitants the decision was rescinded, and
the municipality committed to restore the buildings and turn
the complex into a museum.
2.6.2 Institutions Controlling Municipalities
2.6.2.1 Control Restricted to Legality
An illegal decision by a council is suspended by order of the
minister of municipal affairs. The order must be published
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in the official journal within three days and sent to the chair-
person of the council responsible for its implementation.
The chairperson of the council must convene a meeting
of the council within two weeks from the date he/she re-
ceives the order from the responsible minister. A decision
must be adopted declaring the illegal decision null and void,
or harmonizing it with existing laws and regulations.
The chairperson has the right, without convening a spe-
cific sitting, to submit an application to the court with a claim
to declare the order of the responsible minister null and void.
2.6.2.2 Local and Regional Accounts Auditing
An audit commission is elected by the council from among
the voters of the respective administrative-territorial unit,
proportional to the number of deputies from each political
organization or voters’ associations elected in the council.
The audit commission has the following functions:
• Control expenditure of municipal resources according
to accepted budget provisions and estimates.
• Check legality or financial activity and rationality of the
managers and officials of municipal enterprises and in-
stitutions.
• Control whether the municipal financial resources,
movable property and real estate is managed in accor-
dance with the councils’ decisions and interests of in-
habitants.
• Participate in the audit of municipal property and fi-
nancial resources organized by the state audit office.
2.6.2.3 Other Forms of Control
In accordance with the Law on Local Government, the state
audit office controls the economic activities of local author-
ities. The office audits the management of assets and finan-
cial resources by municipalities, the privatization of munic-
ipal property, as well as auditing annual municipal annual.
In auditing the annual reports of 575 municipalities for 2000,
the municipal audit department identified that 58.09% or
334 annual reports contained material faults in accounting
and bookkeeping. Overall, 578 municipalities should have
submitted their financial annual reports, enclosing a report
by a sworn auditor, to the state audit office. However, two of
them did not submit a report, and one annual report was with-
out an auditor’s report; thus it was not deemed acceptable.
The reports 36.17% or 208 municipalities were ap-
proved; 28 were not. Five municipalities were refused an
opinion, as the report of the sworn auditor did not provide
adequate basis for the state audit office to make an assess-
ment.
Local budgets constitute a part of the state budget and
are accordingly included in national financial and economic
planning.
In accordance with the Law on Local Financial Stabili-
zation and Supervision of Local Financial Activities, finan-
cial restrictions are imposed on local government in the fol-
lowing cases:
• when the volume of local financial liabilities which have
reached the term of payment exceeds 20% of the re-
spective annual budget;
• if the local government is unable or, according to proven
circumstances, will be unable to settle its commitments;
• if local property is endangered due to debt recovery.
In these cases, the local chairperson, the responsible
minister, the finance minister or the state controller can call
for financial stabilization. The local government discusses
the issue, and, if it is adopted, a financial stabilization an-
nouncement is prepared. If the local government is against
it, a substantiated letter is sent to the responsible minister
and the minister of finance. The minister of finance makes
the final decision on financial stabilization.
If a decision for financial stabilization is affirmed, the
ministry of finance appoints a special supervisor for the local
authority in question. The supervisor must develop a finan-
cial stabilization plan. The supervisor is remunerated from
the state budget.
2.7 Municipal Property
as a Source of Local Revenue
Local government revenue includes tax and non-tax reve-
nue, government subsidies and special purpose subsidies, as
well as local government special budget revenue. Each year,
prior to drawing up the local government budgets, the Coun-
cil of Ministers has negotiations with the union of munici-
palities. As a conclusion to negotiations, a letter of under-
standing is signed defining the amount the government will
contribute to local government budgets.
The largest source of local government budget revenue
is personal income tax, accounting for an average of 43% of
the local government total budget revenue. 71.6% of the
collected personal income tax is transferred to the local gov-
ernment budget; the remaining 28.4% is transferred to the
health care budget. Overall, tax revenues account for 54%
of total revenue in the local government budgets.
Local government non-tax revenues contain revenues
from business activities and property, charges and dues, rev-
enue from the sale of municipal real estate and land, as well
as penalties and sanctions. Local governments’ own revenue
contains revenue from paid services.
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Transfers from other budgets, accounting for approxi-
mately a quarter (25%) of the local government total reve-
nue, comprise payments from the state budget both by way
of subsidies and special purpose subsidies. Special purpose
subsidies are allocated money transfers to a local govern-
ment budget for a specified activity. The item “transfers from
other budgets” contains payments from the Local Govern-
ment Financial Equalization Fund.53
Key local government special budgets include the Mu-
nicipal Road Fund, the environmental protection budget
and the Municipal Property Privatization Fund. Pursuant to
the Council of Ministers’ regulations on the state and munic-
ipal road funds, established on June 20, 2000, the Municipal
Road Fund comprises 30% of the fees collected on vehicles
and 30% of a share of excise taxes transferred annually to
the State Road Fund (after the expenditure of financing the
development of rural roads, of the special purpose subsidy
for ensuring the regular passenger bus service, deductions
from the excise tax to the Railway Infrastructure Fund for
the fuel used in railway shipments, as well as the payments
stipulated by regulatory documents have been deducted).
The local government special budgets of environmental pro-
tection receive 60% of the revenue from natural resource
taxes for the extraction of natural resources or pollution of
the environment within the stipulated limited amounts.
In 2002, the revenue of the local government special
budget was estimated at 35.58 million lats, including reve-
nue from natural resources taxes (2.01 million lats), revenue
from the privatization fund (0.89 million lats), revenue from
the road fund (15.3 million lats), revenue from regular pas-
senger bus service (3.38 million lats), revenue from dona-
tions and gifts (4 million lats) and other revenue (10 million
lats).
Revenue from commercial use of municipal property is
included under local government non-tax revenue. Its per-
centage has gradually decreased from 5% to 2–3% of total
local government revenue. Local government revenue from
privatization and the sale of real estate and land accounts for
only a small portion of the local government total revenue,
2% on average.
Public–Private Partnership (PPP) Activities
Although a legislative framework for PPP activities is in place
in Latvia (established in 2000 with the Law on Concessions),
both governmental and municipal authorities lack experi-
ence in implementing such a mechanism. Some municipal-
ities have tried to launch pilot projects for implementing
PPP (for instance, the transfer of a hospital or the main street
of a town to private managers); but not one has been imple-
mented as yet. In order to facilitate PPP activities, the Council
of Ministers approved a concept paper on concession facili-
tation in April 2002, establishing a special concession unit
in the national development agency.
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Table 3.3
Local Government Budget
[in Millions of Lats]
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
(Estimate)
REVENUE 395.6 413.5 441.1 449.6 470.5
1. Local government basic budget revenue 350.1 366.6 386.4 411.8 434.9
1.1. Tax revenue 206.8 219.8 231.0 249.2 264.5
incl. Personal income tax 157.8 171.4 185.9 203.3 221.4
Property tax 48.3 47.3 44.0 44.9 41.4
Internal tax for services and goods 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.7
1.2. Non-tax revenue 19.8 19.4 17.9 17.5 17.3
1.3. Own revenue 24.5 26.4 25.8 25.3 25.4
1.4. Transfers from other budgets 99.1 101.0 111.6 119.8 127.7
2. Local government special budget revenue 45.5 46.9 54.7 37.8 35.6
EXPENDITURE 394.2 424.3 456.6 460.1 482.0
1. Local government basic budget expenditure 354.0 377.2 407.7 415.4 438.9
2. Local government special budget expenditure 40.2 47.1 48.9 43.6 43.1
Financial balance 1.4 –10.8 –15.5 –10.4 –11.5
NET LOANS 9.1 3.6 -2.5 0.0 0.0
Fiscal balance –7.8 –14.4 -13.0 –10.4 –11.5
FINANCING: LOANS FROM STATE BUDGET 7.8 14.4 13.0 10.4 11.5
Table 3.4
Local Government Budget
[in % of GDP]
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
(Estimate)
REVENUE 11.0 10.6 10.2 9.5 9.1
1. Local government basic budget revenue 9.8 9.4 8.9 8.7 8.4
1.1. Tax revenue 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.2 5.1
incl. Personal income tax 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3
Property tax 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8
Internal tax for services and goods 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.2. Non-tax revenue 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3
1.3. Own revenue 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
1.4. Transfers from other budgets 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5
2. Local government special budget revenue 1.3 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.7
EXPENDITURE 11.0 10.9 10.5 9.7 9.3
1. Local government basic budget expenditure 9.9 9.7 9.4 8.8 8.5
2. Local government special budget expenditure 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8
Financial balance 0.0 –0.3 –0.4 –0.2 –0.2
Net loans 0.3 0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0
FISCAL BALANCE –0.2 –0.4 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2
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NOTES
1 Data provided by the Central Statistical Bureau at the
beginning of 2002.
2 Statistics prepared by the Authority of Municipal Affairs
at the beginning of 2001.
3 Statistics prepared by the Authority of Municipal Affairs
at the beginning of 1999.
4 1 Latvian lat (LVL) = 0.595 EUR = 0,604 USD in
October 1, 2002
5 Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Law on State and Municipal
Ownership Rights to the Land and Their Registration
in Land Registries.
6 The date when the Republic of Latvia was declared a
part of the Soviet Union.
7 According to the Law on Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
8 Section 2 of the Law on Land Privatization in Rural
Areas.
9 Article 19 of the Law on Land Privatization in Rural
Areas.
10 Section 6 of the Law on Land Privatization in Rural
Areas.
11 Section 6 of the Law on Land Reform in Cities and
Towns.
12 Article 2 of the Law on Land Privatization in Rural Areas.
13 Articles 1128 and 1129 of the Civil Code.
14 Article 1102 of the Civil Code.
15 Article 1103 of the Civil Code.
16 Article 24 of the Law on Regulation of the First Stage of
Land Reform in Rural Areas.
17 Article 2 of Law on the Land Privatization in Rural Areas
18 Article 1110 of the Civil Code.
19 Item 17 of the Council of Ministers’ Regulations on
the Lease and Use of Water Bodies and Industrial Fishing
Rights.
20 Ibid., Item 86.
21 The Council of Ministers’ regulations on permission
for water use.
22 Article 3 of the Law on Mineral Wealth.
23 Ibid, Article 8.
24 Article 4 of the Law on the Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
25 This ‘bottom-to-top’ approach is opposite to the
approach currently used in the privatization of state
property, meaning that state institutions play an active
role in the initiation of privatization.
26 Article 31 of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
27 Article 35 of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
28 Article 6 of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
29 Article 41 of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
30 Article 42 of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
31 Article 47 of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
32 Article 4 of the Law on Privatization Commissions on
State-Owned and Municipal Property.
33 Article 4 of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned
and Municipal Property.
34 Report on the Economic Development of Latvia, the
Ministry of Economy, Riga, 2002.
35 Article 2 of the Law on Land Use.
36 Article 2 of the Law on Land Commissions.
37 Article 22 of the Law on Land Reform in Rural Areas.
38 Article 40 of the Law on the Use of Land.
39 Item 47 of the Decision of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet on the Regulation of the First Stage of Land
Reform in Rural Areas.
40 Item 24 of the Decision of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet on the Regulation of the First Stage of Land
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anticipated that it will be resolved by drafting
amendments to the Law on Alienation of State-Owned
and Municipal Property (the procedure for the transfer
of real estate) and a new Law on State-Owned and
Municipal Companies (the procedure for the transfer
of equity shares).
49 Article 14 of the Law on Local Government.
50 The above provision has been retained since the mid-
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municipality.
51 Article 14 of the Law on Local Government.
54 Article 3 of the Law on Prevention of the Squandering
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53 The Local Government Financial Equalization Fund was
established to account for the fact that local government
revenues differ depending on their location, the number
of inhabitants and the business environment. The
Council of Ministers approves the budget and
distribution procedure for the fund, and a subsidy from
the central budget is transferred to the equalization fund
(usually constituting 20% of the fund’s budget).
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1. INTRODUCTION
To present the scope and organization of property devolu-
tion, an understanding is necessary of the ownership model
under the communist regime.
Communist policy was oriented toward the maximiza-
tion of state ownership. To achieve this, the following classi-
fications were introduced:
1) Socialized property, including:
• state-owned property;
• cooperative property;
• property owned by other social organizations;
2) Individual property, including private means of produc-
tion, agricultural land, housing, etc;
3) Private property, including all movable items and flats.
State property was administered by:
• ministries and central administrative agencies;
• local or regional state administration;
• state enterprises.
State enterprises were under the control of ‘founding
organs’—ministries as well as regional or local administra-
tions representing the state. Theoretically, important enter-
prises were under direct control of the central government
and smaller enterprises were under local control. In reality,
this principle was not always followed.
Each municipality contained fixed assets belonging to
all classifications—state-owned property administered by:
• local administrations;
• regional administrations;
• the central administration;
• state-owned enterprises controlled by local, regional or
central bodies;
• housing, agricultural and other cooperative property;
• private property.
The property structure in individual municipalities dif-
fered widely, as a result border changes, forced migrations,
war casualties and local political pressure following WWII.
All this had to be taken into account in the planning of
property devolution after 1990.
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF MUNICIPALITIES
2.1 The Character of
Local Government Reform
As a basis for the reestablishment of local government, prop-
erty devolution supports all other reforms. The first step in
the reform process was the establishment of municipalities
in 1990. In order to understand the revolutionary nature of
these changes, one must keep in mind the system of com-
munist monopolization. There were five types of monopo-
lies:
1) Political monopoly—political power was concentrated in
the communist party,  the only party recognized by the
Constitution. After the 1990 elections, local councils
were composed of members representing various par-
ties and political programs, not subordinated to any
single political command center.
2) Uniformity of state power—divisions or branches of pow-
er did not exist, leaving no room for any kind of local
autonomy. Reforms weakened the hierarchical structure
between local and central authorities. Municipal coun-
cils gained importance in public life, with exclusive re-
sponsibilities protected by the Constitution.
3) Property and ownership rights—municipalities became
legal entities allowed to own property according to the
Civil Code. The state was no longer the sole property
owner.
4) Financial monopoly—local budgets had been controlled
by the central government. Reforms gave local govern-
ments control over resources of their own. They were
allowed to take credit, issue bonds and manage an inde-
pendent financial policy.
5) Administration—unified state administration was a pillar
of the command structure.  On May 27, 1990 nearly a
hundred thousand local administrators were moved out
from central authorities. Municipal councils received
their own executive structures. Reform allowed the im-
plementation of policies independent from the central
administration.
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2.1.1 Important Events
• 1981
In June, at an opposition forum, the first document on
restoration of local government in Poland was present-
ed (by the present author and his team). In September,
the 1st National Convention of the Solidarity Trade
Union passed a resolution containing demands for dem-
ocratic local government.
In December, declaration of martial law to protect
the existing political system stopped all discussion on
reforms.
• 1982–1988
Semi-legal research was conducted on the reestablish-
ment of local government.
• 1989
Round table talks between the democratic opposition
and communist authorities began in February. A work-
ing group on local government signed a protocol out-
lining the divergent positions of the two parties.
On June 4, the democratic opposition won a victory
in the parliamentary election.
In September, the first non-communist prime min-
ister appointed a minister of local government reform.
• 1990
On March 8, Parliament approved changes to the Con-
stitution and passed the Local Government Act. On May
27, the first free municipal elections were held.
• 1998
In June, Parliament passed a law on a three-tier system
of local and regional authorities, establishing two upper
tiers: powiat (district) and województwo (voivodship or
region).
• 1999
The new system became operational on January 1.
2.2 The Scope
of Real Estate Devolution
2.2.1 Basic Principles
From the beginning of the process, opposition groups un-
derstood the ownership of property and the right to dispose
of it freely as one of the main conditions for independent
local governments.  The state authorities were ready to in-
troduce municipal property as a new legal category, but op-
posed systematic reforms. They expressed a readiness to cre-
ate an instrument of reform, but not to develop an entity
that instrument could serve.
The Local Government Act of 1990 gave ownership
rights to municipalities, their associations and other munic-
ipal entities, including enterprises. According to the act,
municipal property could be acquired by transfer of nation-
al property or through a municipality’s own economic or
legal activity. Municipalities were granted full autonomy to
dispose of their property, without any specific limitations.
Of course, they were subordinated, like all other owners, to
restrictions imposed by laws on environmental protection,
protection of monuments and agricultural land, etc.
The act did not introduce any limitations on the charac-
ter of municipal property. Municipalities could acquire any
kind of property acknowledged to be useful to their activities.
In practice, the devolution process depended on the
context in which the reform was prepared. Two factors had
to be taken into account. First, a large number of properties
and companies were to be transferred to local governments.
The exact number of lots transferred is still not known; esti-
mates are in the millions.
The former administration attempted to resist these
changes. Reformers, then, strove to resolve as many issues as
possible through exercise of the law, not according to indi-
vidual decisions. This led to a risk of numerous individual
mistakes. Sticking to generally accepted rules created some
very complicated situations. In order to resolve these issues,
extensive studies were needed, but there was no time for
such activity.
The reformers adopted a few simple rules. First, the
entire devolution was based on a legislative decision, so
municipalities obtained property by law, possibly as a one-
time operation. The starting point was a pragmatic assump-
tion that all property managed by the existing local people’s
councils was to become the property of municipalities.
It was not, however, possible to transfer all council prop-
erty mechanically. In many cases, local administrations man-
aged buildings housing state offices, church property or struc-
tures used by foreign embassies. The central administration
needed to retain properties associated with the functions that
remained within its scope of authority.
2.2.2 Exclusions to Devolution
The law provided numerous exceptions to devolution. Ele-
ments of national property did not become municipal prop-
erty if:
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• They were involved in the delivery of public services
assigned to the central administration or the courts.
• They belonged to state enterprises or units exercising
functions above the local level.
• They belonged to the National Land Fund, an entity
that administers arable land owned by the state.
• They were used by diplomatic missions of foreign coun-
tries or international institutions.
• They were used by churches or religious organizations.
Many facilities that served individual municipalities were
managed by regional administrations. A mechanism was
therefore necessary to extend the scope of property subject
to devolution. For that reason, the law contained a provi-
sion that municipalities were to receive those elements of
national property or enterprises which were managed by
voivodship (regional) councils, voivodship offices, if that
property was necessary to the exercise of municipal duties.
The law also provided for the possibility of extending the
scope of devolved property, stipulating that a municipality,
upon request, could receive national property other than that
mentioned in the law, if that property was necessary for the
functions associated with the municipality.
2.2.3 Properties and Rights
of Rural Communities
Whithin rural and urban municipalities, self-governments
were established in villages (solectwa) as well as in urban dis-
tricts (in major cities), as auxiliary units to municipalities.
These governments also received certain rights to some
elements of national property. As early as the Middle Ages,
royal charters had granted various privileges to certain
localities. The best-known privilege is the right of one
village, now a borough of Krakow, to graze cows in green
spaces located in the center of the city. This privilege is still
respected.
The provisions of the laws of 1990 were clear. Munici-
palities were recognized as the primary units of local govern-
ment and were granted exclusive ownership rights. As a
result, solectwa and rural communities also claimed rights. It
was therefore decided that auxiliary units could use and
manage municipal properties according to the terms and
conditions defined in municipal council by-laws, but the
councils could not reduce the existing rights of those units.
That meant that although municipalities had taken over
national property, they were obliged to hand over some prop-
erty to the solectwa. The growing independence of solectwa
progressed, leading to further extensions of their rights to
municipal property.
2.2.4 Housing
In 1990, four categories of housing estates existed in Po-
land:
• communal;
• co-operative;
• those belonging to state enterprises;
• private.
Only communal housing estates that previously be-
longed to the state were devolved to municipalities. The
quality of those estates differed widely, from housing built
in recent decades to old buildings from the pre-war period
which had been nationalized. Housing was often in a poor
condition and in need of repairs.
The housing sector was an important area that required
appropriate legislative standards. In the past, housing had
not been regarded as a commodity but as something the state
was obliged to provide. Regulations remained from the time
of ‘class struggle’ which limited rights to larger flats, as well
as limiting citizens’ right to generate income from such prop-
erty. New solutions were necessary, but every proposal led
to conflicts of interest. All parties that benefited from the
existing situation were interested in maintaining it. In 1990,
municipalities received housing resources from the state. The
administration of those resources became a serious problem,
which must be discussed separately.
2.3 Organization and Management
of Property Devolution
2.3.1 Office of the Minister
of Local Government Reform
All preparation and implementation of local government
reform and its implementation was under the responsibility
of the minister of local government reform, a position known
as pelnomocnik rzadu in Poland—a ‘government plenipo-
tentiary.’ The office carries the rank of an undersecretary of
state, authorized by the council of ministers to perform spe-
cific tasks which encroach on the responsibilities of several
ministers. The government plenipotentiary reports directly
to the prime minister and can act on his behalf.
This office was included within the structure of the
Office of the Council of Ministers and employed a dozen peo-
ple, all highly qualified experts. As new acts passed and im-
plementation of the new system progressed, the department
took control of the offices of regional people’s councils in all
49 regions, employing 3 to 5 people in each. The minister
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appointed regional delegates, mainly former opposition
members who supported reform. They served as the deputy
heads of regional administration and were given a large au-
tonomy. They were completed all preparation work for re-
form within their assigned region and supervised implemen-
tation. After elections, they assisted the newly established
local authorities. They disseminated regulations, directives,
organized training and gave advice. They also represented
local interests to the state administration, extremely impor-
tant in the process of property devolution. Without this ac-
tivity, the new and inexperienced governments would not
have been able to influence the strong state administration.
2.3.2 Procedures
Property devolution was to affect a huge amount of national
property scattered all over the country, fragmented into mil-
lions of elements. It was therefore necessary to establish a
decentralized system, capable of conducting countless oper-
ations in a relatively short time.  The system was expected to
be flexible in resolving unpredicted difficulties in specific
cases while simultaneously ensuring that uniform decisions
were made on the national scale. Municipalities were obliged
to inventory the property they managed and present pro-
posals for ownership to regional state officers. These materi-
als were to be publicly available so that all citizens and insti-
tutions could present claims and reservations. The devolution
of property, being a change of ownership, could not inter-
fere in the rights of tenants or other users of property. Public
access to all documents was particularly important, as many
people had been expropriated of their property in the past
and now had a chance for restitution.
The voivod (regional officer), representing the state,
issued decisions on the transfer of properties to the munici-
pality, confirming the municipal acquisition of property ac-
cording to the law. This was a basis for entry into the land
registry and transfer of the property by the local govern-
ment. If, however, the voivod had objections, he/she could
refuse to make such a decision and the property remained in
the hands of the state. In such a situation, a municipality
could submit an appeal to the National Enfranchisement
Commission, an authority appointed by the prime minister.
Both parties were entitled to submit an appeal against the
commission’s decision to the Supreme Court.
As legal entities, municipalities received the right to
present claims against the central administration to the gen-
eral courts, as described in the Civil Code.
A similar procedure was applied to property transferred
to municipalities upon their request. A municipality was also
an applicant, and the voivod represented the state. In that
case, the transfer of property was based on agreement, not
law. The voivod, therefore, did not have to transfer the prop-
erty, but could do so if it was justified.
2.3.3 The National Enfranchisement
Commission
Hundreds of thousands, even millions of decisions were is-
sued by virtue of law to devolve properties to local govern-
ments. Several thousand appeals were filed with the Nation-
al Enfranchisement Commission.
The establishment of the commission was a specific so-
lution, which made the process of property devolution cred-
ible and fully democratic. Local authorities were treated as
equals to the central administration. The powers of the com-
mission were defined by law. Teams of three made decisions,
but the whole commission examined particularly important
matters. The composition of the commission changed sev-
eral times. There were more staff members when the num-
ber of applications ranged from 1.4 thousand in 1991 to
nearly 2 thousand in 1992. In following years, when the
number of applications decreased, the commission’s staff was
reduced. The commission completed its work in seven years.
The reasons for appeal varied. Municipalities appealed
when they disagreed with the voivod on a given property.
Other institutions and private individuals filed protests. The
National Enfranchisement Commission allowed a broad
definition of the terms of appeal and stated that not only a
municipality or voivod were included in the procedure, but
also anyone whose interest could be violated by the process
of devolution. The idea was that this process was to clean up
and clarify the system of ownership in Poland. Hence, ap-
peals made by individuals were also reviewed. In many cases
their concerns were unjustified, because transfer of property
did not infringe upon users’ rights.
The rulings in this respect are clear: land was subject to
devolution if it was owned by the national treasury on May
27, 1990. However, buildings erected by users remained their
property, and they obtained the right to long-term lease.
2.3.4 Issues and Legal Decisions
Although legal provisions were clearly defined, many con-
flicts occurred; some only to be resolved by resolution of the
constitutional tribunal. Some of most important issues were
as follows:
1) Indivisible property: In many cases properties were used
jointly or were subdivided by local and other institu-
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tions. Usually it was impossible to divide buildings or
lots.  The tribunal decided that in such situations real
estate was by virtue of law co-owned in proportion to
functions exercised. It was then up to the co-owners to
decide upon future use or separation.
2) Location of a property : In many cases municipalities or
their enterprises administered national property situat-
ed outside their boundaries. Water intakes, sewage treat-
ment stations, refuse dumps or recreational facilities were
in such a situation. Thus a question emerged if the prop-
erty should be transferred to the municipality in whose
territory the property is located, or to the one whose
authorities actually manage it. The constitutional tri-
bunal’s unequivocal ruling was that the location, not
the administration, determined the right of ownership
of a municipal property.
3) State agricultural land: If separate plots constituted eco-
nomically justified wholes, they were transferred to state
farms. The National Land Fund kept, however, scat-
tered fragments of land that could not be leased or at-
tached to existing farms. The question was whether that
land should be transferred to municipalities, which
would certainly put it to the best use, or left in the hands
of the central administration. A compromise was made,
where municipalities obtained the right to apply for
ownership of specific plots of land.
4) Natural resources : The recognition of the municipal right
to own land enforced the definition of their entitlement
to natural resources under the surface. This issue was
resolved later in a law adopted in 1994. It was necessary
to reconcile national interests with the interests of local
communities directly exposed to the effects of geologi-
cal and mining activity. The state maintained owner-
ship of minerals—the right to use them and supervise
excavations. But the opinion of local government must
be taken into account in the process of issuing licenses
for the search and identification of deposits and for the
excavation of minerals. Sixty percent of the income from
charges for excavation and mining belong to local bud-
gets and forty percent go to the National Environmen-
tal Protection and Water Management Fund.
5) Unused property of state enterprises : A municipality should
always reserve some land for future development. How-
ever, substantial land resources were under administra-
tion of state-owned enterprises, which usually demand-
ed more land than they needed. After all, land did not
cost anything. Reformers intended that the so-called
reserve resources be transferred to municipalities and
not be frozen in the hands of enterprises. For that rea-
son the law contained a provision according to which
land owned by state-owned enterprises but not used
according to its purpose should be transferred to mu-
nicipalities upon their request.
The industrial lobby managed to change the laws
and on December 9, 1990 state enterprises became
owners of the land they managed. This was considered
entirely inappropriate by reformers. In many cases nearly
bankrupt state-owned enterprises covered their deficits
by selling land instead of restructuring.
This raised the question of partial property trans-
fers from state-owned enterprises to a municipality.
Some enterprises wanted to alienate various unneces-
sary property elements that were of municipal interest.
The view that prevailed, finally, was that as the state
treasury no longer owns the property of a state enter-
prise, the Law on Property Devolution was inapplica-
ble.
6) Unwanted property : Besides conflicts around the take-
over of wealth, there were many instances of unwanted
property. Local governments often argued that they did
not agree to take over a property with debts attached, as
the debts had arisen when the property was owned by
another party. The National Enfranchisement Commis-
sion did not accept these arguments, claiming that the
law not only gave the right to take over properties, but
also defined an obligation to hand over property to
municipalities which was necessary for their function-
ing. Local governments were obliged to take over the
entire property, both assets and liabilities. The transfer
of a property and other proprietary rights is obligatory.
In practice, it means a municipality may not ‘choose’ a
certain part of the property, as that would contradict
the legal duty of exercising its functions.
7) Claims for properties administered by regional adminis-
tration: Besides wealth transferred by law, municipali-
ties could obtain, by request, an element of property
administered by a regional administration, if it is neces-
sary for the exercise of their functions. Many such ap-
plications were submitted to the state administration in
that respect. The primary aspects taken into consider-
ation were the relations between the claimed property
and the municipal functions and regulations set-aside
in the land use plan. Decisions on municipal claims were
always very difficult and required a number of studies
and expert analyses.
The most spectacular conflict, lasting many years, grew
around the right to land used as allotments (so called ‘work-
ers gardens’). Allotments are very popular in Poland. A law
forming the Polish Association of Allotment Users, adopted
in 1981, provided that national land could be used free of
charge for that purpose. Then, according to laws passed in
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1990, that land, being national property, should have been
transferred to municipalities. The association and its regional
boards made claims for the land. However, the National
Enfranchisement Commission and the Supreme Court stat-
ed consistently that land used for allotments had become
municipal property by virtue of law. The political allies of
the association managed to pressure Parliament into a pass-
ing a new law on allotment privileges. When the constitu-
tional tribunal declared the law unconstitutional, Parliament
overruled this verdict. Owing to that law, the Polish Associ-
ation of Allotment Users became the biggest urban land-
owner in Poland. The association received the right to long
term use of 420 km2 of land free of charge. In central War-
saw alone, according to market prices, the allotments were
worth 2 billion dollars.
2.3.5 Municipal Companies
The decision that municipalities take over the property of
the former people’s councils enforced a transfer of all state
enterprises that had been under control of former local ad-
ministration. Many questioned whether the transfer of all
enterprises to municipalities was appropriate. The question
was important, as in the late 1980s the communist authori-
ties began to implement a policy of deconcentration of man-
agement. Without changing the principles of the system,
management of more and more state-owned enterprises was
transferred to regional or local authorities. The process ad-
vanced to varying degrees in individual parts of the country.
There were three categories of the state enterprises un-
der local control:
• enterprises that deliver of public services;
• enterprises that maintain municipal estates;
• profit-oriented units.
All enterprises delivering public services went to mu-
nicipalities. There were no difficulties in transferring an en-
terprise administered by a municipality and serving only its
inhabitants. They were transferred by law with all their as-
sets. In several cases an enterprise under the control of a
municipality served neighboring units as well. In such situ-
ations, the enterprise went to the municipality in which it
was located and future cooperation was to the free agree-
ment between interested municipalities.
There was not enough time for adequate in-depth stud-
ies of state enterprises serving individual municipalities but
administered by central or regional administrations. Such
cases were expected to be analyzed individually. In effect,
the resistance of state administration was so strong that not
one enterprise was transferred in subsequent years and a sub-
stantial number of locally important enterprises were exclud-
ed from devolution to municipalities. The process of prop-
erty devolution was assumed to enjoy general support. That
support, however, did not materialize.
2.3.6 Associations Serving
Groups of Municipalities
Due to the specific type of functions assigned to public util-
ities, some organizational units provide services to an area
which considerably exceeds the territory of one municipali-
ty. Hence, there were many enterprises running local servic-
es but subordinate to regional authorities. According to laws
adopted in 1990, their property was to be transferred to
municipalities. Two procedures were possible in that case:
enterprises could be divided and their individual parts trans-
ferred to appropriate municipalities, or if the property was
indivisible it could be handed over to associations formed
by interested municipalities. Until that time, the enterprises
and their wealth were to remain under the management of
the regional administration.
The law stated that municipalities might establish task-
oriented associations to deliver specific public services as-
signed to individual municipalities. An association may
possess property as a legal entity. The ministry of the in-
terior keeps a registry of associations, which allows the
monitoring of their formation. The registry does not include
agreements between municipalities if a separate legal entity
is established.
 The establishment of an association is a voluntary
decision; it is not a simple process. All interested local gov-
ernments have to make identical decisions, so initial negoti-
ations are always long and difficult. However, Parliament
may oblige municipalities to form a task-oriented associa-
tion in order to exercise specific functions. But such deci-
sions are very restricted in number. The first task-oriented
association of municipalities was registered on October 6,
1990. The next were formed soon afterwards. The largest
number of associations was registered in 1991, decreasing
afterward. Functions requiring joint efforts had clearly been
exhausted. The associations are very different in terms num-
ber of member municipalities. 40% are rather small, with
up to 5 members, and 22% are large associations with more
than 10 members.
However, in many cases municipalities were very cau-
tious in creating associations to take over service delivery
enterprises of regional character. It was risky and expensive.
As a result such associations were never established in some
urban agglomerations where individual enterprises delivered
services for several cities. Enterprises were under state
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administration for several years, until the reforms of 1998
established district and regional self-governments.
2.3.7 Municipal Roles and Policies
in Service Delivery and Economic Activity
The transformations in the public service sector were the
subject of stormy debates. Disputes focused on the basic is-
sue of what a municipality is supposed to be in the econom-
ic sense, and consequently, what methods it should use to
exercise its legal functions. The ‘liberals’ claimed local gov-
ernment should only represent residents’ interests and con-
fine their activity to strictly administrative functions; conse-
quently they held that municipal property should be radically
privatized. They were afraid municipalities could create lo-
cal monopolies and restrict the development of the private
economy. Local government ‘advocates’ were of a different
opinion. They believed a municipality had obligations with
respect to its residents which it may fulfill only if it has its
own property and conducts economic activity, not only
municipal, but also commercial. Therefore they opposed
privatization of municipal property and strove to establish
direct management of public utilities.
As was mentioned before, local administration controlled
many enterprises not linked to public service delivery. It was
impossible to establish, in a short time, clear criteria for their
devolution to municipalities. Thus, we chose the simplest
solution. The Council of Ministers was authorized to issue a
relevant executive order excluding certain enterprises from
devolution. 69 enterprises, including 42 in agriculture, were
to remain state-owned; some thousand of state enterprises were
transferred. Many of them were clearly linked to municipal
economies, such as enterprises for housing maintenance,
green spaces, etc. Many others were purely profit-oriented.
Municipalities took over not only properties of public
utility, associated with their own functions, but also proper-
ty owned by commercial enterprises and buildings used for
housing purposes. Consequently municipalities were engaged
in economic activity beyond the sphere of public utility. The
law of 1990 gave them this right, if it was justified with
social needs. Municipalities could form organizational units,
including enterprises, and conclude agreements with other
entities. The purpose of this legislative flexibility at the be-
ginning of systemic transformations was to enable munici-
palities to play the role of a specific catalyst for economic
change. Municipalities were particularly predestined to per-
form that task, as they represented forces contrary to the
earlier totalitarianism.
The activities of local governments were quickly revealed
in the effects of the market economy. The so-called ‘small-
scale’ privatization of trade and services became almost sym-
bolic as it introduced a new reality into the recent past. That
caused a principal debate on the right of local government
to perform economic activity. Several stormy discussions were
held in Parliament, outlining two clear options.
According to an idea effective in many countries, local
governments may not be involved in economic activity out-
side public utility. Municipal revenues should come from
taxes. Local government should support economic develop-
ment by creating conditions for private enterprise. Involv-
ing local government in profit could lead to monopolist
measures.
Another option grew out of the current situation. Pol-
ish municipalities had been involved in economic activity
earlier and were owners of many enterprises. The exclusion
of these enterprises from devolution would lead to state con-
trol over the economy, contradicting the objectives of trans-
formation policy. One way to break state monopoly was to
devolve enterprises to municipalities, then gradually priva-
tize them. At that time, insufficient supply appeared to re-
duce the danger of local monopolies. Therefore in 1990
municipalities received several profit-oriented enterprises.
During subsequent years this approach changed several
times, and legislation was changed as well. Finally, munici-
palities have the right to engage in economic activities, but
restricted to their public responsibilities
2.3.8 Legal Status of Municipal Enterprises
Under the previous system, state enterprises were charged
with the delivery of public services. According to the Law on
State-Owned Enterprises, the authorities of the enterprise
(mainly the employee council) had a number of powers to
which an owner is entitled according to civil law.  A special
threat lay in the absence of efficiency incentives—very dan-
gerous in monopolies.
The Local Government Act of March 8, 1990, which
defined the scope of municipal responsibilities in public ser-
vice delivery, gave local governments freedom to choose the
manner of service provision. According to that act, local
governments may either provide services directly, create or-
ganizational units, including enterprises, or conclude con-
tracts with other entities.  The choice had to be harmonized
with the legal status and structure of enterprises devolved to
municipalities. The ownership and legal statuses of enter-
prises was in flux. For that reason, the laws obliged local
governments to make the following necessary legal transfor-
mations:
• transformation of a state-owned enterprise into a com-
pany, according to the Civil Code;
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• direct delivery of services by the municipality or munic-
ipal establishments;
• contracting services to other entities according to civil
law and privatization, or liquidation of enterprises
taken over.
Companies are separate legal entities—they act on their
own behalf and bear risk themselves. The municipality is
not liable for their obligations and companies are not re-
sponsible for the obligations of the municipality. The mu-
nicipality, being the owner or co-owner of a company acts
according to principles defined by law.
Local budgetary establishment is based on the pro-
visions of the Budget Law and is not a legal entity. The
municipal council founds the establishment, which trans-
fers financial surpluses to and receives subsidies from the
municipal budget. The municipality is thus fully responsi-
ble for the obligations of the budgetary establishment. All
capital expenditures are financed by the municipal budget.
The law allowed local governments to conclude con-
tracts for services with individuals or other enterprises. This
particular provision is of fundamental importance to the
introduction of market mechanisms into the municipal sec-
tor. In such an arrangement, the local government with-
draws from direct activity on the municipal service market,
but that does not mean it is not responsible for quality of
services. The Law on Public Procurement defines the prin-
ciples of such contracts.
The process of legal transformation was long and
difficult. Municipalities were afraid to make sometimes rev-
olutionary changes, and managers and employees were gen-
erally resistant to any changes. Finally, Parliament was
obliged to issue a law fixing a date after which all former
state enterprises in municipal hands became companies, sub-
ordinate to the Civil Code. The progress of the transforma-
tion process was not identical in all municipal sectors; it de-
pended on the specific features of a given sector. In areas
where service delivery relied on expensive infrastructure, or
official prices were applied, transformations encountered
serious difficulties. On the other hand, the market for ser-
vices in which private firms had an increasing share was de-
veloped in those areas which did not require any extensive
technical infrastructure and where prices are flexible.
The entire public service delivery sector, however,
evolved toward a market economy model. The former mod-
el of state enterprises disappeared completely. In many mu-
nicipalities, former enterprises were cancelled or privatized,
and service delivery was contracted to private companies.
Recently, some municipal companies were transformed into
joint-stock companies and traded in the Warsaw Stock Ex-
change.
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF DISTRICTS
AND REGIONS IN 1998
The second step in strengthening decentralization was the
establishment of two higher tiers of local and regional gov-
ernment. The process of transformation of the state was con-
tinued throughout the decade. The transfer of primary
schools to the municipalities was the greatest change in prop-
erty management. Real estate and all movable assets belong-
ing to schools became municipal property.
The positive experiences associated with the transfer of
property to municipalities established a model for reforms
in 1998. Both districts and regions were granted legal status
and ownership rights and received certain state properties.
The scope of property devolution was much more limited,
and transfer was much simpler. Districts took over several
institutions, which had been controlled by the middle level
of state administration. Property was transferred together
with administrative responsibilities. Despite the fact that
districts took ownership of 6,155 units, the transfer was quick
and easy. Regions took over the property of 1,323 units.
However, the management of property is of marginal im-
portance to regions, as they concentrate their efforts on sup-
porting economic development.
Table 4.1
Number of Organizational Units
Taken Over by Districts and Regions
Sector Units Transferred Units Transferred
to Districts to Regions
Education 4,207 445
Health care 477 476
Public welfare 718 0
Culture 166 201
Other 587 201
Total 6,155 1,323
The extent of these transformations called for a special
organization. The Council of Ministers established a special
ministerial team led by the Minister of the Interior, which
was given extensive powers of attorney. The team was com-
posed of representatives of all interested ministries. Its secre-
tary, deputy minister of the interior, by special appointment,
coordinated the entire work of the team. The implementa-
tion of all transformations was assigned to voivods in 16
new regions. The voivods were supervised by plenipotentia-
ries appointed in each new voivodship. Deputies from inter-
ested ministries were assigned the role. Their supervision was
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generally confined to intervention in crisis situations and
the actual burden of performing the task fell on the voivod-
ship administration.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND EVALUATION
Devolution of state property to municipalities was the first,
perhaps the only one-time operation on such a scale to re-
duce national property in Poland. Results were positive be-
cause the operation was conducted in a comprehensive and
radical manner. The principle of transfer by law, as well as
the organization of a system for negotiations and appeals
limited biased decision, although they could not be entirely
eliminated.  The results are easy to see when traveling across
Poland: the improving conditions of previously neglected
villages and towns and the visible effects of owners’ greater
care for tidiness and order.
4.1 A Success: Infrastructure
and Environmental Quality
The most spectacular effects are to be seen in the field of
local infrastructure. The infrastructure inherited by the new
local authorities were frequently in an awful state of disre-
pair, making residents’ lives difficult and restraining oppor-
tunities for economic development. Infrastructure develop-
ment became a municipal priority. The previous bureaucratic
system of investment and development was eliminated and
a new system was launched, based on market mechanisms.
Sensational results were achieved. Table 4.2 shows the de-
velopment of sewage and water supply systems. The great
improvements were the result of work performed by munic-
ipalities, owners of more than 90% of water and sewage fa-
cilities.
It should be noted that the quality of the infrastructure
improved. This can be observed especially in sewage treat-
ment plants. Cities now demand a higher standard for those
plants, replacing mechanical plants with modern technology.
Road construction was another objective. Local govern-
ments spent nearly 1.6 times more on this than they gener-
ated from vehicle tax, which was the source of income allo-
cated for the extension of roads. From 1993 to 1999, the
length of paved local roads increased by 15%.
The activity of rural municipalities deserves particular
emphasis here. The economic structure in communist Po-
land gave definite priority to industrialized areas causing the
impoverishment and stagnation of agricultural areas. In the
situation following 1989, rural municipalities were con-
siderably handicapped by poor infrastructure, the lack of
capital and shortage of technical staff and skills necessary to
organize public works. Even so, results exceeded all expecta-
tions. The number of houses connected to water systems in
rural areas in 1990-1998 increased from 400 thousand to
over 2 million. The increase in connections to sewage sys-
tems was also considerable—530%. In 1999, 71.7% farms
were connected to water systems, up from 29% in 1990.
This means a substantial change of living standards in rural
areas.
Table 4.2
Water Supply and Sewage Systems in Poland
Specification 1980 1990 1999 Changes
1980–1990 1990–1999 Between
(2)–(1) (3)–(2) Decades [%]
(5) : (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Water systems:
Water-main [thousand km] 6.1 8.3 41.8 2.2 33.5 1,522
Distribution system [thousand km] 53.1 93.1 203.6 40.0 110.5 276
Connections to houses [thousands]   1,203 1,531 3,723 328 2,192 668
Sewerage systems:
Sewers [thousand km] 20.5 23.1 46.8 2.6 23.7 911
Connections to houses [thousands] 460 511 1035 51 524 1,027
Cities served by sewage treatment plants: 357 467 778 110 311 282
Mechanical 158 165 67 7 –98
Biological–standard 199 302 666 103 364
Biological–upgraded 0 0 205 0  205
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Attention should also be paid to the development of
telephone connections in rural areas. Regarding the relation
between the number of telephone users to the entire popu-
lation, Poland was at the bottom of the list of European
countries in 1990. Owing to the activity of local govern-
ments, however, considerable success was accomplished. The
number of telephone users grew exponentially. Mobile phone
networks expanded exponentially as well.
Table 4.3
Users of Fixed-line Phones
Users 1980 1990 1999
[Thousands]
In cities 1,727 2,902 7,872
In rural areas  216  391  2,204
Total 1,943 3,293 10,076
These changes influenced the quality of life and had an
important impact on environmental quality. Water supply
systems and treatment plants had a crucial impact in that
field, as municipalities received the power to intervene against
air pollution. In the past, the state administration was very
lax with respect to all industrial polluters due to informal
political pressures. This is not the case when local govern-
ments are supported by suffering local population.
4.2 Financing Development
Funds used to finance the development of infrastructure came
from many different sources. Besides local budgets, grants
from the central budget and residents’ own contributions,
the biggest sources were the National Environmental Pro-
tection and Water Managment Fund and voivodship envi-
ronmental protection funds as well as the Agency for Agri-
cultural Restructuring and Modernization. The latter has
been the administrator of the government’s 300 million-
dollar loan from the World Bank since 1994, of which 250
million were set aside for rural development.
It is striking that municipal budgets had such a big share
in individual investments—about 50%—and the constant
increase of capital expenditures clearly exceeds the inflation
rate. This example shows the huge capacity of local govern-
ments to generating funds from different sources.
4.3 A Failure: Regression
in Cultural Institutions
Municipal economy and management were successful. But
some areas experienced regression—mostly in culture. Re-
gression in this area is the result of two factors. On one hand,
the shortage of funds; on the other, lack of vision in sup-
porting culture under the new systemic conditions. Hence,
there is a lack of policy in this field both at the local and
central levels.
Reforms implemented after 1990 resulted in the decen-
tralization of decisions relating to culture as well as funds
used to support culture. The transfer of powers and funds to
local governments was to enable the adjustment of cultural
infrastructure and activities to local needs, as the manage-
ment of cultural development is local government’s inalien-
able attribute. But there was no program on how to do it.
The development of such a program was beyond the capac-
ity of local activists. Local governments, without models,
did not know how to adequately support culture. Because
their budgets were insufficient, they cut expenditures in that
field.
Table 4.4
The Structure of Capital Expenditures on Water and Sewage Systems by Sources of Funding
Source of Funding [%] Water Supply Sewerage Systems
1993 1999 1993 1999
Municipal budgets 59.4 59.4 51.7 47.4
State budget 17.3 8.2 6.1 6.2
Residents 17.8 14.8 3.4 4.5
NEPWMF 5.5 3.7 38.1 26.9
AARM — 8.2 — 7.5
Other — 5.7 0.7 7.5
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Table 4.5
Changes in the Number of Cultural Institutions
from 1990 to 1999
Type  1990/91  1999
Civic and cultural centers 2,343 2,241
Clubs and activity centers 1,759 1,344
Museums 563 623
Cinemas 1,318 682
Public libraries 10,269 9,046
Community libraries 17,565 2,870
Artistic groups 12,091 14,848
4.4 SECONDARY EFFECTS
There were also less visible but equally important effects.
When municipalities began to experience the right to own-
ership, they began to lease buildings at market prices. This
caused completely unexpected secondary results. One was
the break with the old system of retail sales. In the commu-
nist system, retail trade was largely nationalized, with big
national enterprises—in effect, oases of party nomenklatura.
These enterprises had numerous privileges, such as reduced
rent for facilities. These monopolies of state retail trade fell
apart only when municipalities had taken over buildings and
began to treat tenants equally. State-owned enterprises were
not able to pay as much rent as private tenants.
Devolution of state property became one of the funda-
mental elements of the tremendous breakthrough that was
municipal reform. Possession of property was a basis for lo-
cal dynamic activity.
The Polish experience provides evidence that transfer
of state property to local governments is a fundamental con-
dition for effective decentralization. Without unrestricted
ownership and asset management rights, local governments
would be unable to act effectively.
The entire devolution process must be done radically
but very flexibly, as local conditions differ, and it is impossi-
ble to foresee all issues which will arise. The way in which
devolution is organized and implemented has a decisive im-
pact on the final result.
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ANNEX 1
Extract from the Law on Municipal Self-government
passed March 8, 1990
Definition of Terms
Gmina—a municipality, the smallest administrative unit in
Poland. There are about 2500 gminas. They were formed
into self-governing bodies in 1990.
Województwo (voivodship)—region, existed in 1990 within
a two-tier system. In 1999, the three-tier system was
introduced and the number of województwos was limit-
ed to 16.
Wojewoda (voivod)—head of state administration in a
województwo.
Solectwo—a rural community, an auxiliary unit to a gmina,
not a legal entity.
Chapter 5
Municipal Property
Article 43.
Municipal property shall include ownership and other rights
to property held by individual gminas and their associations
and the property of other municipal legal entities, including
companies.
Article 44.
Municipal property shall be acquired pursuant to the law—
implementing laws to the Local Government Act—by way
of transfer of property to gminas in conjunction with the
establishment or change of the gmina’s boundaries accord-
ing to the procedure referred to in Article 4; property shall
be transferred by way of agreement of interested gminas and
in the absence of agreement, pursuant to the decision of the
prime minister, as a result of conveyance by the central ad-
ministration on terms defined by the Council of Ministers
by way of executive order, as a result of own business activ-
ity, by way of other legal transactions or in other cases de-
fined in separate provisions.
Article 45.
Entities which hold municipal property shall make indepen-
dent decisions on the purpose and use of elements of prop-
erty in compliance with the requirements contained in oth-
er legal provisions, the provisions of Paragraph 2 excepted.
A gmina council’s resolution shall require approval by
the voivodship assembly if the voivod lodges an objection by
way of resolution if the resolution concerns: (i) changing the
purpose and alienation of property which serves public
benefit or direct satisfaction of public needs, (ii) changing
the purpose and alienation of objects which have a particu-
lar scientific, historical or environmental value, (iii) aliena-
tion of other elements of municipal property with no com-
pensation.
Article 46.
A declaration of will on management of property shall be
made on behalf of the gmina by two members of the execu-
tive board, or one member of the executive board and a per-
son authorized by the board (plenipotentiary), unless the
bylaws provide otherwise.
The executive board may authorize a rural mayor (wójt),
or city mayor (burmistrz) to make a declaration of will asso-
ciated with the management of the gmina’s everyday affairs.
If a legal transaction may result in financial obligations,
the gmina treasurer (chief accountant for the budget) or an-
other person authorized by the former shall be required to
countersign it for the transaction to be effective.
A gmina treasurer (chief accountant for the budget) who
refuses to countersign it, shall do it upon written instruction
from a superior and shall notify the gmina council and the
regional audit chamber thereof.
Article 47.
Heads of gmina organizational units, which are not legal
entities, shall act as single persons based on authorization
granted by the gmina executive board.
The executive board’s approval shall be required for
transactions which exceed the scope of the authorization.
Article 48.
The rural community or urban district shall manage and
use municipal property and use revenues from this source to
the extent defined in the bylaws. The bylaws shall define
also the scope of legal transactions made independently by
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the authorities of the rural community or urban district with
respect to the property to which they are entitled.
The gmina council may not reduce the rural communi-
ty’s (solectwa) present right to use the property without the
consent of the rural assembly.
All rights of ownership, usufruct, or other rights to
assets and property, hereinafter referred to as municipal
property, held hitherto by rural residents, shall remain in-
violable.
Provisions on municipal property shall apply to gmina
property, Paragraph 3 excepted.
Article 49.
The gmina shall not be liable for the obligations of other
gmina legal entities, and the latter shall not be liable for the
gmina’s obligations.
In the event of abolishment or division of a gmina, the
gminas which take over its property shall be jointly liable for
its obligations.
Article 50.
Persons involved in the management of municipal property
shall be obliged to ensure special diligence when exercising
management according to the purpose of this property and
to protect it.
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ANNEX 2
Extract from the Law on Implementation of Laws on Local Self-government
and Self-government Employees, passed May 10, 1990
Chapter 2
Acquisition of Municipal Property
Article 5
1. If further provisions do not provide otherwise, national
(state) property, which belongs to:
(i) national councils and local authorities of the state
administration at the primary level,
(ii) state-owned enterprises for which the authorities
referred to in Point 1) are founding authorities,
(iii) boards and other organizational units subordinate
to the authorities defined in Point 1,
shall by virtue of law become the property of appropri-
ate gminas on the day on which this law takes effect.
2. If further provisions do not provide otherwise, national
(state) property, which serves public benefits and be-
longs to
(i) national councils of the capital city of Warsaw, city
of Krakow and city of Lódz´, and to local authori-
ties of the state administration at the voivodship
level in these urban voivodships,
(ii) state-owned enterprises for which the authorities
defined in Point (i) are founding authorities,
(iii) boards and other organizational units subordinate
to the authorities defined in Point (i), shall by vir-
tue of law become the property of these cities on
the day on which this law takes effect, if it is situated
within their administrative limits, unless a special
provision provides otherwise.
3. If further provisions do not provide otherwise, national
(state) property which serves public benefit and belongs
on the day on which this law takes effect to:
(i) national councils and local authorities of the state
administration at the voivodship level,
(ii) state-owned enterprises for which the authorities
defined in Point (i) are founding authorities,
(iii) boards and other organizational units subordinate
to the authorities defined in Point (i),
(iv) gminas and associations of gminas, if it is necessary
for the performance of their functions.
4. Also national (state) property other than that mentioned
in Paragraphs 1-3 may be transferred to the gmina upon
its request if it is associated with the performance of its
functions.
Article 6
1. Indivisible elements of municipal property, referred to
in Article 5, Paragraphs 1–3, which are used to perform
the functions of more than one gmina, shall remain,
until an appropriate municipal association is established
or agreement concluded, managed by the present entities.
2. If gminas do not take over the property referred to in
Paragraph 1, within one year from the day the Local
Government Act takes effect, the voivod shall request
the court to designate an administrator. Provisions of
the Civil Code shall be applied accordingly to the ad-
ministration of common property.
Article 7
1. Gmina property, as construed under the provision re-
ferred to in Article 2, Paragraph 1, Point 1, shall be-
come by law the property of the gmina in whose territo-
ry it is situated on the day on which the Local Govern-
ment Act takes effect.
2. The provision of Paragraph 1 shall not violate the rights
of third parties to the property mentioned in this provi-
sion, including also the rights of land and forest com-
munities.
3. Appropriate authorities shall transfer elements of mu-
nicipal property referred to in Paragraph 1 to rural com-
munities (solectwa) established in the territory of the ex-
isting rural communities, which used gmina property.
This refers to elements of property situated outside the
territory of the gmina in which the rural community is
located.
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Article 8
1. State-owned enterprises for which the founding author-
ities are local authorities of the state administration de-
fined in Article 5, Paragraphs 1–3, shall remain legal
entities, as they become municipal companies.
2. By December 31, 1991 the gmina council shall make a
decision concerning the choice of the legal and organi-
zational form for its business activity conducted so far
by municipal companies. Until the legal and organi-
zational form is chosen, provisions on state-owned
enterprises shall be applied accordingly to municipal
companies.
3. The Council of Ministers may define, by way of execu-
tive order, a special procedure for the division of state-
owned enterprises, mentioned in Article 5, Paragraph
3, the division of which is necessary in conjunction with
the transfer of municipal property to gminas or their
associations.
Article 9
1. The rights and duties of entities mentioned in Article 5
shall be transferred to their counterpart municipal enti-
ties. This refers in particular to the rights and duties
resulting from perpetual usufruct.
Article 10
The transfer of property to gminas, referred to in Article 5,
Paragraphs 1 and 2, does not violate the right to use ele-
ments of property on the existing terms by foreign compa-
nies operating in Poland
Article 11
1. Elements of national (state) property, referred to in Ar-
ticle 5, Paragraphs 1–3, shall not become municipal
property if:
(i) they serve public functions which fall within the
competence of the central administration, courts,
and state authorities,
(ii) they belong to state-owned enterprises, or organi-
zational units which exercise functions at the na-
tional level, or above the voivodship level, the pro-
vision of Article 14 excepted,
(iii) they belong to the National Land Fund, the provi-
sion of Article 14 excepted.
2. The Council of Ministers shall define, by way of execu-
tive order, a list of enterprises and units, referred to in
Paragraph 1, Point 2.
Article 12
National (state) property shall not be subject to enfranchise-
ment, if it is used by:
(i) diplomatic missions and consular offices of foreign coun-
tries as well as international institutions which enjoy
diplomatic or consular immunity to the extent to which
it results from laws, international agreements or com-
monly-respected international customs,
(ii) the Catholic Church or other churches and religious
associations.
Article 13
1. Real estate transferred to gminas according to the pro-
cedure defined in this law shall be subject to regulatory
proceedings referred to in Articles 61–63 of the Law of
May 17, 1989 on Relations between the State and the
Catholic Church in the Polish People’s Republic (Jour-
nal of Laws, No. 29, item 154).
2. The provision of Article 61, Paragraph 4, Pont 3 of the
law referred to in Paragraph 1 shall not be applied.
Article 14
1. The land of state-owned enterprises which is not sub-
ject to municipalization based on this law and not used
according to the socio-economic purpose of this land,
shall be handed over, upon gminas ’ application submit-
ted by December 31, 1991, to the gminas in whose ter-
ritory this land is situated.
Article 15
1. Upon a gmina ’s request, land owned by the State Land
Fund, situated in the territory of this gmina, may be
transferred to this gmina. Provisions of Article 17, Para-
graphs 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 shall apply accordingly.
Article 16
1. Property shall be acquired based on this law with no
compensation.
2. If, pursuant to a special law passed December 31, 1990,
there will be a change in the functions and responsibil-
ities of the public administration which will require el-
ements of municipal property acquired pursuant to this
act to be transferred to the state treasury, it will be trans-
ferred with no compensation, the state treasury paying
the cost borne by the gmina, according to Article 226, §
1 of the Civil Code.
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Article 17
1. Gminas shall make inventories of the property referred
to in Article 5, Paragraphs 1 and 2.
2. The inventories referred to in Paragraph 1 shall be made
by inventory commissions within three months after the
gmina council appoints the commission.
3. Property other than that mentioned in Paragraph 1 shall
be taken over based on records of transfer which reveal
also the rights and obligations.
4. Inventories of property and copies of records of transfer
shall be available for public inquiry in the seat of the
gmina management for 30 days about which the public
shall be informed in a manner generally accepted in a
given area.
5. An individual whose legal interest concerns findings in
the inventory of property may, within the time limit
referred to in Paragraph 4, present his reservations to
the inventory commission.
6. The inventory commission shall review the reservations
immediately and, if they are taken into consideration,
shall change the findings in the inventory accordingly.
7. The Council of Ministers shall define the method of
making the inventory referred to in Paragraph 1.
Article 18
1. The voivod shall make decisions concerning the acqui-
sition of property by virtue of law and decisions con-
cerning transfer of property to the extent defined in the
law.
2. The National Enfranchisement Commission shall be
established as a body receiving appeals against decisions
referred to in Paragraph 1.
3. The Prime Minister shall appoint the chair and mem-
bers of the National Enfranchisement Commission and
shall define the procedure for its work.
4. The provisions of the Administrative Proceedings Code
shall apply accordingly to proceedings in cases referred
to in Paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as in cases of appeals
against decisions filed with an administrative court.
Article 19
Civil law claims associated with the acquisition of municipal
property may be vindicated in a common court.
Article 20
1. A final and valid decision confirming the acquisition of
property by virtue of law, or concerning transfer there-
of, shall constitute a basis for an entry in the land and
mortgage register.
2. The final and valid decision, referred to in Paragraph 1,
shall be sent within 30 days from the date on which it
became final and valid to the appropriate notary’s of-
fice.
3. Proceedings concerning the entry referred to in Para-
graph 1 shall be exempt from court fees.
Article 21
1. If an element of property which is subject to enfran-
chisement in accordance with the procedure defined in
this law was previously contributed as the founding cap-
ital of a commercial law company, or cooperative, the
gmina, or another municipal legal entity may, within
three months from the day on which this element of
property was acquired, demand dissolution of the com-
pany by the court or withdraw its shares from the coop-
erative, if this element of property is to be used to satisfy
the public needs of the local community or if the fur-
ther operation of the company or the municipal legal
entity’s participation in the cooperative violates the pro-
visions of the Local Government Act.
2. The provision of Paragraph 1 shall not apply to compa-
nies in which foreign entities have shares.
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Decentralization of Public Property in Poland
R a f a l  S t a n e k
1. BACKGROUND
Decentralization in Poland began prior to the creation of
fully operational local governments in the 1990s. Tradition-
ally, since before World War II, administration in Poland
was divided into about 2,500 municipalities (gminas), oper-
ating as local branches of the central government. Gminas,
as basic administrative units, have operated up to the present
day with practically unchanged borders.
The average gmina has a population of just over 15,000
residents and occupies an area of over 125 km.1 Polish legis-
lation distinguishes between rural (municipalities that con-
sist of several villages), rural-urban (a town with surround-
ing villages) and urban gminas (cities). Naturally, the number
of residents may deviate from the average; there are gminas
with populations of 5,000, and there are large cities that
constitute a single gmina. A unique status is reserved for the
capital city of Warsaw.
In the 1980s, gminas received relative autonomy (gmi-
na councils were elected) and more mandates from central
authorities; therefore, it can be said that decentralization in
Poland began in the 1980s.
In 1990, as a consequence of changes to the political
system in 1989, local government at the gmina level was
introduced. The administrative division stayed the same,
while the local administrative system changed. Consequent-
ly, gminas were able to make the transition while continuing
with their previous activities.
The following legal acts were of fundamental impor-
tance to the functioning of gminas in the 1990s:
• The Law on Local Government of March 8, 1990 (still
binding under the name of the Gmina Government Law)
defines the organizational structure of gminas and
assigns tasks and competencies to individual gmina
organs.
• The Budget Law (amended in 1999 by the Public Fi-
nances Law) regulates budgeting, revenues and expen-
ditures.
• The Laws on Revenues of Local Government Units are
short-term laws (binding for less than five years) speci-
fying sources of local government revenues, particularly
designed for transferring subsidies and grants.
The regulations for implementation of the Local Gov-
ernment Law and the Local Government Employees Law
(Legal Journal, May 22, 1990) precisely described the pro-
cess of transforming basic units of state administration into
local governments.
In 1999, administrative reform was continued, intro-
ducing 16 provinces (regions) called voivodships and mid-
dle-level units (powiats) that consisted of several gminas. The
names of these administrative units hearkened back to his-
torical names used before WW II; in the case of voivod-
ships, names were often several hundred years old.
One argument for such an organizational structure was
the creation of stronger regions which could prepare and
implement development strategies, taking into consideration
the specific features of each region. The number of voivod-
ships was raised (10 to 12 would have been most logical) in
reaction to political pressure from larger cities that wanted
to serve as headquarters of provincial authorities. Due to an
array of tasks too broad for gminas and too narrow for voivod-
ships, a middle administrative level—over 300 powiats—was
introduced. Both new levels (voivodships and powiats) are
self-governing, although voivodships also act as independent
organs of central administration. In the course of the re-
form, the competencies of gminas were not changed. The
newly introduced reform, however, had an impact on the
extent of their tasks and finances, which will be discussed at
the end of this report.
The structure of local government, its tasks and compe-
tencies, have had an important impact on the status of local
government property.
Representatives who serve on gmina, powiat and voivod-
ship councils are elected to four-year terms. Gmina councils
consist of 15 to several dozen representatives, depending on
the population of the administrative-territorial unit.
Executive management boards are elected by each gmi-
na council and consist of 3 to 7 members. The mayor is the
chairman of the management board. In 2002, the electoral
system was amended, and now mayors are elected directly
and have expanded competencies. The mayor and board
manage local administrations employing anywhere from a
dozen to several hundred officials.
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Local government units have their own responsibilities
but are also assigned tasks by the central administration or
other local government units. Their responsibilities2 include
the following:
• land-use planning, local development and environmen-
tal protection;
• local roads, bridges and traffic control;
• water supply, sewage, public cleanliness, sanitation, waste
disposal, waste treatment, electricity and heat;
• public transport;
• health care;
• social care centers;
• communal housing;
• education, including elementary schools, pre-schools and
other educational institutions;2
• culture, including communal libraries and other cul-
tural centers;
• sports and physical education;
• fairgrounds and market halls;
• public parks and woods;
• communal cemeteries;
• local public security and fire protection;
• communal public buildings and administration objects;
• social, medical and legal care for pregnant women.
Tasks3 exceeding the scope of individual gminas are as-
signed to powiats, such as:
• public education;
• health promotion and protection;
• social assistance;
• family support activities;
• support for disabled persons;
• culture and protection of cultural assets;
• physical fitness and tourism;
• surveying, cartography and control of the land registry;
• real estate management;
• spatial development and supervision of construction;
• water management;
• environmental and nature protection;
• agriculture, forestry and inland fisheries;
• public order and security;
• flood protection, fire protection and prevention envi-
ronmental hazards;
• income and employment generation;
• consumer rights protection;
• maintenance of powiat public utility and administrative
facilities;
• defense;
• cooperation with local government organizations.
Voivodships4 are assigned tasks of regional character, such
as the following:
• public education, including university education;
• health promotion and protection;
• culture and protection of cultural objects;
• social assistance;
• family support policies;
• modernization and development of rural areas;
• spatial development;
• environmental protection;
• water management;
• public roads and transport;
• physical fitness and tourism;
• consumer rights protection;
• defense;
• public safety;
• employment and income generation.
The competencies of local governments are defined in
detail in the Competency Law (e.g., determining which kinds
of schools are the domain of which level of government).
2. TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP
TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
2.1 Transfer of Ownership in 1990
The Gmina Government Law of March 8, 1990 created lo-
cal governments at the basic level which needed to be en-
dowed with property. Local governments took over tasks
that had been the responsibility of local branches of the cen-
tral administration; therefore, a portion of state-owned as-
sets became gmina property. State administration bodies that
managed property on behalf of the State Treasury were obli-
gated to transfer a portion of those assets to gminas. Those
assets included state-owned property formally owned by the
State Treasury (documented ownership). It referred both to
real estate and mobile assets defined in the Law Regulating
Implementation of the Local Government Law and the Lo-
cal Government Employees Law, passed May 10, 1990.  This
law set the date for property transfer: May 27, 1990.
The law stated that the transfer applied to state proper-
ty under management of local branches of the central ad-
ministration and their subordinate units. All assets were sub-
ject to transfer: real estate, mobile assets and ownership rights
to enterprises. The transfer was performed based on deci-
sion by the voivod (the representative of the central admin-
istration at the regional level—there were 49 regions in Po-
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land at that time). A voivod was authorized to make such
decisions if the State Treasury had ownership documents for
those assets. As even under communism there was a private
sector in Poland, state authorities took over a significant
amount of property without arranging formal ownership
status for assets (sometimes that was impossible). As a result,
a significant portion of the property required legal docu-
mentation before it could be transferred to local governments.
As a consequence, the process of property transfer contin-
ued throughout the decade.  However, the bulk of property,
particularly buildings and infrastructure for communal ser-
vices, was transferred in a single transaction in 1990. In that
year, gmina councils appointed commissions to take inven-
tory of the property. Documentation was submitted to the
voivod. By law, a voivod’s decision served as the legal basis
for recording ownership changes in real estate or enterprise
registries. As some property belonged to regional entities
whose purview exceeded the territory and/or competency of
a single gmina (e.g., regional heat and energy enterprises),
the property was divided between gminas, unless interested
gminas decided to create a joint public utility enterprise.
Several problems occurred during the inventory pro-
cess. First, inventory commissions consisted of new local
government employees with limited skills and experience.
The inventory protocol was a quite a simple document, con-
taining very basic information about objects to be transferred;
it did not involve a monetary valuation of the property.
An inventory commission had three months to perform
an inventory, after which the inventory was presented to the
public. An individual whose legal interests were affected by
inventory findings was able to present his reservations to the
inventory commission. The commission had to review such
reservations immediately.
The inventory was submitted to the voivod, who ap-
proved it, thereby allowing ownership to be entered in the
real estate or other registry.
If a voivod disagreed with some elements of the inven-
tory protocol, arbitration authority was transferred to the
National Enfranchisement Commission. Only these disputed
objects were reviewed at the central level.
Disputes over ownership of state-owned electric com-
panies led to a public discussion on the rights of local gov-
ernments to participate in the privatization of such compa-
nies. Local governments sought 50% of electric company
shares, but were unsuccessful.
The voivod had to postpone approval if the legal status
of an object was unclear. Clarifying the legal statues of cer-
tain objects took over eight years.
In summary, the property transfer procedure defined
by law was simple and clear for the majority of objects and
was used in cases where legal status was clear. When doubt
arose as to whether the State Treasury was the owner, the
long process of clarifying this ensued, and only then could
the object be transferred. Thus, for a time, gminas managed
roads with unregulated legal status.
2.2 Transfer of Ownership Due To the
Transfer of New Mandates
The most important change in gmina competencies was the
addition of elementary education to its list of tasks. This
transfer was to be completed on January 1, 1994, but gmi-
nas could postpone the transfer to as late as January 1, 1996.
Taking over the school network involved the transfer of prop-
erty (school buildings) and financial responsibilities—sala-
ries, maintenance and construction costs, etc.
Schools were transferred based on the amended Law on
the Educational System of September 7, 1991. That law stat-
ed that schools assets transferred to gminas became gmina
property on the day of the transfer. Thus gminas became
owners of all school property, in particular land and school
buildings.
In the 1990s, the school network was modernized. Due
to a decreasing number of children (caused by the low birth
rate), some schools had so few students that their continued
operation was impractical. Therefore, gminas decided to con-
centrate students in selected larger schools and provide trans-
port services for students from more distant areas. As a re-
sult, some empty school buildings could be used for other
purposes.
Gminas, as managers of school buildings, decided to
use them in a number of ways; here are some exam-
ples:
• The Dukla gmina sold an old, destroyed school
building in Chyrowa to a private person who
opened a bed-and-breakfast facility there. At
present, renovation of the building is being com-
pleted. There are apartments on the first floor and
multi-bed rooms for organized youth groups on
the second floor. One of the renovated external
walls serves as a climbing wall; a nearby small
swimming pool and a ski lift are planned.
• Zabierzów gmina leased a school building to an
NGO.
In 1999, the school system was reformed and a new
level between elementary and high school was introduced: a
three-year middle school (gimnazjum). Gminas manage this
tier and needed buildings other than those used for elemen-
tary schools. In the first stage of reform, gminas did organize
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middle schools together with elementary schools. In the past
three years, however, they have had to find money for the
construction of new schools. Thus, the school network has
completely changed: old buildings are often unused and while
new buildings are being erected.
Adding the management of elementary schools to the
scope of gmina tasks has not been the only expansion of the
gmina ’s mandate in the past 12 years of local government
reform. Pre-school management was passed to gminas in
1992, but the financial effect was much less significant.
In 1990, gminas also became owners of community
housing. These consist of multifamily dwellings, usually rent-
ed to poorer citizens. Later on, the extent of community
housing owned by gminas became even larger when gminas
took over ‘enterprise housing,’— dwellings built by enter-
prises for their employees, construction of which was subsi-
dized by the state. These units were usually owned by large,
state-owned enterprises from the heavy industry sector that
experienced a serious crisis in the 1990s and consequently
were financially unable to retain ownership of the apartments.
Therefore, by law, gminas took over those premises together
with their residents. A further history of ‘enterprise apart-
ments’ is discussed in the following chapters.
2.3 Transfer of Ownership
Due to the Creation of
New Tiers of Local Government
As mentioned at the beginning of this report, further ad-
ministrative reform was introduced in 1998. Starting in 1999,
two new tiers were introduced to the administrative struc-
ture: powiats and self-governing voivodships. As in 1990,
reform involved transfer of property to the new administra-
tive units. The date of property transfer set by the law was
January 1, 1999.
2.3.1 Powiats
Powiats were created based on the Powiat Government Law
of June 5, 1998. An executive order by the Council of Min-
isters on August 7, 1998 defined powiat borders. Details of
the reform were included in the Law on Implementation
Regulations for the Public Administration Reform Law of
October 13, 1998.  This law contains provisions concern-
ing organizational units transferred to powiats and voivod-
ships. Of particular significance is the Competency Law
(mentioned in the introduction to this report), as it defines
precisely which tasks belong to the powiat mandate and,
therefore, which state administration units are to be trans-
ferred to powiats.
The Law on Implementation Regulations appoints each
voivodship a government delegate for reform (operating at
the regional level). The most significant tasks of the govern-
ment delegate are:
• coordinating the process of transferring institutions and
organizational units or parts thereof to appropriate lo-
cal government units;
• supervising registration of liabilities and inventory of
premises, real estate, installations, equipment and doc-
umentation (including archives) of liquidated, trans-
formed or transferred organizational units and their pro-
tocol of transfer.
The delegate supervised the transfer of new competen-
cies from the central administration to local government
units.
It should be emphasized that before this reform was
implemented, there were so-called urban public services zones
in Poland—pilot powiats. Those zones and their property
were later transformed into powiats.
After the reform, powiat mandates included such insti-
tutions as: fire stations, regional police headquarters, regional
veterinary inspectors, territorial sanitation and epidemic sta-
tions, employment offices, centers for surveying and cartog-
raphy and other facilities. By law, powiats took over these
units on January 1, 1999.
A problem arose when the operating area of a unit ex-
ceeded the jurisdiction of the new powiat. In such cases the
following solutions were considered: division of the unit or
an agreement defining which local government was to take
over the unit. The government body responsible for super-
vising the unit carried out the division.
Similarly to other local government units, as of January
1, 1999, powiats took over elementary schools, special edu-
cation schools, high schools and sports schools managed until
December 31, 1998 by ministries or regional representa-
tives of the central government (the ‘old’ 49 voivodships).
The transfer of all the units mentioned above served as
the basis for the acquisition of property defined in Chapter
4 of the Law on Implementation Regulations. On January
1, 1999, state-owned property managed by institutions and
state organizational units taken over by powiats and self-
governing voivodships became the property of the new gov-
ernments. Such property acquisition was formally approved
by the respective voivod.
Unclear or unregulated legal status of property—land
in particular—is a particular problem in Poland. This is a
legacy of World War II and the subsequent regime’s poor
management. Thus, numerous state-owned facilities were
built on land taken without appropriate legal procedures.
The law relegated the costs of regulating the legal status of
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property transferred to local governments to the State Trea-
sury. This permitted the transfer of property with clear legal
status to local governments.
Article 65 of the Law on Implementation Regulations
provides that transfer of property is free and void of taxes
and fees.
A powiat may also apply for transfer of other state prop-
erty. Article 64 of the law limits such cases to property that
can be used to execute the powiat ’s tasks (of significance,
then, is the list of powiat tasks). Such transfer can be com-
pleted based on an application by the powiat management
to be approved by the voivod. The voivod is not bound to
approve an application, particularly if the given property is
used for different purposes. Therefore, in the beginning of
their existence, some powiats had to incur significant costs
of office construction as the property transferred to them
was insufficient to their needs.
The transfer of property included liabilities bound into
it, which had to be disclosed in the transfer decision. The
transfer decision served as grounds for recording property in
the real estate registry; that record was free of court charges.
By law, the following items were not subject to transfer:
• rivers and streams;
• riverbanks and river islands;
• areas between riverbeds and anti-flood dykes;
• anti-flood dykes including the areas on which they are
located;
• retention reservoirs, dams, locks, weirs and other hy-
dro-technical structures.
The law dealt also with State Treasury property under
military management (the Military Property Agency) and
ordered its transfer to local governments for purposes relat-
ed to performance of public administration services.
The report mentioned the regulation of legal status. This
was of particular importance in cases of roads; due to diffuse
land ownership, many Polish roads were built on land not
owned by the State Treasury. The law provides that such
land, as of January 1, 1999, became the property of the State
Treasury or a local government (depending on whose land
the road traversed), subject to owner compensation.
Powiat and voivodship governments took over central
government investments in progress if such activities were
consistent with their tasks and competencies. As a result,
powiats and voivodships acquired not only the property
itself but the obligation to complete the investment as well.
In that case, the law earmarked grants for local governments
to continue transferred investments.
2.3.2 Voivodships
A similar law set the legal regulations for regional govern-
ments (voivodships). It should, however, be recalled that there
is a smaller scope of tasks for voivodship governments and
central administration branches operating at the same level.
Legal regulations remained the same. Voivodship govern-
ments took over many central government investments in
progress, thus there are many earmarked grants and invest-
ment outlays in their financial reports.
2.4 The Long Process
Ownership Transfer
Let the following report from the small city of Luków on the
state of municipal affairs serve as a description of failures in
the area of property transfer:
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, as well the
Gmina Government Law called local governments into be-
ing. As a consequence, a portion of state assets became the
property of gminas. Organs of state administration manag-
ing these assets on behalf of the State Treasury were obliged
to transfer a portion of the assets to gminas. State property,
for which the State Treasury had documentation of owner-
ship, was subject to this transfer. This applied both to real
estate and mobile assets as defined by the Law on Imple-
mentation Regulations of May 10, 1990. The inventory of
State Treasury property subject to transfer (communaliza-
tion) was conducted by the Inventory Commission formed
by Gmina Council resolution.
The commission conducts an inventory of property
based on resolution No. 104 of the Council of Ministers on
the manner of conducting inventory of municipal property
(July 9, 1990). The voivod renders the decision on the trans-
fer of State Treasury property to gminas based on documents
prepared by the Inventory Commission.
By the end of 1999, 429 hectares of State Treasury land
had been communalized, which constituted 76.3 % of the
area intended to be transferred based on the Law on Imple-
mentation Regulations. The voivod issued 1,092 decisions
on communalization of 2,426 registered parcels.
The main reasons for delays in communalization of
property were:
• lack of ownership documentation, necessitating the reg-
ulation of legal status of real estate in court;
• lack of current designations of real estate in appellate
courts (especially property formerly owners by Jewish
persons), requiring expert investigation into existing doc-
uments and real estate registries;
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• lack of entry in the real estate registry for land intended
for communalization;
• conflicts between the real estate registry and other doc-
uments;
• the need for surveying in order to establish the borders
and surface area of real estate.
Table 5.1
Progress Toward Communalization in the City of Luków
Year Communalized Area of Land [in hectares]
1991 81.2
1992 7.8
1993 183
1994 27.7
1995 65.3
1996 20.5
1997 19.6
1998 15.7
1999 8.2
Total 429
The voivod, based on article 18, paragraph 1 of the Law
on Implementation Regulations, also issues decisions con-
firming purchase.
On January 1, 2000, the following schools were received:
• No. 1 with land of an area of 1.5 hectares;
• No. 2 with land of an area of 1.2 hectares;
• No. 3 with land of an area of 0.93 hectares;
• No. 5 with land of an area of 3.4 hectares.
The decision confirming purchase based on the Act on
Primary Schools, issued at the end of 2000.
3. CHANGES IN THE LEGAL STATUS
AND REGULATIONS ON
MANAGEMENT OF MUNICIPAL ASSETS
In this chapter, procedures for changing the legal status of
various groups of municipal assets will be presented, espe-
cially purchase and sale.
3.1 Real Estate
(Land and Municipal Buildings)
Local governments can purchase and sell land and munici-
pal buildings, as well as lease them or contribute them in-
kind to companies (as paid-in assets). It should be empha-
sized that, in accordance with Polish law, selling land occu-
pied by a building also entails the transfer of ownership of
that building. Therefore, it is not possible to sell or purchase
only the building without the land on which it stands. More-
over, real estate may serve as collateral for payment of liabil-
ities, including credits.
Purchase of land with and without buildings (in the
latter case together with the buildings) requires the approval
of the gmina council as the law provides that sale of assets
exceeding the capacity of ‘typical administration’ require
council approval. Because this report concerns asset changes
that exceed the assumed typical administration in Poland,
the gmina executive board cannot independently purchase
and sell asset components, except for low-value mobile as-
sets (administrative equipment, computers, etc.). The
Local Government Act states that the gmina council estab-
lishes the rules for sale, purchase and encumbrance of real
estate or its lease or rent for a period of less than three years.
If the gmina council does not establish such rules, each pur-
chase or sale of real estate requires the one-time approval of
the council. Moreover, the council may allow the board to
purchase and sell up to a pre-defined level without such
approval.
Moreover, all gmina council resolutions, including bud-
get resolutions (financial means for the purchase of real es-
tate come from the budget) are checked by the Regional
Accounting Chamber (Regionalna Izba Obrachunkowa—
RIO), which constitutes the organ of control determining
whether a resolution passed by a local government conforms
with Polish law. RIO checks, in particular, whether public
funds were spent on activities to meet the local government’s
own mandate or a delegated mandate. Therefore, the local
government may not purchase just any asset, but only those
that serve the performance of tasks at the given level of local
government.
A further limitation on the ability to sell certain asset
components was the required approval of the voivodship in
the following cases:
• changes in purpose or sale of real estate serving general
use or directly meeting public needs;
• changes in purpose or sale of objects of particular scien-
tific, historic, cultural or natural value;
• relinquishing (sale without compensation) other com-
ponents of municipal property.
When the new Local Government Act was passed in
1999, this limitation was removed and replaced by a state-
ment that local governments decide the purpose and man-
ner of using components of assets, provided that they ad-
here to requirements found in other legal regulations. Ten
years of good local self-government experience convinced
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the central government and parliament that introducing
additional limitations would be pointless. Local governments
expend enormous amounts of funds to expand their assets
and they also rid themselves of components not essential to
meeting their mandate.
A further step in purchasing real estate is the investiga-
tion of its legal status, in particular obtaining an entry in the
real estate registry and checking whether the real estate is
encumbered by some liability (e.g., a bank mortgage in the
case of securing credit, usage rights for third parties, etc.). If
the legal status is clear, purchase of the real estate may pro-
ceed. Purchase is conducted by a notary, who prepares a
contract, collects all fees and taxes, as well as sends docu-
mentation to the court in order to complete all ownership
changes in the real estate registry and to the powiat in order
to make appropriate entries to the land registry. The powiat
always informs the gmina about such changes, because the
gmina collects property tax and must know the current own-
ership status of real estate. The procedure for gmina pur-
chase of real estate ends at this stage. In cases in which the
gmina council had previously established rules for purchase
and sale of property, the procedure does not last long and
depends mainly on the dates of obtaining real estate registry
entries in the courts. The typical timeframe is two weeks to
obtain a real estate registry entry in the case of investigating
the legal status of real estate and at least two months for
completing a new entry into the real estate registry. Some-
times, real estate has a few co-owners, of which a portion are
difficult to reach (e.g., they are living or working abroad); in
such cases the procedure lengthens. Obtaining real estate
registry entries in some courts also lasts longer than the afore-
mentioned two months.
In the case of sale of real estate, apart from approval by
the gmina council, a tender must be conducted. The local
public is informed of the tender, which is posted in the pub-
lic procurement bulletin. Moreover, an assessment of the
real estate is conducted by a licensed person; this constitutes
the basis for establishing the opening bid price of the real
estate. In the case of sale of more complex assets (land, build-
ings and associated infrastructure), the assessment may be
expensive (encumbering the budget) and long-lasting. A bid-
der typically must pay a security deposit as proof of interest
in purchase (the security deposit is returned to all those who
lost the tender; the winner’s is kept and goes toward the
purchase price of the asset). If the tender winner does not
sign a contract, he forfeits the security deposit and the local
government retains it. Due to the need to organize a tender,
the procedure for sale of the real estate is longer.
In the tender, the best offer is selected; in other words,
the highest bid. Sometimes, the gmina may have stipula-
tions as to the manner in which the sold real estate is used or
managed. In such cases, in the tender and subsequently in
the contract, the appropriate restrictions are registered pur-
suant to later use of the real estate.5 Clearly, a tender may be
organized in order to sell land to an investor who will build,
e.g., a swimming pool or recreation center intended for lo-
cal public use.
An interesting case is the gmina of Warsaw-
Centrum. The gmina leased land for 30 years to an
investor for construction of an office building; the
investor will benefit from the investment from rental
of office space. The gmina, however, in exchange
for an exemption from leasing fees for several years,
stipulated that the investor would designate a por-
tion of the building space for a community library.
Moreover, because the building is constructed on
gmina land, it is the formal owner of the building,
which after the contract period is over (30 years),
will transfer to the gmina.
The opportunity to lease municipal property is often
exercised by local governments that do not want to dispose
of their property and want to maintain control of it, yet
prefer that the property is used by another organization.
Because this most often applies to property needed for the
provision of public service, it will be discussed in later
sections of this report.
3.2 Municipal Housing
Municipal housing is examined separately due to the more
complicated history of this component of municipal prop-
erty. As mentioned earlier, state housing in 1990 was trans-
ferred to gminas. In the 1990s, gminas also took over factory-
owned housing. Gminas became owners of flats in which
residents lived based on regulations left over from the com-
munist period. ‘Special’ regulations gave tenants the right to
reside in such housing, while the owner was limited in terms
of raising rents or terminating rental by the occupant.6
Because maintaining municipal housing cost more than the
gmina received in rent, gminas were eager to dispose of such
assets. The special mode of rent, however, meant that there
were no willing buyers of such housing together with ten-
ants other than those tenants currently living in the hous-
ing. Because gminas were aware, however, that most of the
tenants were not wealthy (those in better situations owned
flats built by cooperatives or single-family homes), they
offered large discounts.
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For example, in Krakow, when a tenant purchased
a municipal flat, the city conducted an assessment
of the value of the flat and then applied a 90% dis-
count; hence, the tenant could purchase the apart-
ment for 10% of its value. Naturally, a contract for
such a sale was coupled with a restriction on fur-
ther sale; in order to prevent speculative purchases,
the purchasing tenant could not sell the property
for a period of 10 years.
The sale of municipal housing is not easy. The typical
situation in a tenement-house is such that only a portion of
the tenants purchase their flats. The gmina dispenses with
the need to maintain only those flats that have been pur-
chased, but remains the owner of the remaining flats. In
such a case, many owners, including the gmina, have to form
a ‘housing community’ in order to manage the tenement-
house jointly. Decisions on repairs and renovation must be
made by the entire community and financed by all owners
in proportion to the surface area of the flat they own. Only
when all apartments in the building are sold can the gmina
completely be free of the problem of maintenance.
At the beginning of the 1990s it appeared that gminas
would sell municipal housing to tenants. It turned out, how-
ever, that the poorest strata of society could not pay for its
own flats and, despite the fact that government assistance
programs exist, gminas often decide to build new buildings
for rental of municipal flats.
Another interesting and increasingly popular solution
to housing problems involving gminas are so-called Social
Building Societies (TBS). They operate as a form of compa-
ny, most often with gmina ownership, which, apart from
acquiring shares, offer the companies municipal land on
which to construct.
3.3 Schools
School buildings were described in detail in the section on
new local self-government tasks. In theory, local governments
have complete freedom in managing assets and are free to
decide themselves what kind of school network will exist,
but they must adhere to certain standards: e.g., there cannot
be too many pupils per class and if the distance from the
pupil’s home to the school is too far, the local government
must provide free transport.
Moreover, liquidation of schools often leads to social
problems; residents do not want to agree to closings because
they prefer to have small, yet closer schools. Sometimes
public pressure is so intense that the local government with-
draws from the idea of liquidation or looks for other solu-
tions.
3.4 Infrastructure
In 1990, gminas, and in 1999, powiats and voivodships be-
came the owners of infrastructure. Gminas acquired the fol-
lowing infrastructure:
• water mains;
• sewers and wastewater treatment plants;
• heating networks and heating plants;
• roads (and local public transportation: buses and trams);
• public spaces.
Central government administrative units at the local level
were the previous owners of the infrastructure. The basic
problem of transferring ownership of infrastructure was their
centralization in voivodship enterprises (at the time there
were 49 voivodships, not to be confused with the 16 voivod-
ship self-governments introduced in 1999), e.g., the Voivod-
ship Thermal Energy Enterprise, which encompassed a doz-
en or even a few dozen gminas in its service area. In this case,
the Central Government Delegate had to divide up the as-
sets among each gmina, most often along territorial lines.
Gminas, based on the divided assets, created their own en-
terprises (their legal form will be described in the next sec-
tion).
From time to time local governments undertook joint
action and, on the basis of divided assets, created joint en-
terprises.
For example, the Thermal Energy Enterprise (PEC)
in Gliwice was founded from assets taken from the
Voivodship Thermal Energy Enterprise in Katow-
ice. A large heating plant and heating network were
located in Gliwice to serve the entire city. Two oth-
er nearby gminas decided to contribute their assets
to the Thermal Energy Enterprise in Gliwice.
Therefore, the new enterprise served three gminas,
each of which owned a share in the enterprise in
proportion to the value of their paid-in assets. With
time, it became clear that the interests of each gmi-
na lay elsewhere, and at present PEC Gliwice serves
only the City of Gliwice; the remaining gminas
formed their own enterprises after parting with PEC
Gliwice.
In subsequent years, local governments have significantly
expanded the municipal infrastructure assets they acquired.
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3.4.1 Water Mains
The total length of water networks that local governments
acquired in 1990 amounted to 93.2 thousand kilometers.
By 1995, this figure had risen to 154.7 thousand kilometers
and by 2000 to 212.1 thousand kilometers.7 It more than
doubled. In rural areas, this increase was even more signifi-
cant: from 56.6 thousand kilometers to 162.0 thousand
kilometers, almost a three-fold increase.
Figure 5.1
Increase in the Total Length of Water Networks
3.4.2 Sewers
Figure 5.2
Increase in the Total Length of Sewer Networks
As in the case of water mains, the length of sewer networks
doubled over the past ten years of local government opera-
tions, from 26.5 in 1990 to 33.5 thousand kilometers in
1995 and to 52.1 thousand kilometers in 2000. Similarly,
rural local governments made the most progress (or rather
had the largest deficiencies) from 3.1 to 16.2 thousand kilo-
meters.
3.4.3 Roads
An increase in the length of gmina roads took place, although
roads were more often a priority for cities. Many problems
in obtaining land with clear legal status slowed new roads
development. Instead, local governments invested in mod-
ernizing existing roads and building new bridges with short
accompanying roads.
3.4.4 Heating
Heating networks have expanded slightly since 1990; dis-
trict heating enterprises, however, have faced problems of
more efficient use of heat and decreased heat consumption.
Consequently, modernization works (more efficient boilers
and pre-insulated pipes) were municipal priorities.
3.4.5 Financing Development
of Local Government Assets
Such a significant increase in assets, as presented in preced-
ing sections, was, inter alia, the result of local government
priorities. Polish local governments revenues consist of own
revenues of which the most important are real estate taxes, a
share in national taxes (a portion of income tax on private
persons and companies), block grants (transfers from the
state budget that local governments are free to use as they
wish) and earmarked grants (transfers from the central bud-
get that local governments must allocate to a pre-defined
goal). Moreover, local governments often drew credit or,
much less often, even issued bonds in order to finance the
construction of infrastructure.
Debt is subject to some constraints. The two most im-
portant are:
• Debt servicing (loan repayment and interest) cannot ex-
ceed 15% of annual revenues.
• The total debt level cannot exceed 60% of annual reve-
nues.
Another instrument a gmina can use to finance invest-
ment projects are municipal bonds. Due to the costs of pre-
paratory work, which is usually conducted by a contracted
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financial institution (typically a bank), this instrument is used
only for a larger scale of financing. The financial institution
is responsible for financial forecasts and analysis when issu-
ing municipal bonds.
The tables and graphs below present local government
revenues and expenditures8 from 1994 to 1998 (in current
values).
Table 5.2
Revenues of Polish Local Government
[Million PLN]
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 14,808 19,993 30,956 39,518 46,119
Cities 12,046 16,027 23,892 30,390 35,756
Villages 2,762 3,966 7,064 9,128 10,363
Table 5.3
Expenditures of Polish Local Government
[Million PLN]
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 14,904 19,828 31,499 40,504 47,495
Cities 12,110 15,918 24,374 31,237 36,933
Villages 2,794 3,910 7,125 9,268 10,563
SOURCE: Central Office of Statistics (GUS)
Total Polish local government debt amounted to 12,266
million PLN (about 3 billion USD) on December 31, 2001.
Another means of increasing local government invest-
ment potential are environmental protection funds.9 These
funds manage public money collected from environmental
user charges and penalties (EkoFundusz manages funds from
the Polish debt-for-nature swap mechanism) paid in by pol-
luters (most often industrial plants) and dispense these funds
as an earmarked grant for investments improving the quali-
ty of the environment. The selection of projects for financ-
ing is competitive; funds strive to subsidize investments that
bring the largest environmental benefit at the lowest cost.
Parallel to grants, especially now, funds increasingly award
loans at lower rates than offered by commercial banks (pref-
erential or soft-loans). When a gmina uses a soft-loan from
an environmental fund, the terms and conditions are quite
different: the physical and environmental effects resulting
from the loan must be demonstrated. The scale of soft-loans
is fairly large: about half of the local government’s long term
debt.
3.5 Joint Ownership through
Associations of Local Governments
Local governments have the opportunity to form associa-
tions. Most such associations are lobbying groups, especially
national associations. Associations are also formed in order
jointly to develop infrastructure. Under the law, such asso-
ciations have the same rights to ownership of assets as local
governments, yet these associations have not been endowed
with an initial asset portfolio. Moreover, membership dues
are the main source of revenue for associations (from the
local governments comprising the association) and local gov-
ernments are reluctant to pay their revenues into some other
organization. For this reason, most associations just co-ordi-
nate actions and do not generate their own assets. One of
the few associations that does develop its own assets and
currently has a credit rating is the Upper Raba River Basin
and Kraków Association.
In order to stop water degradation in the Raba riv-
er basin, the gminas located in the Upper Raba River
Basin and Krakow created a legal entity and imple-
ment public projects under the association’s name.
The Association currently has 14 members—all
gminas in the Malopolska Voivodship.
The first task of the association involved de-
veloping a document titled “Comprehensive Pro-
gram for Maintaining Water Quality in the Raba
River Basin Area—from the Source to the Dob-
czyce Dam.”
This plan contains an inventory of the sources
of contamination, proposed methods to neutralize
the pollution and a fiscal calendar for the program’s
implementation.
The program is intended to provide a compre-
hensive solution to the problems associated with
the collection and treatment of sanitary wastewater
in the entire area of the Upper Raba Basin, from
the river’s source to the reservoir in Dobczyce.
The total value of the works and designs com-
pleted to date is 78 million PLN (about 20 million
USD).
3.6 Shares in Enterprises
As mentioned, gminas in 1990 and powiats and voivodships
in 1999 acquired organizational units at the local level to-
gether with their assets. Some of these units (operating over
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an area larger than the territory of a single local government)
were divided in order to transfer assets to concrete gminas.
Municipal services, especially associated with water mains,
sewers, supplying heat, removal of solid waste, municipal
transport or municipal housing management10 were most
often carried out by units subordinate to local governments.
Local governments use different legal entities to imple-
ment their tasks, invest in environmental protection and
operate existing assets:11
• Budgetary units: A budgetary unit is not a separate
legal entity and is financed directly from the gmina
budget.
• Budgetary enterprise: A budgetary enterprise, although
also not a legal entity, is not financed directly from the
gmina budget. Revenues collected from services cover
all costs (there is no depreciation included in budgetary
enterprise costs) and any surplus is transferred to the
gmina budget. In the case of a deficit, a subsidy from
the gmina budget is required. On the other hand, all
investment costs are covered directly from the gmina
budget.
• Limited or joint-stock companies (with 100% or less of
gmina shares): In this case, a company as a separate legal
entity organizes and provides a municipal service, in-
cluding investment and operation. Due to their scale,
these investment companies have to incur debt and must
seek funds on the commercial and soft loans market if
possible.
The first two forms are legally autonomous units, yet in
forming a company, a local government creates a separate
entity. The local government exercises influence over the
entity as owner of shares. Creating a company (in Poland,
companies with one owner are permitted) most often in-
volves the local government’s paying assets into the compa-
ny and taking over shares. Sometimes the local government
has decided to pay in a small sum in cash that enables the
enterprise to commence operations.
At the shareholders’ meeting, at which local governments
are most often the only shareholder, the owner can make
decisions on development directions, select or recall an ex-
ecutive or supervisory board for the enterprise and make
decisions on investment expenditures. Hence, if the local
government is the sole shareholder of the enterprise, it exer-
cises total control over it.
A typical problem of municipal companies in Poland is
their poor financial condition. The gmina is responsible for
setting fees for utilities. Very often, because of local political
pressure, gminas set very low utility rates, which are not suf-
ficient to cover operating costs. This reduces the ability of
the gmina to make investments financed from collected fees.
The revenues from fees may not even be enough to cover
maintenance. Financing such a deficit depends on the legal
status of the utility. Budgetary units are financed directly
from the gmina budget so other budget income covers costs.
Budgetary enterprises and companies may receive subsidies
from the gmina budget. Very often companies organize
additional services (for example, maintenance of private util-
ity equipment, organizing small specialized workshops) to
cover losses.
Wod-kan, a limited municipal company in Krap-
kowice for water and sewage, organized additional
services (water equipment repair and maintenance).
Wod-kan generates losses, but due to depreciation
and additional services, it has a cash surplus. It can
continue long-term but cannot expand, replace or
modernize the network in the future.
For this reason, investments are typically financed both
partially from the local government budget and partially from
the company’s own sources. Local governments, in spend-
ing budget funds on investments, most often transfer them
to the company while simultaneously increasing their shares
in and control over the company. As receivers of assistance,
gminas also prefer available cash from various types of funds
(at the very least environmental protection funds mentioned
earlier).
Local governments also decide to maintain assets as prop-
erty without converting it into shares in companies and the
infrastructure is leased to the municipal company or to some
other enterprise.
Local governments may dispense with the shares they
own in the same manner as other investors. Local govern-
ments must apply the Trade Company Code, which regu-
lates joint stock and limited liability companies. They must
also, in offering shares, apply the regulations found in the
Act on Public Trade of Marketable Securities.
The scale of sales of municipal company shares in Po-
land, however, is small, because local governments prefer to
maintain control over municipal services. Local government
shares in other entities are not large; local governments do
not have free funds to allocate towards such purposes.
The sale of shares in municipal companies is the begin-
ning of their privatization. In larger cities, this process has
already begun, although it is proceeding very slowly. For
example, Krakow planned the privatization of its municipal
companies but has shelved such plans.
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An unusual example is the company AQUA from
Bielsko-Biala. The City of Bielsko-Biala and several
surrounding gminas own shares in this joint stock
company that supplies water and treats wastewater.
The city has increased its share of the company due
to building additional infrastructure and transfer-
ring it into the company, thus raising its paid-in
capital. AQUA was in good financial condition and,
as a result, obtained a Word Bank loan to develop
its facilities. Total debt of the company (from dif-
ferent sources, including soft loans) at the end of
1999, reached 66.971 million PLN (around 16.5
million USD).
Shares of AQUA, as the first municipal com-
pany, were issued on the Warsaw Stock Exchange
on the Central Table of Offers (which has slightly
less stringent requirements than the normal ex-
change). Therefore, for the past few years, a por-
tion of the shares have exchanged owners. As a con-
sequence of share issue, the City of Bielsko-
Biala found a British investor, to whom it sold 21%
of shares. This revenue went into the city budget
and could then be used for other purposes.
Another interesting phenomenon is the creation of
municipal holding companies. On one hand, it is important
that municipal companies have a strictly defined scope of
activities and do not control all municipal services (although
in smaller cities and towns, this is precisely the case; it sim-
ply does not pay to form several entities providing munici-
pal services). Dividing up companies avoids the cross-subsi-
dization of various types of activities and privatization of
only certain companies. On the other hand, some munici-
pal services often generate losses. Because municipal compa-
nies—like all companies—have to pay income tax on gener-
ated profit, companies that generate a profit pay taxes and
those that face losses pay no tax. Forming holding compa-
nies allows entities to reap the benefits of operating as sepa-
rate units, yet, at the same time, profit may be spread over
the entire holding. As a result, a portion of income tax re-
mains in the holding and may be allocated toward invest-
ments. The first municipal holding companies were created
in Ostrów Wielkopolskie and in Krakow.
Public-private partnerships, as a method of building
infrastructure, are slowly developing in Poland. This meth-
od involves using private capital for construction or mod-
ernization of local government infrastructure and then al-
lowing the investor to glean benefits from fees. The benefit
for the local government lies in obtaining infrastructure with-
out spending its own resources. The local government may
also require expansion of municipal infrastructure (e.g., in
the case of construction of large stores, local governments
require that the modernization of roads in the vicinity and
investors agree to this because such action also improves ac-
cess to their facilities). Or, the benefit may be construction
of some object of local government land, which is as a rule is
well-located (e.g., when constructing a swimming pool on
gmina property, in exchange for access to land, the investor
signs a contract to open the facility to area schoolchildren
from 8 to 15:30. These are the least favorable business hours
for commercial sale of tickets and the investor will draw prof-
its in the evenings and on weekends). Another example of
public-private partnership is the organization of Energy
Saving Companies (ESCO).
3.7 Other Components of Assets
Gminas also own current and financial assets (cash, receiv-
ables and inventories) as well as liabilities. There are no special
regulations regarding these assets. Gminas and other tiers of
local government have their own treasury offices, lead by a
treasurer, who is responsible for local financial management.
Local governments collect local taxes and co-operate with
the State Treasury in collection of shared taxes (PIT and CIT).
3.8 General Transformation Tendencies
Evident in Poland
In summary, the transformation tendencies evident in local
government asset management are as follows:
• Municipal housing by and large has been sold to ten-
ants. A trend is developing whereby gminas build new
housing intended for rent.
• Land parcels are commonly sold and purchased in oth-
er places needed for construction of needed objects.
• Limitations in the sale of property have decreased sig-
nificantly and local governments now have greater free-
dom of action to dispose of their assets as they see fit.
Still, they typically only maintain assets needed for the
execution of their mandate.
• Cases involving unregulated legal status are common,
especially in the case of roads. Local governments must
spend resources to put these issues in order (purchase of
land, clarifying legal status, etc.).
• Local governments want control over municipal enter-
prises and as a result are reluctant to privatize them.
• The private sector is slowly entering into the municipal
infrastructure construction market; the scale of this en-
gagement is still small relative to need.
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3.9 Regulations on Property
Management by Local Government
In essence local governments have broad flexibility in
managing their assets. Provisions of the Gmina Local
Government Law in its current form do not contain any
limitations, although limitations may appear in other regu-
lations.
The law that regulates real estate management is the
Real Estate Management Act passed on August 21, 1997.
This law mainly applies to real estate owned by the state and
local governments. The law establishes the manner of real
estate assessment, applied in the sale of real estate owned by
the local government. According to the law, the opening bid
price for sale of real estate (the law also stipulates how the
tender should be organized) cannot be lower than the price
indicated by the independent property assessor.
Real estate owned by a local government may, accord-
ing to the law, be sold, exchanged or relinquished, given
over to perpetual use, rented or leased, lent, turned over for
permanent administration, encumbered by legal limitations,
contributed in lieu of cash (equity) to a company, trans-
ferred as equipment of the created municipal enterprise or
assets of a created foundation.
Restrictions also apply when real estate is sold, turned
over for perpetual use, lent, rented or leased if it is located in
one of the following locations:
1) seaside coastal strips, requiring an agreement with the
central government administration responsible for mar-
itime issues;
2) mining areas, requiring, if no urban plan exists, an agree-
ment with the central government administration re-
sponsible for granting mining licenses;
3) national parks, requiring agreement with the director
of the national park;
4) border real estate turned over for permanent adminis-
tration for purposes of national defense and safety, re-
quiring agreement with the appropriate state govern-
ment organ;
5) real estate entered into the monuments registry, subject
to other limitations in turnover.
The law defines local government real estate and de-
clares that the basis for real estate management is the spatial
land use plan. Local government real estate assets can be
used for purposes of local government development, for or-
ganized investment activities—especially completion of hous-
ing and technical infrastructure—and for execution of other
public goals. According to the law, real estate management
mainly involves the preparation of land surveying and legal
documents and designs, subdivision and merging of real es-
tate, as well as equipping it, as far as possible, with needed
technical infrastructure.
The law also addresses precedence in the purchase of
real estate by its users. In particular this applies to flats owned
by the gmina, enabling the gmina council to grant right-to-
purchase priority to its tenants or lessees.
Of specific importance to gminas is a provision in arti-
cle 22 of the Real Estate Management Law, which states
that real estate owned by the State Treasury and intended in
urban plans for housing construction and associated infra-
structure can be donated to the gmina upon request, if a
compelling gmina interest is demonstrated which cannot be
achieved by the State Treasury. The donation contract spec-
ifies the goal toward which the donation is intended. In the
event that the real estate is not used for this purpose, the
donation may be rescinded. Thanks to this provision, local
governments gained real estate with the proviso that they
use it for housing construction.
Local governments, in particular those of larger cities
that own significant assets, create real estate management
departments (infrastructure for municipal services is typi-
cally turned over to the unit providing the services). This
applies mainly to flats, buildings (including public works)
and land. These departments organize tenders for lease, es-
pecially of public works buildings, attempt to sell flats to
their tenants, as well as buy and sell land depending on need.
The coordination of activities with other departments is also
important (the next section contains more information on
this).
In summary, local governments, especially smaller units,
are still in the process of developing good real estate man-
agement skills. In the 1990s, many activities were chaotic,
uncoordinated and of unclear purpose. By the end of the
1990s, most local governments had developed and approved
long-range strategies and detailed strategies on asset man-
agement. Once in possession of these elements, local gov-
ernments could begin to apply professional real estate man-
agement.
4. INFORMATION ON MUNICIPAL ASSETS
4.1 Real Estate Registry
Courts maintain real estate registries, which contain infor-
mation on land parcel ownership. An entry into the real es-
tate registry constitutes a basis for all subsequent actions in-
volving the land: its sale, lease, etc. Real estate may also serve
as collateral for securing loan payments. This security is not-
ed in the real estate registry up until the moment the loan is
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repaid. All local government real estate is contained in the
real estate registry.
4.2 Enterprise Registry
The courts maintain the enterprise registry. All municipal
companies are entered into the enterprise registry and infor-
mation on them is publicly available through the National
Court Registry (Krajowy Rejestr Sadowy). Financial reports
of these companies are available from the registry and are
subject to reproduction in special publications.
4.3 Information Published
in the Local Government Budget
The local government budget is an annual financial plan
published locally. It contains information on the local gov-
ernment’s planned revenues and expenditures in a given year
and may be desegregated to show expenditures on assets.
The budget may also contain information on multi-year in-
vestment programs.
In the descriptive portion of the budget, a report on the
status of municipal property is attached; it does not consti-
tute a detailed financial report, but describes local govern-
ment holdings. Some local governments prepare a more de-
tailed report of assets even though this is not required.
Significantly, assets owned by municipal companies and
their revenues are not published in the local government
budget. For this reason, it is often difficult to compare local
governments with one another. In 2000, a few cities decid-
ed to develop, as a pilot project, a consolidated budget con-
taining information on property owned, including that by
municipal enterprises (problems arose in cases where the local
government was not the only company shareholder). Cur-
rent law—the Public Finance Act—enables the minister of
finance to introduce the obligation to prepare consolidated
budgets; no minister has exercised this power, however, most
likely due to the lack of an accepted methodology.
4.4 Statistical Information
Local governments, just as other entities, prepare statistical
information for the Central Office of Statistics (GUS). How-
ever, data is often fragmentary, especially regarding munic-
ipal property. The ministry of finance collects information
on budget execution. In 2000 (thanks to USAID assistance),
a computer system was introduced to collect this informa-
tion. Local governments enter data into their computer sys-
tems and then, via the Internet, send them to the Regional
Accounting Chamber (RIO), which after synthesizing the
information, sends the data on to the ministry of finance. As
a result, the ministry of finance obtains current and com-
plete information on local government finance (revenues and
expenditures).
4.5 Property Assessment
Currently, property assessment is only conducted during sale.
Local governments employ expert real estate assessors in the
evaluation of real estate. This assessment serves as the basis
for announcing a tender for sale of municipal property. In
the case of housing sales, the expert conducts the assessment
and then the local government applies discounts as men-
tioned earlier.
Real estate assessment is sometimes needed for calcula-
tion of real estate tax. In general, this tax is calculated based
on the land area of the real estate. Ultimately (and this is
already beginning), the tax will be calculated on the value of
the real estate. Currently, local governments do not have
databases on the value of real estate in their jurisdictions.
4.6 The Scope of Property
Transferred to Local Governments
Some investigations claim that about 2 million objects were
transferred to local governments. The whole process was
decentralized and took place over several years; consequent-
ly no statistical data exists on the central level. Reports on
the status of municipal property (attached to the municipal
budget) are not standardized, and data is not aggregated.
The system of reporting to the ministry of finance is
quite good and records budget revenues and expenditures
but not changes in municipal assets.
The Central Office of Statistics conducts more general
research about objects located in local government jurisdic-
tions, albeit without consideration as to who the owner is.
5. IMPACT OF CHANGES
IN MUNICIPAL ASSETS
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETS
The sale of municipal property, including the sale of shares
in enterprises, is treated as a local governments’ own source
of revenues. The scale of these revenues at the beginning of
the 1990s was quite large—gminas sold housing and gener-
ated a fair amount of revenues. Currently, the level of reve-
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nues from the sale of property has stabilized (see Table 5.4,
below). On the other hand, expenditures on assets in 2000
and 2001 decreased compared to earlier years. In years prior
to 2001, the scale of investment outlays made by local gov-
ernments was a bit higher, and the increase in assets was
consequently higher as well.
Table 5.4
Local Government Assets—Revenue and Expenditure
2001 % of Total
(Billion PLN)12 Local Gov.
Revenues
Local government revenues 79.6 100
Revenues from sales of assets 3.3 4.1
Expenditures on assets 16.1 20
Net increase in local
government assets13 12.8 —
As mentioned earlier, local governments also purchase
real estate. If this is not associated with a transfer from the
State Treasury (as in 1990 and 1999 or in conjunction with
local governments being assigned new mandates), expendi-
ture comes from the local government budget.
The scale of privatization of local government assets other
than real estate—mainly municipal enterprises—is still in-
significant. In 2001, local governments obtained 67.2 mil-
lion PLN from privatization, a small fraction of their reve-
nues. More common are cases in which the asset is leased for
a period of several years.
On the other hand, local governments increasingly un-
derstand the role of local economic development and try to
attract investors. For this purpose, industrial or service zones
are created, in which the local government owns land that is
equipped with infrastructure (water, sewer, electricity, tele-
phones, convenient roads, etc.) and is intended for indus-
try/services in local land use plans.
The City of Ostroleka set up an industrial zone.
The city had land at its disposal but also developed
infrastructure and made the appropriate amend-
ments to land use plans. Next, it developed an in-
formation folder on the terrain in the zone. The
city has already attracted a number of investors but
still has open land in the zone. For this reason, it
was decided to send a brochure to German and Dan-
ish companies operating in the food processing sec-
tor (an appropriate branch for Ostroleka), together
with a cover letter inviting the addressee to invest.
The number of such industrial or service zones located
on municipal land is increasing. Thanks to these actions,
some cities have attracted firms that provide jobs for local
residents. In effect, investors construct buildings on this real
estate and pay taxes, especially real estate taxes, which are
completely local.
6. EFFECT OF PRIVATIZATION
OF NATIONAL ENTERPRISES
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
From 1990 to 2000, 6,691 state enterprises were privatized
or liquidated; 794 enterprises were liquidated, 1,775 sold
and 1,480 companies were transformed into companies
wholly owned by the State Treasury.
The share of local governments in privatization is small,
because the legal basis for this share has not been established.
In 1990, such enterprises became gmina property (but were
not privatized), provided that the enterprise was essential to
the completion of gmina tasks. This is what happened to water
and sewer, heating, city sanitation and mass transit enterprises.
The example of Krakow is instructive: In 1990 the
city took over the municipal thermal energy enter-
prise. This enterprise delivered heat generated main-
ly at CHPs in Krakow and Skawina. Krakow in-
cluded the CHP in the inventory protocol, but the
voivod disagreed. The National Enfranchisement
Commission asked the voivod to review process
again, but still no agreement resulted. The CHP in
Krakow remained the property of the state. The
Krakow city council issued 7 resolutions that raised
claims on the CHP Krakow. At the beginning of
the 1990s, Krakow wanted to communalize the
CHP; therefore, when the government announced
its privatization plans, Krakow asked for 51% per-
cent of the shares. In the next resolution, Krakow
asked for 40%. In the second half of 1990, the pro-
cess of CHP privatization began and the city ex-
pressed interest in receiving a smaller share packet
from the privatized enterprise. When 55% of CHP
shares were sold to a foreign investor and, pursuant
to privatization law, 15% was reserved for employ-
ees, the City of Kraków asked for the remaining
30%. The last resolution was issued in 1999 and
sought the inclusion of local governments in the
privatization of the large monopolies.
The city argued that the CHP was providing
heat for the city; despite its efforts, the city never
received any shares.
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After introducing further reforms in 1999 (introducing
powiats and voivodships), local governments pointed out their
right to receive shares in enterprises whose assets had been
built by the local public. They justified their claims with
local or regional public service enterprises. For instance, this
applied to energy concerns (local heating or CHP plants,
network distribution, gas companies, Polish Telecommuni-
cation, bus companies). Unfortunately, these actions were
unsuccessful.
7. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
It may be counted as a success that local governments re-
ceived a large amount of assets and then expanded them
significantly. Local governments did not receive assets that
they did not need; therefore, there was no need to apply
greater rigor on the sale of assets by local governments.
Property transfer to local governments was connected
with local government tasks, and legislation gave provisions
under which more property could be transferred in the event
that new tasks were assigned to local governments.
As is evident from the report presented in the chapter
2.4—typical of many Polish gminas—the transfer of assets
resulting from changes in 1990 went on throughout the
decade. The main barriers are legal problems over land owned
and controlled by the State Treasury.
Moreover, according to the law, local governments are
responsible inter alia for supplying electrical energy (resi-
dents also assume local governments are responsible for sup-
plying gas and telephones) but do not have any competence
in supplying enterprises. Similarly, a significant portion of
assets (e.g., arable land) is located in ineffective government
agencies which could be relieved by transferring these re-
sponsibilities to local governments.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
In some countries, the transfer of local government proper-
ty took place without considering local government func-
tions. This was caused by the need for the state to protect
itself against the complete sale of property by local govern-
ments. Consequently, this brings about the need to classify
property and apply a variety of limitations. For this reason,
it is recommended to move away from the direct return of
property based on its status from 1995. The scope of local
government functions has changed over time, and new man-
dates can be expected in the future. The difficulties in con-
ducting inventories of property expressed by conference par-
ticipants demonstrate that Serbian local governments use a
portion of property for purposes other than those related to
the functions they perform. Therefore, a better solution
would be first to use the current list of functions performed
by Serbian local governments as a starting point and based
on this conduct an inventory and then transfer state proper-
ty to local governments. Possibly, a new law should contain
an obligation to transfer property in the event that the local
government mandate is expanded in the future.
It is also possible to return property to the state as in
1995. In this case, it is necessary to consider a course of
action in the event that property has changed owners or le-
gal form (through transformation or privatization of enter-
prises) or if the legal situation is unregulated. Authorities
will be anxious about the fate of property that is not essen-
tial to local governments for the performance of their func-
tions. A mechanism insuring property is not wasted will be
essential.
The uncontrolled sell-off of assets may be avoided by
classifying property and limiting the freedom of control (es-
pecially sale) of certain types of property. Moreover, budget
law may limit the use of revenues from sale of property to
capital investments only. In this manner, it will not be pos-
sible to sell property in order to “consume” monetary sourc-
es (on current issues).
Regardless of the path chosen to return to the status of
1995 or transfer property linked to local government func-
tions, it will be essential to take an inventory. This is a diffi-
cult task, demanding time and capability. Therefore, it is
recommended that administrative procedures for such an
inventory be developed, including:
• Develop the manner in which the body taking inven-
tory is formed—a commission formed by the local
government is advisable, but it might also be a mixed
commission of local government representatives and
local representatives of the national government or
employees designated to fulfill this role; it is important
to ensure that the proper level of administrative ability
exists in the persons conducting the inventory.
• Establish the manner of the commission’s work, dead-
lines and level of detail of the protocol to be submitted.
• Define criteria for including a property on the inventory
list.
• Define which central government body approves the list
through, providing the legal basis for transfer of property.
• Define appellate organs, in the event that the local gov-
ernment does not agree with elements of the list (this
may be a joint commission at the national government
level or the administrative court).
• Define the competencies of each organ involved.
Moreover, the procedure or resolution should define the
date upon which the property transfer goes into effect.
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Because taking inventory is not an easy task, the com-
missions should be trained in the application of procedures.
Therefore, the timeline for the entire process should be es-
tablished so that once the procedures have been developed
there is time and resources to conduct training at the local
level.
Due to the large amount of local governments and com-
ponents of transferred property, the entire process should be
decentralized in order that the central government bodies
deal only with appeals, in other words unclear issues.
It is important to ensure that approval of the list obli-
gates registration bodies to register local government owner-
ship.
Regardless of limitations on the sale of assets by local
governments, it is important to ensure proper asset manage-
ment. In particular, it is recommended to:
• Ensure proper local public control over the sale of prop-
erty, e.g., through requirement of approval by the local
council for sale of the property.
• Ensure proper and independent assessment of property
intended for sale.
• Require competitive procedures (similar to public ten-
der) in the sale of property.
In cases of particularly sensitive categories of property,
the requirement to obtain the approval of the central gov-
ernment for sale may be introduced.
Moreover, effective property management should also
include reporting. It is suggested that the reporting system
be linked to the procedure for budget approval and report-
ing. A consolidated report on the state of communal prop-
erty, in particular providing information on changes in prop-
erty (purchases and sales) and, even better, changes in
property values, should be submitted together with the bud-
get. The report should be available to the public and collect-
ed by the central government administration for review and
control purposes.
NOTES
1 Based on the Local Government Law of March 8, 1990.
2 Education was controlled by the central government
until 1996, when it was transferred to gmina adminis-
trations. Educational reform in 1999 assigned manage-
ment of middle schools (gimnazjum) to gminas and high
schools (lyceum) to powiats.
3 Based on the Powiat Government Law of June 5, 1998.
4 Based on the Powiat Government Law of June 5, 1998.
5 Furthermore, the spatial land use plan of the gmina,
passed by the gmina council, also contains a proviso on
the manner of use of each zone.
6 This law applied and still partially applies to private
owners of flats.
7 Based on data from the Central Office of Statistics
(GUS).
8 Revenues, according to Polish classification, do not
include long-term debt, and expenditures do not reflect
payment of that debt. Therefore, the difference between
revenues and expenditures must be covered by credits,
loans or bonds, with consideration toward the need to
pay debt incurred earlier.
9 A significant portion of infrastructure investments are
for environmental protection, especially sewers with
wastewater treatment plants, expansion of heating
networks and modernization of heating plants.
10 Sometimes health service, although the legal const-
ruction of such units is a bit more complicated, because
it must be in conformance with the act of health
protection, which provides for special types of units and
their registry.
11 According to Article 9 of the Local Government Act of
March 8, 1990.
12 1 USD = 4.0 PLN
13 Depreciations are excluded, because the scale of de-
preciation is hard to assess—local governments do not
calculate depreciation.
D E C E N T R A L I Z AT I O N  O F  P U B L I C  P R O P E R T Y  I N  P O L A N D
Decentralization of Public
Property in Slovakia
J a r o s l a v  K l i n g  a n d  J a r o s l a v  P i l á t
C O U N T R Y  R E P O R T S
F R O M  U S A G E  T O  O W N E R S H I P
Tr a n s f e r  o f  P u b l i c  P r o p e r t y  t o  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t s  i n  C e n t r a l  E u r o p e
112 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
F R O M  U S A G E  T O  O W N E R S H I P
113
Decentralization of Public Property in Slovakia
J a r o s l a v  K l i n g  a n d  J a r o s l a v  P i l á t
1. Introduction
The social and economic changes of 1989 in Central and
Eastern Europe included the reform of public administra-
tion in Slovakia. Already in 1990, a dual model of public
administration was implemented. The Law on Municipali-
ties of 1990 reestablished local government. The Municipal
Property Law was approved in 1991. These two laws to-
gether with the Law on Local Elections form the core of the
legal basis of local government in Slovakia. As for the cen-
tral public administration, regions (kraj) were abolished and
a new tier of local administration was created. Before the
reforms, local administration consisted of 38 districts (okres)
and 121 subdistricts (obvody) that were subordinated to dis-
tricts. Along with these branches of central administration,
there were specialized local administration bodies, subordi-
nated to respective ministries, such as the network of tax
offices, environmental protection offices, labor offices, etc.
In 1996, a major change in local administration took place
in Slovakia. Parliament approved the re-creation of regions
(kraj), abolished subdistricts and networks of specialized
public administration and extended the number of districts—
the lowest tier of local administration.1 The same year, Slo-
vakia was divided into 8 regions and 79 districts with an
integrated model of local state administration, recognizing a
limited number of specialized networks (tax offices, labor
offices, etc.).
The next step in public administration reform was com-
pleted over a five-year period. In 2001, a regional level of
local government was approved and eight self-governing re-
gions (samosprávny kraj) were created. In 2001, the transfer
of a number of competencies in various areas of public ad-
ministration from bodies of local administration to territori-
al governments (local and regional governments) was ap-
proved as well. The transfer of tasks began on January 1,
2002—the date when self-governing regions started to op-
erate in Slovakia.
In the last twelve years, the changes in public adminis-
tration in Slovakia were primarily connected to central ad-
ministration and only at the beginning of the new millenni-
um did local governments (at the regional level) receive
attention. Currently, the transfer of tasks to territorial gov-
ernments continues; further reforms in local administration
and local government are to come (abolishment of district
offices, restructuring of local governments, etc.).
LOCAL STATE ADMINISTRATION TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT
Specialized
local administration
General
local administration
8 regional offices
79 district offices
+ 43 offices outside
the district seat
2,883
municipalities
8 self-governing
regions
Figure 6.1
Current Organization of Public Administration in Slovakia
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2. THE PROCESS
OF PUBLIC PROPERTY TRANSFER
2.1 Time-frame of Property Devolution
Decentralization of public property in Slovakia (before the
split-up of Czechoslovakia), more precisely the transfer of
ownership of selected public property to territorial govern-
ments (municipalities and regions), was related to the dem-
ocratic changes of 1989. Following these changes, the so-
cialist Constitution of Czechoslovakia was amended in 1990.
This amendment allowed the recreation of local government
as an institution of public administration. Consequently,
Slovakia approved the Law on Municipalities (369/1990)
that defined local government, its operation and bodies, as
well as relations between local government, citizens and other
entities. In the fall of 1990, the first free local elections took
place after 40 years, and local government was reestablished.
Although local governments were created in 1990, they
had no property. The Law on Municipal Property (138/
1991), approved in March 1991, became effective on April
1, 1991. Legally, this launched the process of property de-
centralization. This law defined which state properties were
to be transferred to municipalities and set rules on the use of
property by municipalities. At that time, the creation of a
second tier of territorial government was considered. How-
ever, the creation of this tier and a respective transfer of prop-
erty did not happen until 2001.
 In October 1990, the federal Law on Transfer of State
Ownership to Other Legal and Physical Entities (known as
the Law on Small-scale Privatization2) was approved. This
phase of privatization began in February 1991 and was com-
pleted by March 1994. The phase saw ownership changes
in municipalities, as the process included the privatization
of various trade, production or service facilities that were
formerly managed by the national committees (národny´
vy´bor). These facilities were transferred to municipal man-
agement (not ownership) first, upon the Law on Transfer of
Founders’ Functions of National Committees to Munici-
palities, Central Government Bodies and Local State Ad-
ministration Bodies (518/1990). Since the national com-
mittees were basically state bodies, these facilities were
included in small-scale privatization.3
This law transferred founders’ functions of state enter-
prises founded by the national committee and situated in
the territory of the particular municipality. Certain state
enterprises were exempted from this transfer—the food in-
dustry, water management, transportation, road construc-
tion, car repair, trade, recycling material collection and R&D
for local economies. In these cases, founders’ functions were
transferred to the respective government ministry. Besides
these exemptions, the transfer contained special regulations
in other areas as well.
In the case of budgetary and contributory organizations
founded by national committees, management units4 were
transferred to the municipalities in which they were located.
There were other exemptions here—some organizations in
the area of healthcare, transportation, culture, internal ad-
ministration, environment, state archives, schools and school
facilities, etc. Again, the transfer of the founders’ functions
to municipalities did not mean the transfer of ownership
rights.
After the transfer of state property to municipalities upon
the Municipal Property Law of 1991 (gaining the full own-
ership over property) and the end of small-scale privatiza-
tion, there were no relevant changes in the area of property
transfer to local governments.
The next important period of property decentralization
began after the parliamentary elections of 1998. The newly-
elected government, committed to continuing public admin-
istration reform, undertook profound decentralization
measures. After expert preparatory work and often-difficult
political negotiations, the legislative process to establish a
second tier of local government and implement decentra-
lization began in 2001.  Decentralization was related to
competencies, property, funds and political power; the
weakening of central administration at the local level was to
continue. After the decentralization of competencies and
property, fiscal decentralization is planned to take place in
2004—still the subject of much controversy.
In this period, two laws were important for the decen-
tralization of property. First, an amendment to the Munici-
pal Property Law (447/2001) defines the transfer of further
state property in relation to the transfer of competencies from
state administration to municipalities, as well as some provi-
sions on use and management of this property. Second, the
Law on Property of Self-Governing Regions (446/2001)
provides the transfer of state property to regional govern-
ment ownership related to the transfer of competencies from
state administration to regional government. Further provi-
sions of this law contain the rules of management and use of
this property. This phase of decentralization began January
1, 2002 and should be complete by 2004. Property transfer
is tied to the transfer of competencies taking place in 2002–
2004 in five phases.
Property decentralization has been in process for sever-
al years and is not over yet. The long time-period stems from
the slow pace of the public administration reform that basi-
cally halted after 1991. This process was reactivated as late
as 2001—after a ten-year pause.
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2. 2 Organizational and Institutional
Setting of Property Transfer
The protocol on the transfer of ownership rights under the
Municipal Property Law were elaborated by municipalities
and sub-district offices (then the local branches of central
administration). The next wave of state property transfer
started after the amendment to this law in 2001. Protocols
on property transfer must be signed by the mayors of mu-
nicipalities and the statutory bodies of local administration
(the head of the district office). As for the transfer of real
estate, municipalities are obliged to apply for changes in the
cadastre within 12 months of the transfer of ownership.
During small-scale privatization, privatization commis-
sions were established in every district to organize and man-
age privatization in the particular district. The commissions
were founded by the privatization ministry based on the Law
on Ownership Transfer (474/1990). District offices were in
charge of the commissions’ operation.  Members included
representatives from local governments, representatives from
the Association of Towns and Villages of Slovakia (ZMOS)
and others as defined by law. Property to be privatized in
small-scale privatization was published by each participat-
ing municipality on an announcement board.
The most important institution in the property transfer
processes was the municipality. Article 65 of the Constitu-
tion states that “Municipalities and self-governing regions
are legal entities which independently use and manage prop-
erty and finances according to the law.”
In property transfer to regions, property is transferred
in relation to the regions’ competencies (healthcare, social
services, education, etc.). Like municipalities, regions must
sign a protocol with the previous administrator of the trans-
ferred state property. These administrators are often the prin-
cipals of the regional and district offices. Regions must sign
protocols within two months of the transfer of ownership
rights. However, there have been problems in practice. Re-
gions often refuse to sign the protocols, since they are not
elaborated precisely and the transfer of property is connect-
ed with unresolved issues. In the case of real estate, regions
are obliged to apply for changes in the cadastre within 12
months of the transfer of ownership rights.
Relevant parties in property transfer were/are:
1) national committees, abolished in 1990;
2) sub-district offices, established in 1990 and abolished
in 1996;
3) district and regional offices of state administration, es-
tablished in 1996;
4) municipalities, reestablished in 1990;
5) self-governing regions, established in 2001.
2. 3 Information on Public Property
In Slovakia, the privatization ministry takes care of state prop-
erty. However, a complete and exact inventory of state prop-
erty is not publicly available.
Real estate of any ownership is listed in the cadastre.
Information in this registry is publicly available, on payment
of a fee. Registration with the cadastre is necessary for claims
of ownership rights for any real estate. Starting in 2002 the
network of cadastral offices separated from the district offic-
es. The body of central administration for this network is
the Institute for Surveying, Cartography and Cadastre. Fi-
nancially, the network is directly connected to the state bud-
get. Despite efforts to reform the operation of cadastral of-
fices, they still operate as budgetary organizations and
decisions on funds flowing into the offices cannot be sepa-
rated from politics. The offices are often understaffed, and
the registration of ownership takes time. These problems
leave room for corruption.
3. LEGAL CONTEXT
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
3.1 Legal Provisions
on Property Transfer
The Slovak National Council approved the Municipal Prop-
erty Law (No. 138/1991) in the spring of 1991.  The pur-
pose of this law was to transfer state-owned property to
municipalities and define the property status of municipali-
ties and their use and management of their property.
The elementary provisions on municipal property are
included in the Law on Municipalities. However, it is the
Municipal Property Law that treats this issue in detail. Ac-
cording to the law, municipality property is to be used for
the provision of the municipal tasks. Further, this law states
that municipal property should be appreciated and kept in-
tact—a provision difficult to enforce due to the right to free
use of property by municipalities. Municipalities in Slova-
kia are allowed to enter into business activity, by nature in-
volving a degree of risk. There is no guarantee that property
invested into business will be returned intact. The Law on
Municipalities forbids donating municipal real estate not
defined in a special law. Municipal property that is used for
public purposes (e.g., local roads and public spaces) is wide-
ly accessible and can be used unless limited by the munici-
pality.
The Municipal Property Law defines transferred prop-
erty. However, it does not name the exact properties to be
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transferred. Municipalities were given the following state
property:
• Every property managed by national committees and
located in the territory of the municipality, except prop-
erty belonging to bodies of local administration.
• Small production, service and trade facilities became
municipal property if:
1) They were not listed to be privatized during small-
scale privatization.
2) They were listed, but the privatization was unsuc-
cessful.
• Property of state companies, budgetary and contributo-
ry organizations and the founder’s function was trans-
ferred to central government bodies or the respective
body of local state administration (requiring agreement
between the respective administrative branch and the
municipality).
• Towns received historic town halls owned by the state.
• Real estate under the managerial control of selected en-
terprises (for example, the Bratislava Construction Com-
pany) or former district committees when the Law on
Municipalities became effective. Real estate was trans-
ferred to the municipality of which they were located.
• Real estate formerly under the administration of sports
organizations (telovy´chovná jednota) abolished by the Law
on the State Property Administration. Municipalities
were obliged to continue to dedicate such real estate to
its established purpose (public sports activity).
Municipalities were given buildings, land plots, forests,
roads, parks, unused and public spaces, selected enterprises,
sports facilities, facilities for cultural events, daycares, etc. In
the first round—at the beginning of the 1990s—munici-
palities were not given property in the area of healthcare,
welfare or education.
Under the “second wave” of property decentralization,
initiated when the Municipal Property Law was amended in
2001, further state property has been transferred to munic-
ipalities. This law transfers ownership to municipalities of
properties to which founders’ functions were transferred by
the Competency Law (416/2001).
The Municipal Property Law allows for the transfer of
other properties based on agreements between municipali-
ties and respective local administration bodies. Every prop-
erty mentioned is transferred to the municipality in which it
is located.
The law does not provide an exact list of property to be
transferred, but it does define the following properties that
cannot be transferred to municipal ownership:
• property of which state ownership is forbidden by the
Constitution;
• private land;
• real estate under state ownership used by a non-state
organization, except for property listed above (schools
and social services);
• property of schools, school facilities and other facilities
under managerial control of national committees, the
founders’ functions of which were not transferred to
municipalities (not including real estate belonging to
schools which is not used for educational purposes)5;
• facilities for education, healthcare and welfare construct-
ed within the program of complex housing construc-
tion, except facilities constructed through Action “Z”
(a voluntary construction project during state socialism);
• technical infrastructure—water supply, sewage, gas sup-
ply, adjusting station for gas pipeline, electricity distri-
bution, transformers, telecommunications, TV and elec-
tricity distribution constructed within the complex hous-
ing construction;
• real estate used for foreign diplomatic, cultural and in-
formation facilities;
• facilities forming the civil emergency system.
Municipalities gained related property rights adminis-
tered formerly by national committees, state enterprises and
budgetary organizations. These rights were transferred to
municipal enterprises and budgetary organizations to which
founders’ functions were transferred to municipalities (un-
der law 518/1990). The respective organizations gain the
right of administration over these properties, while owner-
ship remains in the hands of the municipality.
Together with property, liabilities were transferred as
well. Transferred liabilities, however, amount only to the
value of transferred property. Municipalities did not take
over:
• liability for payments for supplies and services that are
overdue and not settled by the date of the transfer;
• liabilities for taxes, welfare and health insurance pay-
ments, etc. that were overdue and unpaid on the date of
transfer.6
Slovak legislation enables municipalities the right to
joint-ownership, regulated by a special law (the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership).
3.2 Self-governing Regions
and Property Decentralization
After 1998, the works on public administration reform had
started. They resulted in the approval of several laws in 2001.
The creation of regions completed the process of establish-
ing elected bodies in Slovakia (with the Law on Regional
Self-Government, 302/2001). During these reforms, com-
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petencies and respective property were transferred to regional
governments. This transfer is detailed in the Law on Re-
gional Self-Government Property (446/2001)—known as
the Regional Property Law.
As regards property, the Law on Regional Self-Govern-
ment is similar to the Law on Municipalities. Likewise, the
Regional Property Law has provisions very close to the Mu-
nicipal Property Law. Only the most important features of
this law will be explained here.
Regions received property that had been administered by:
• legal entities, of which founders’ functions were trans-
ferred to regions in accordance with the Competency
Law (416/2001);
• founders of vocational education and training centers
without legal independence;
• founders of welfare services facilities without legal inde-
pendence, of which the founders’ functions were trans-
ferred to regions by the Competency Law.
Regions also take over liabilities related to transferred
property. The law defines what liabilities do not transfer:
• liability payments for supplies and services that were
overdue and unpaid on the date of transfer;
• liability for tax, welfare and health insurance payments.
Regions can use property just as can municipalities. They
cannot, however, use the property to establish a new legal
entity.
The law defines rules for property management and use.
Regions must maintain the use of property that was intend-
ed for education, welfare support, health care or cultural
purposes at the time of transfer. This obligation can be can-
celed only through the exclusion of the facility from the net-
work of particular facilities (by law regulating the respective
field).
Regions also received founders’ competencies over mu-
seums, galleries and other historical and cultural facilities.
The use of these facilities is regulated by the Law on Preser-
vation of Cultural and Historical Heritage (known as the
Heritage Law).  Regions cannot alienate such property; re-
pairs and reconstructions must be undertaken under expert
supervision, etc.
Further matters relating to property use and manage-
ment by regions are regulated by provisions relating to those
regulating municipal property use and management.
3.3 Regulations on Property
Management by Local Governments
A municipality is allowed to assign its budgetary or contrib-
utory (what is called an “indirect budget beneficiary” in Ser-
bia) organization to administer its property. Municipalities
are further allowed to use property to invest in a commercial
company or to form the basis of a new legal entity. This
provision excludes property used for education and related
activities, welfare support, healthcare and culture. The mu-
nicipality is obliged to continue a single-purpose assignment
of such property. This obligation is canceled upon:
• exclusion of school facilities from the school network
according to the Schooling Law (29/1984);7
• exclusion of a social service facility from its network by
the authorized body (e.g., the relevant ministry);
• closing of the facility under a special law;
• decision of the municipal council in cases of surplus or
unusable tangible assets.
Property transferred in selected areas (education, wel-
fare support, healthcare, culture) cannot be used as collater-
al and cannot be declared in bankruptcy cases.
Municipalities and respective organizations are obliged
to manage and use municipal and state property to develop
the municipality, serve its citizens and protect the environ-
ment. These institutions are obliged to develop, protect and
appreciate the municipal property. This obligation includes:
• maintenance and usage of property;
• protection of property against damage, destruction, loss
or abuse;
• use of all available legal means to protect property, in-
cluding use of ownership rights or interest;
• entrance of property in relevant registries.
3.4 Limitations
on Local Property Management
The use of museum and library collections are regulated the
Heritage Law.
According to this law, a municipality must protect, ren-
ovate and make use of the cultural artifacts in its territory.
The municipality ensures that owners of cultural artifacts
act in accordance with this law, coordinating construction
of technical infrastructure to protect historical sites and co-
operating in the construction of historical parks, public light-
ing and advertisement to raise historical and cultural aware-
ness. The municipality supports civic initiatives to protect
artifacts and sites and maintains a monument registry. The
municipality is allowed to collect contributions and funds
for the repair and renovation of monuments in its territory.
The municipality is responsible for the management of
the cultural heritage registry, which includes movable re-
mains as well as real estate, natural and man-made items,
historical events, street names, geographical and cadastral
names, etc.—anything connected to the history of the mu-
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nicipality and its citizens. The municipality submits this reg-
istry to the regional heritage office (Pamiatkovy´ úrad); in the
case of real estate, the registry is submitted to the construc-
tion licensing office as well (Stavebny´ úrad).  Entries in the
registry are subject to further detailed limitations for use by
municipalities.
Municipalities received land and forests that they owned
prior to nationalization in 1949. Together with land and for-
ests, municipalities gained the agricultural, water treatment
and forestry facilities they owned prior to 1949, if the facil-
ities belonged to the state on the date of transfer. A munic-
ipality could deny the transfer of such objects in special cas-
es—mainly related to national parks and other protected
areas.
3.5 Distribution of Competencies
within Local Government
The Municipal Property Law defines certain rules of prop-
erty management. The key players are the municipal coun-
cil and the mayor.
The municipal council must also approve rules for mu-
nicipal property management, including:
• rights and obligations of organizations established or
founded by the municipality in order to manage mu-
nicipal property;
• prerequisites for alienation of municipal property from
organizations founded or established by municipality;
• use of securities;
• a list of activities that must be authorized by municipal
bodies.
According to the Municipal Property Law, the follow-
ing activities must be approved by the municipal council:
• transfer of real estate ownership;
• transfer of movable assets above a value set by the mu-
nicipal council;
• operations concerning ownership rights of a defined
value;
• auctions according to special regulations;
• investment of real estates to the property of new or ex-
isting commercial companies;
• investment of other property of a value defined by the
municipal council in new or existing commercial com-
panies.
The mayor is the statutory body of local government.
Since the municipality is a legal entity, the statutory body is
authorized to act on its behalf. The statutory body must
authorize any transfer of property. There are operations with
municipal property that do not require approval by the
municipal council. These operations are defined by law or
by the approved municipal property management rules. In
the case of such operations, the approval/signature of the
mayor is sufficient.
The Law on Municipalities obliges the municipality to
have an auditor-in-chief. The auditor-in-chief is appointed
by the municipal council for a six-year term. The council is
the only body that can recall the auditor. The auditor is an
employee of the municipality and reports to the municipal
council. The auditor-in-chief has the following duties:
• Control municipal budget revenues and expenses, use
of municipal property and operations by budgetary and
contributory organizations.
• Provide expert opinions on the municipal budget finan-
cial statement prior to their approval by the municipal
council.
• Submit results of control activity directly to the munic-
ipal council.
• Report to the municipal council at least once a year on
control activities.
• Cooperate with respective administration bodies on
matters of use and management of state budget trans-
fers to the municipality.
According to the Law on Municipalities, the municipal
council must form expert commissions on various topics,
including property management. More often, however, the
municipal council forms a commission to supervise the mu-
nicipal economy as a whole. Commissions are advisory bod-
ies; their decisions do not create obligations for the munici-
pality.
In cases of territorial changes, municipalities must settle
their own ownership relations. The courts arbitrate conflicts
that arise from transfer of ownership rights, property rights
and state liabilities to municipalities. The courts are autho-
rized to act on any property conflict connected to the trans-
fer ownership rights from the state to municipalities.
4. ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF PUBLIC
PROPERTY DECENTRALIZATION
4.1 Scale of Municipal Property
There is no summary of the scale of transferred and other
municipal property in Slovakia. Even the Association of
Towns and Villages of Slovakia (ZMOS), the organization
representing 90% of municipalities in Slovakia, does not
provide such information. The ministry of finance keeps
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records on municipal budgets and financial statements, but
their information proved inaccessible and incomplete. There-
fore, the scale of municipal property is provided here in very
rough estimates and quite inconsistently.
In 1992, municipalities received 330,000 previously
state-owned apartments. In subsequent years they received
an additional 20,000 apartments. Today, municipalities own
almost 40,000 apartments (about 2.4% of the total number
of apartments in Slovakia).  In the beginning of the 1990s,
municipalities took over unfinished housing, technical and
social infrastructure objects as well, valued at around Sk 12
billion.
Municipalities own about 180,000 hectares of agricul-
tural and non-agricultural land. Along with this land, mu-
nicipalities own almost 192,000 hectares of forested land.
Forests were transferred to municipalities as part of the pro-
cess of restitution. Municipalities also own facilities for agri-
cultural and forestry production that were owned by mu-
nicipalities before 1949.
The privatization of healthcare facilities will be com-
pleted in 2003 (Table 6.1).
In the last four years, municipalities received 119 health-
care facilities, mostly local clinics and policlinics, valued at
Sk 474.329 million.
More about the scale of municipal property can be found
in municipal financial statements. However, these documents
do not directly describe property value. Balance sheets pro-
vide the value of resources covering fixed and floating assets
of budgetary and contributory organizations—about Sk
196.3 billion in 2001. Property funds accounted for Sk 192.7
billion of these funds. In comparison, at the beginning of
2000, own resources amounted to Sk 173.6 billion.
More precise and consistent records of property trans-
ferred to municipalities will be available after transfer proto-
cols are signed. These protocols contain a detailed list of
property being transferred together with the competencies
under which they are used. Municipalities and regions are
receiving substantial property—founders’ rights in many
areas of welfare services, primary and secondary education,
culture and healthcare are gradually being transferred to self-
governments.
4.2 Property-related Revenues
in Municipal Budgets
Even though the exact scale of municipal property is diffi-
cult to estimate, available data gives a picture of property-
related revenues to municipal budgets. These revenues con-
sist of:
• sale of buildings, apartments and land plots;
• enterprise and ownership revenues;
• municipal apartment rentals;
• transfers from contributory organizations;
• sale of shares;
• interest on deposits and loans.
Table 6.1
Transfer of Healthcare Facilities to Municipalities
1999 2000 2001 2002
Units Value Units Value Units Value Units Value
[Thousand Sk] [Thousand Sk] [Thousand Sk] [Thousand Sk]
7 10,949 80 145,347 16 43,325 16 274,708
SOURCE: Privatization ministry.
Table 6.2
Municipal Property Related Revenues
[Millions of Sks]
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Property 51.2 106.1 1,903.7 1,905.2 2,163 2,265.9 2,970.9 3,366.3 2,644.5 4,895.5 4,781.6
revenues total
Sales of 2,758.9 2,122.8 2,535.8 2,525.1
real estates
SOURCE: Municipal financial statements 1991–2001.
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In the past, the sale of municipal property served for
balancing missing funds for operational expenditures of
local government. Starting in 2002, municipalities are not
allowed to use revenues from municipal property sale for
these purposes. Such funds can be used only for new in-
vestments (construction of facilities, etc.) or municipal debt
settlement.
The financial authority of local governments is insuffi-
cient, and municipalities often lack funds for covering their
assigned functions. Since municipal tax revenues are more
or less still defined by the state budget, municipalities must
seek non-tax revenues. Total revenues of municipal budgets
were Sk 32.7 billion in 2001. Transfers from the state bud-
get (shared tax revenues, subsidies for small municipalities
and other subsidies and transfers) have reached Sk 11.75
billion. Revenues related to municipal property ownership
account for about Sk 4.8 billion (14.7% of total revenues).
Further significant sources of municipal revenues were real
estate taxes (Sk 3.7 billion) and credits (Sk 2.7 billion).
The breakdown of property-related revenues points to
the reasonable use of municipal property. In 2000 and 2001,
municipalities received significant revenues from property
rentals—Sk 1,095 million and Sk 1,120 million respective-
ly (for buildings, apartments, land plots, etc.). This is a more
favorable use of property, as revenues are repeatable. The
fact that property sales have not risen in the last two years
indicates that municipalities are learning more responsible
ways to use property.
Table 6.3
Breakdown of Property-related Revenues in 2001
Revenues Source  [Million Sks] % of Total
Revenues
Sale of real estate 2,525.1 7.72
Enterprise and 449 1.37
property ownership
Property rentals 1,120 3.43
Municipal apartment rentals 367.4 1.12
Transfers from contributory 171.7 0.53
organizations
Sale of shares 148.4 0.45
Interest on deposits 192.2 0.59
and provided loans
Total revenues/ 32,700 15.21
% of total revenues
SOURCE: Municipal financial statement.
In Bratislava, revenues totaled Sk 2.85 billion in 2001.
In the same year, the city sold property worth Sk 406.7 mil-
lion. Revenues from property rentals reached Sk 187.2 mil-
lion; enterprise and property ownership, Sk 7.5 million;
transfers from contributory organizations, Sk 3.5 million;
sale of shares, Sk 86.9 million; and interests on deposits and
provided loans, Sk 88 million. Overall, property-related rev-
enues in the City of Bratislava budget (not including
district budgets) totaled Sk 779.8 million (27.4% of total
revenues).
4.3 Sale of Municipal Property
The scale and value of municipal property that is suitable
for sale is directly proportional to the size of the municipal-
ity. There are several kinds of municipal property with var-
ious meanings in terms of privatization. Sale of property
brings revenue to municipalities; however, local governments
must maintain property that is difficult to sell.
Privatization of municipal apartments was probably the
most problematic process in municipal property privatiza-
tion. The original motivation for the transfer of apartments
to municipalities was that these apartments would be sold in
order to generate revenue for further housing construction.
However, calculations proved this idea wrong, as revenues
were insufficient even for maintenance of existing munici-
pal housing. Moreover, municipalities had to cope with the
issue of unfinished KBV units (complex housing construc-
tion).
The sale of municipal apartments began in 1992.
However, a number of obstacles had to be addressed first.
Several amendments to several laws were approved. Another
problem was insufficient capacity of cadastral offices when
citizens overburdened some offices with applications to reg-
ister ownership of former municipal apartments. Munici-
palities retained about 10,000 apartments for permanent
exclusion from privatization. Due to these problems, sale of
municipal apartments has not been completed. After trans-
forming former municipal enterprises, the maintenance and
administration of their apartments was put in the hands of
municipal administration companies (private/municipal,
etc.). Operation of such companies was often very non-trans-
parent and there was much fraud in municipal pro-perty
administration.
Agricultural and non-agricultural lands form another
category of municipal property suitable for sale. Sale of non-
agricultural land takes place individually from municipality
to municipality. Primarily, attractive construction sites have
become a vital source of finance. These plots were sold mainly
through real estate agencies and public tenders. However,
even this process has been plagued by scandal and corrup-
tion. Recently, municipalities have realized the value of hous-
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other aforementioned laws. Such property was to be priva-
tized in two phases—small-scale and large-scale privatization.
Small-scale privatization was governed by the Law on
Small-scale Privatization (427/1990—in Czechoslovakia).
This law transferred ownership of service and retail organi-
zations, and organizations not related to agricultural pro-
duction. Basically, it was a way to quickly privatize retail
and tourism facilities and service businesses through the
public auctions (Niznansky´ and Reptová 1999). Property
that was not successfully sold in public tenders and auctions
was transferred to municipal ownership. Similarly, property
of special importance to local governments that was not in-
cluded in property laws was transferred to municipalities.
Along with the transfer of about 490 facilities during small-
scale privatization, municipalities received revenues from the
privatization of enterprises, to which the municipality had
received founders’ rights. In 1993, 1994 and 1999, munic-
ipalities received 25% of such revenues, totaling Sk 1.05
billion.
Large-scale privatization involved the privatization of
large economic entities such as manufacturing enterprises,
banks, insurance companies, large trade companies, etc. It
was regulated by the Law on Large-scale Privatization (92/
1991). Large-scale privatization occurred in two phases us-
ing several methods (vouchers, direct sale, tender, auction,
etc.). During the first phase, municipalities took over prop-
erty worth Sk 886 million—mostly comprising privatized
companies’ housing units, daycares, kindergartens, recreation
facilities and land plots. Some municipalities became share-
holders in various companies (Bratislava, Ko ice and Poprad
gained the shares in CSA airlines; Topolcany in Topvar
brewery; Humenné in the Chemes chemical production com-
pany; spa municipalities became shareholders in the local
spas, etc.).9
In large-scale privatization, privatization of public bus
transportation companies (SAD) was especially relevant to
local governments. In 2002, a 49% stake of 17 regional SAD
companies was sold to private companies. The remaining
51% stake remained under National Property Fund owner-
ship. In the second phase of the transformation of SADs,
the National Property Fund will transfer 34% of its shares
to regional governments. This transfer will be connected to
the transfer of competencies in the area of road manage-
ment and transportation.
4.4.2 Privatization
and Infrastructure Development
Privatization of state utility companies is closely connected
to the issue of municipal property. There are two dimen-
s¡
s¡
ing construction for local economic development. They of-
fer land plots from utilities for symbolic prices as a way to
address housing and employment issues.
Municipalities established special municipal companies
to administer forests and forestland. Profits from such com-
panies go to municipal budgets. Forests are often used as
collateral, and in many cases municipalities have used the
sale of municipal forests to cover municipal debt.
For example, in 2001, the city of Ko ice was on the
verge of defaulting on loans in excess of Sk 2 billion. In
order to meet the conditions of the settlement, Ko ice need-
ed to lower the debt to Sk 1.2 billion. The city wanted to
fulfill this condition by selling city forests. The original idea
was to sell about 20,000 hectares of forests for Sk 3.5 bil-
lion, later decreased to Sk 2.5 billion. There was no demand
for such a purchase. The city turned to the state to buy the
forests for about Sk 1 billion, but the state came up with a
different way to help. The city received a 15-year state loan
guaranteed by city property and the bank took over the re-
maining debt settlement. This solution, however, turned out
to be insufficient for solving the financial situation of the
city, and Kosice continues to search for a buyer for its for-
ests.
Buildings are the largest source of privatization reve-
nues for municipalities. The disadvantage of this is that
municipalities often sell buildings that could later be used
more efficiently by the municipalities themselves. However,
financial difficulties force municipalities to sell them. Cor-
ruption and fraud are not unknown in this area either. So
far, however, no local government representative has been
sentenced for municipal property fraud or corruption be-
cause of the sale of municipal property.8
4. 4 Significance of Privatization
(and Compensation)
Most revenues come from the privatization of properties that
were not transferred by the Municipal Property Law. Second
in importance is the privatization of municipal property.
Third, funds with which municipalities are reimbursed for
the construction of utilities after the privatization of state
utilities companies (gas and electricity distributions) and the
transfer of state water and sewage companies to munici-
palities.
4.4.1 State Property Privatization Revenues
Municipalities participated in the privatization of state prop-
erty that was not included in the Municipal Property Law or
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sions to this problem—state water and sewage companies
will be privatized, and municipalities will be reimbursed for
the construction of utilities with revenue from the privatiza-
tion of gas and electricity companies.
By law, municipalities are responsible for water supply
and waste disposal within their territory. However, state com-
panies (Vodárne a kanalizácie) still deliver water and provide
wastewater collection and treatment few (a few small mu-
nicipal companies began operating in these areas over
the last three years). In the past, construction of the water
supply, sewage and wastewater treatment facilities were pri-
marily financed by municipalities. These constructions were
transferred to the state later. Municipalities pushed the gov-
ernment to transfer these companies to municipalities, and
this process started in the mid-1990s. In 2001, a govern-
ment resolution set the final procedures for transformation.
The government approved the establishment of six munici-
pal water supply companies (despite a proposal from mu-
nicipal leaders to form eight). In 2002, privatization pro-
posals for creating these six companies were approved and
transformation of the state companies into stock companies
was to be completed by the end of 2002. The final number
of companies after transformation will probably be seven.
Property and functions of original state companies will be
gradually transferred to these new municipal companies. The
value of property to be transferred to municipalities totals
Sk 37.9 billion. After the transformation is complete, mu-
nicipalities will most likely look for private investors to in-
vest in these companies. Property ownership should, how-
ever, remain in the hands of municipalities, with private
companies only serving as managers.
Similarly, municipalities requested the transfer of shares
in state energy and gas companies. The rationale for such a
request is that municipalities paid for and constructed gas
and electricity distribution lines, regulation stations for gas
supply and electric transformers under Action Z. In this case,
municipalities are asking only for compensation for payments
made by their citizens. It is difficult, however, for munici-
palities to prove which facilities should be included. The
expense of such constructions will be difficult to estimate as
well. Therefore, municipalities must find a way to demon-
strate the amount of their contribution. Even after 1989,
the law obliged municipalities to transfer gas distribution
lines, electricity distribution lines and other facilities con-
structed from the municipal sources to respective state com-
panies free of charge. The irrationality of such an obligation
is further stressed by the fact that citizens must pay for the
use of infrastructure, the construction of which they financed
themselves.
Municipalities have lobbied for reimbursement of their
investments into gas distribution lines since the late 1990s,
when the first information on potential privatization of SPP
(Slovensky´ plynárensky´ priemysel—the gas company) appeared.
Municipal leaders proposed that compensation should come
from revenues from the SPP’s privatization. The company
provided partial compensation before 1999, when almost
Sk 1 billion was transferred to municipalities (another Sk
0.5 billion was transferred in 1999 and 2000). In 2002, a
49% stake in SPP was sold to a consortium of foreign gas
companies, and ZMOS succeeded in lobbying for further
compensation (Sk 4.073 billion was distributed between
1,500 municipalities). This amount was transferred to the
municipal bank (PKB—a specialized municipal bank) and
municipalities may withdraw a value based on individual
compensation agreements. Municipalities may use these
funds to settle of debts or invest in economic development.
The ZMOS a similar success will result from lobbying for
the compensation for investments in electricity distribution
facilities. Municipalities are asking for compensation total-
ing about Sk 0.5 billion.
4.5 Utilization of Local Assets
for Local Economic
Development Actions
Municipalities have no significant options for influencing
local economic development. As shown in Capková’s research
(2001), they stimulate economic development mostly
through rental of buildings and land plots.  Municipalities
also use the sale or donation of land plots, buildings, post-
ponement of local tax payments, deductions in local taxes,
as well as various forms of reliefs and waivers. Some munic-
ipalities invest in commercial enterprises or establish of en-
terprises themselves. Municipalities often prepare sites for
potential investors in their territory, a high-investment ac-
tivity. Municipalities have constructed industrial parks, but
municipal financial funds are not sufficient for such projects.
Additional financing must come from the state budget. On
the other end of the scale, municipalities do not often issue
loans to entrepreneurs or subsidies for commercial compa-
nies. Municipalities offer assistance in administrative tasks
related to enterprising, favorable rents, consulting, promo-
tional activities and start-up assistance.
Municipalities do not like to provide guarantees for en-
trepreneurs’ credits. This is because municipalities would
use municipal real estate as collateral, and there are not suf-
ficient guarantees that supported activity will be profitable.
In the first years of their existence, many municipalities had
to take over debts on private companies and lost property. If
municipalities decide to put their property at stake, they do
so to support local production, increase employment, sup-
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port food production, tourism, hotel renovation, protection
and improvement of the environment, etc. Municipal in-
vestments can be secured in various ways—contracts, insur-
ance, exchange of collateral after an investment is carried
out and thorough supervision by the municipality. Often,
however, municipalities do not take such measures to secure
investments.
Even if municipalities are hesitant to support private
companies directly, they are still willing to participate in eco-
nomic activities. They form companies, with various forms
of ownership and legal status. Almost 75% of municipalities
with over 2,000 inhabitants possess at least one 100% mu-
nicipally-owned company. 44% have shares in such compa-
nies. Contributory organizations account for the majority of
100% municipally-owned companies. Contributory orga-
nizations are municipal companies connected to the munic-
ipal budget through contribution transfer. Financial rela-
tions with the municipality are given in the municipal budget.
Contributory organizations deliver public services that can
be covered by fees, and municipal budget transfers only cov-
er potential losses. Out of the total number of companies
with municipal shares, almost 75% are directly connected
to the municipal budget. This portion decreases as the size
of the municipality increases. Large municipalities form com-
mercial companies (limited-liability companies and stock
companies) more often than small ones. As for employment,
75% of 100% municipally-owned companies are small en-
terprises with less than 25 employees. Only 5% of such com-
panies have more than one hundred employees.
Municipalities also engage in commercial enterprises
with multi-municipal ownership. Almost 17% of munici-
palities with over 2,000 inhabitants have a share in such
companies.
Larger municipalities are more likely to contract private
companies to carry out services for citizens. The reasons that
municipalities use the private services are: lower costs, high-
er flexibility and the existence of a private company able to
deliver the necessary services. Often, municipalities use both
contributory organizations and private companies for provi-
sion of a single service.
4.6 Strategic Planning Regarding
Municipal Property and Assets
The majority of municipalities do not have a realistic long-
term strategy for economic development. Such a concept
should include not only necessary investment and non-in-
vestment activities, but, above all, a draft arrangement of
the economic structure of the municipality, including own-
ership and organizational and legal forms to ensure the per-
formance of municipal self-government functions. Due to
this absence, municipalities often engage in inappropriate
and uncontrolled activity. Problems with municipal waste,
dilapidated real estate, public transport and housing, etc.
have often caught municipalities unprepared. Solutions se-
lected under pressure were rarely optimal. In what other way
can the inadequate investments of cities like Kosice and Ban-
ská Bystrica be explained?
This lack is not only due to inadequate capacity of self-
government officials, but also due to lack of adequate regu-
lation, which would clearly divide the rights and obligations
between state and local governments.
Capková’s research (2001) showed that less than half of
the investigated cities (34) had elaborated and approved a
long-term planning document. Most municipalities with over
2,000 inhabitants have master plans. However, these plans
are often outdated, and municipalities update them only
when a potential investor appears. According to the research,
municipalities have no concept of municipal property use,
no tax strategy for municipality development and no con-
cept for support and development of entrepreneurship. In
the future, municipalities plan to elaborate strategic docu-
ments to deal with municipal development as a whole, in-
cluding systemic use of municipal property.
Local governments in Slovakia do not have sufficient
experience in the elaboration of strategic and conceptual
documents. This situation is mainly due to an unsystematic
process of municipal staff education and training. For mu-
nicipalities to elaborate and apply viable strategic plans, their
staff must have certain knowledge and be capable of strate-
gic thinking. More emphasis must be put on the proper def-
inition of strategic issues and procedures. However, signs of
change in this area can be observed. Several municipalities
have recognized the advantages of systematic use of local
assets for municipal development and have strategic plans
for future development.
5. CONCLUSION
Property decentralization has been problematic, but contin-
ues in a positive direction. This paper has analyzed the time-
frame of property devolution as well as its organizational
and institutional framework. The laws and legal regulations
related to municipal property transfer, use and management
have been examined. Economic aspects of property decen-
tralization, including scale, statistical information and the
fiscal relevance of municipal property have been analyzed as
well.
The years of transition have seen a continuous transfer
of property and use of municipal property for improving the
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financial situation of local governments. After 2001, the
newly created self-governing regions instigated further trans-
fer of state property to local government.
5.1 Failures of Public Property Transfer
in Slovakia
The following failures can be cited:
1) Insufficient control mechanisms, mainly at the begin-
ning of the process, to prevent conflicts of interest and
favoritism (e.g., transfer of municipal property to rela-
tives of local government representatives).
2) Following 1989, ownership settlements for nationalized
property have not been adequately dealt with. Munici-
palities or regions often received state property that had
been nationalized after the communist upheaval of 1948,
and requests from the original owners have not been
settled. Land crossed by roads or under schools cannot
be returned. However, other forms of restitution can be
applied (mostly financial). The original owner must file
a request for restitution with the local government. It
would be logical that these requests are processed by
local administrations (the institution that nationalized
the property to begin with), but as the properties have
already been transferred to municipal ownership, such
restitution issues remain the responsibility of munici-
palities.
3) The quality of legislation elaborated prior to transfer
was poor, and laws were sometimes approved during or
shortly prior to transfer. The trained staff in charge of
decentralization became critical in this regard.
Regarding more recent property transfers, local govern-
ment representatives identified the following problems:
• Preparation for the transfer of competencies from local
administration offices was inadequate. Despite the fact
the administration knew property would be transferred,
no action was taken to properly document and regulate
the transfer.
• Transfers were often laden with unsettled operational
debts (often large unpaid utility bills). Utility compa-
nies threatened to shut off supply if debts were not set-
tled. The law stipulates that the state (the central gov-
ernment) is to pay this debt. Municipalities, however,
had no powers to force the state to settle its debts.
Further problems related to property transfer include:
unresolved ownership relations, lack of property reports,
insurance and problems related to facilities located on/in the
restituted property.
The state of repair of buildings transferred to local gov-
ernments was another concern. The so-called moderniza-
tion debt totals several tens of billions of crowns—the result
of poor management and lack of maintenance. The Laws on
Municipal and Regional Property state that these debts pass
to the local government. Regions feel the largest weight of
this burden, as they did not receive the amount of property
with freedom of use that was received by municipalities. How
regions will raise funds to pay off these debts is still unclear.
5.2 Challenges in Public Property
Transfer to Local Governments
in Slovakia
In subsequent years, more competencies will be transferred
to municipalities and self-governing regions than those al-
ready defined by the existing Competency Law. The lessons
learned from previous transfers of competencies and prop-
erty should be reflected in preparation for further transfers.
The issue of transferring state property to regions should
be addressed in the near future. Regions currently have no
property with which to form the financial basis of develop-
ment. Property transferred to regions carries the huge ‘mod-
ernization debt’ that must be covered by the regions them-
selves. If the state was able to pass on responsibilities for
transferred property, it should be obligated to create condi-
tions for local governments to modernize and renovate old
buildings. Instead, the state strictly limits local governments’
use of most recently transferred property (after 2002). Such
limitations will have to be minimized in the future.
New laws cannot effectively address the problem of cor-
ruption and misbehavior in property management. Instead,
current laws need to be enforced more vigilantly. The devel-
opment of civil society could also help address this issue.
Public awareness of civil rights and the competencies of lo-
cal governments to use property must be raised by publicity
campaigns.
Local government staff must be educated to think stra-
tegically, preparing and implementing strategic planning
documents on property management. Sale, lease and other
uses of the property should be systematic, with the use of
such incomes clearly devoted to local/regional development.
5.3 Lessons Learned
The transfer of competencies and property was slowed by
delays in public administration reform, lack of preparation
and other complications (unresolved ownership relations,
incomplete documentation, insufficient information on the
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state of repair of buildings and facilities, etc.). Shortcomings
in laws on the transfer of competencies complicated the ac-
companying property transfer.
Everything related to property transfer was somewhat
chaotic. The scale of property transferred to municipalities
over a decade ago is still impossible to quantify. This disor-
der ultimately points to poor performance by public admin-
istrators. Public administration bodies restructured proper-
ty ownership several times during socialism and after 1989
as well, but the chaos in the public property registry was
publicly visible for the first time only during privatization.
Disorder was even more pronounced during transfer of prop-
erty to local governments. During this process, complica-
tions in property ownership were also passed on to local gov-
ernments. In the long-term, citizens will know which
properties are private and which are public, which belong to
municipalities, regions or the state. To define all the condi-
tions of property transfer before the process begins is impos-
sible. Certain properties must not be alienated by the state
under any circumstances. Individual problematic cases can
be left for later, when there is time to sort through them.
Trying to fine-tune the conditions of transfer when process
has already begun has proved fruitless.
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Law on Protection of Cultural Heritage (49/2002—the
Heritage Law).
Law on Regional Property (446/2001).
Law on Regional Self-Government (302/2001).
Law on Small-scale Privatization (427/1990).
Law on Transfer of Founders’ Functions from National
Committees to Municipalities, Government Bodies and
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Law on Transfer of Selected Competencies from State
Authorities to Municipalities and Self-Governing
Regions (416/2001—the Competency Law).
Municipal financial statements 1990-2001
Schooling Law (29/1984).
NOTES
1 For the purposes of this paper, “local government” refers
to bodies of locally-elected officials enjoying some degree
of financial autonomy; “local administration” refers to
local branches of the central administration whose
officials are appointed from above rather than elected.
2 Small-scale privatization refers to privatization of small
production, service and trade facilities. Large-scale
privatization (organized by the so-called Law on Large-
scale Privatization) refers to privatization of large
companies, banks, etc. Large-scale privatization has not
yet been completed).
3 The facilities relevant for municipalities that were
excluded from the small privatization were under full
ownership of municipalities (see section 3.1)
4 This included head-quarters of organizations, even if
other units were located in an other municipality.
5 This provision has been indirectly amended; pre-schools,
elementary schools and related facilities became the
property of municipality in which they are located.
6 These liabilities have been partially paid by the state
budget; the rest is to be paid from the same source.
7 Local administration bodies are authorized to make such
a decision—in this case, the local representative of the
minister of education.
8 This is mainly due to weak law enforcement and the
sophisticated methods of corruption and fraud.
9 A provision concerning the transformation of state
companies into joint-stock companies transferred a
certain percentage of privatized shares to municipalities.
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Policy Recommendations for Returning and
Transferring Property to Local Government in Serbia1
C h a r l e s  J ó k a y
1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Municipalities and cities in Serbia may “use” state property
to carry out their functions. Local governments may use,
enjoy the benefits of and make improvements to state prop-
erty, but they may not sell or own property. Titles to assets
acquired by local governments, in particular real estate, are
issued in the name of the Republic of Serbia (RS), not the
purchaser. The 1995 Law on Assets confiscated all other
types of previous municipal property without compensation.
The Law on Privatization (2001) allots a 5% share of
privatization revenues to both the autonomous province and
to the municipality or city for infrastructure development if
revenues are generated from the privatization of an entity
headquartered in that jurisdiction. The privatization of an
entity, such as a utility or a bank, which has many branch
offices and production equipment in many localities, will
lead to disputes.
Another 15% is distributed as compensations to private
persons for nationalized property and endowments to the
National Health Fund. The balance, 75% of cash proceeds,
goes to repayment of public debt (see Article 60-61). The
scope of privatization could apply to legal entities that are
“socially owned” or “state owned…unless otherwise provid-
ed for in special regulations” (Article 3). The Privatization
Law excludes “natural resources and goods in public use, as
well as goods of general interest.” A definition of these ex-
ceptions is warranted, as communal enterprises and many
other service-providing entities do serve public and general
interest. Whether this excludes the use of public-private part-
nerships where state or “social” assets are combined with
private capital is uncertain.
In accordance with the Law on Property Owned by the
Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia
53/95, 3/96, 54/96 and 32/97), all residential accommoda-
tions that were “socially owned” and conferred to munici-
palities prior to 1995 were “nationalized” and have become
state property. Nevertheless, municipalities were authorized
to continue to dispose with housing units as they did before,
without prior consent of the state agency (see Law on
Since its inception in 2001, the work of the Serbian Local
Government Reform Program (SLGRP) has been obstruct-
ed by state ownership of assets used by local governments.
All key actors in the decentralization process in Serbia—
representatives from central and local governments as well
as members of international community—recognize this
problem. Addressing this challenge, SLGRP, supported by
USAID, in cooperation with the Local Government Initia-
tive of the Open Society Institute (Budapest), agreed to help
local stakeholders (especially the Standing Conference of
Towns and Municipalities and the PALGO Center) in their
efforts to put this issue on the Serbian government’s agenda
and provide analytical and advisory support. To meet these
ends, studies were prepared by experts from Poland, Hun-
gary, Slovakia and Latvia with the intention of document-
ing the experiences of these countries in the devolution of
property to the municipal level from 1990 to 2002. The
present paper is a summary of the experiences of transitional
countries expected to join the EU on May 1, 2004, leading
to specific political and technical recommendations for the
Serbian government.
The recommendations this paper offers do not flow only
from international experiences. They have also grown out of
input from local experts and officials, including but not lim-
ited to: analysis prepared by local government officials from
Nis, Krusevac and Aleksandrovac and by an official of the
Serbian Secretariat for Legislation, comments heard on
the Technical Conference on Property Devolution to Local
Governments in Serbia (held on November 8, 2002 and
January 29, 2003) in Belgrade, a number of interviews and
focus groups with experts and officials on different levels of
government.
The authors certainly recognize that the experience of
the Central European countries are not always applicable to
Serbia, and that stakeholders in Serbia, given their unique
circumstances and initiatives already taken, must be given
an opportunity to question, comment on, disagree with and
finally modify this set of recommendations.
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Property, Article 50). In the previous ten years, during the
privatization of state-owned housing units, municipalities
had already sold almost all housing units.
On a constitutional basis, local self-government units
do not own the property used in carrying out mandatory
and delegated duties. The 1992 Federal Constitution (to be
superceded by a new constitution of Serbia-Montenegro)
does not list municipal or city property as a class of proper-
ty, stipulating in Article 73 that “real estate and other prop-
erty utilized by federal organs and local authorities and or-
ganizations performing public services shall be state owned,
and the status and rights of these organs and organizations
as regards the disposition of these assets and their utilization
shall be regulated by law.” Article 56 of the 1990 Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Serbia identifies social, state, private
and cooperative forms of property explicitly. Article 59 au-
thorizes the Republic of Serbia to “transform social and state”
property into other forms of ownership. Article 60 indicates
that “urban construction sites,” unless they are privately
owned, shall be owned by the state or are considered “social
property.” The state is also the legal owner of local govern-
ment service facilities, despite the fact that in most cases
municipalities and towns were the primary investors in build-
ing and equipment of the municipal school buildings, local
hospitals and social welfare institutions. The Law on Property
Owned by the Republic of Serbia still regulates that issue.
Three options for resolving the constitutional obstacle
have been proposed by various experts:
a) Abolish the Law on Property of the Republic of Serbia;
b) Amend the Property Law by allowing unlimited mu-
nicipal authority over property they use, including the
right to sell such property, with the state acting only as
a formal owner;
c) Wait for changes to either or both constitutions.
There seems to be a general disagreement among ex-
perts whether constitutional and statutory restrictions on
municipal ownership—significant hindrances to efficient
property management—could be overcome within the ex-
isting framework, avoiding the need for politically contro-
versial changes to systemic laws.2
As of March 2003, no proposed legislation addresses
the return of municipal/city property nor transfers of state
assets to support new functions assigned by the 2002 Law
on Local Self-Government. Serbia could benefit from the
experiences from central governments in other transition
countries that transferred property using a variety of legal
bases in the early 1990s.
The first and most important step was to provide con-
stitutional and statutory guarantees for property (both real
and financial) that were in municipal (council) possession
upon transition (the equivalent in Serbia would be return-
ing municipal and city property nationalized in 1995. In
addition, transition countries such as Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic assigned state enterprises, real estate and
other assets to local governments prior to their transforma-
tion into limited companies and ultimate privatization. Pro-
ceeds from other privatized state assets that were not first
transferred to the municipal level were partially paid in cash
and state bonds. A final type of property transfer or com-
pensation involved reimbursing local governments for ‘self
contributions’ and other involuntary investments paid by
residents for developing infrastructure—in some cases the
actual capital costs of manufacturing facilities. In the case of
Serbia, state asset transfers involve all of the above, in addi-
tion to the unique aspects of returning assets nationalized in
the 1995 law.
1.1 Preliminary Conclusions
The most important conclusion of this analysis is not whether
Serbia should return or transfer property to the municipal
sector, but rather when and how to implement the devolu-
tion process.
Not only EU candidate countries have taken this step
(often early in the transition process, as the accompanying
texts show); all of the states of the former Yugoslavia are far
ahead of Serbia. Slovenia and Croatia have already complet-
ed the process, with positive results. In Macedonia, the main
issue is currently property balance between units of local
governments. In the Republika Srpska, the second phase of
the property devolution process is about to commence (trans-
ferring schools and other public institutions of local impor-
tance). In Montenegro, the government still has title to lo-
cal property, but local governments hold the authority to
manage it, including the right to sell without government
approval. More information on the cases of Slovenia, Croatia,
the Republika Srpska, Macedonia and Montenegro will be
provided in Appendix I. Just by looking at neighboring states,
it becomes apparent that a coherent system of local govern-
ment property ownership does a lot for advancing asset man-
agement on the local level. As all developed countries, all
transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe and all
countries of the former Yugoslavia have introduced the right
of local governments to own property, a logical conclusion
is that there is nothing specific in the situation of Serbia that
would justify perpetuation of this legal stranglehold.
Regarding the question of timing, the experience of other
transition countries suggests that Serbia should act resolute-
ly and swiftly. An important finding for this consideration is
that it is not necessary (nor wise) to wait until denationaliza-
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tion (returning property to individuals) takes place and prop-
erty registries are updated before engaging in the devolution
process. On the contrary, all transition countries undertook
property transfers first, and many of them still have open
issues regarding registries and denationalization. Concern-
ing the third question—the methodology of property trans-
fers, this paper offers several considerations that might be of
use to future lawmakers.
2. THE EXPERIENCES OF FOUR CENTRAL
EUROPEAN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES
2.1 Why Pursue Property Devolution?
Professor Jerzy Regulski, the government plenipotentiary for
municipal government reform3 in Poland in the early 1990s,
argues that returning property to municipalities had an over-
whelmingly positive effect.4 He writes:
Devolution of state property became one of the fun-
damental elements of the tremendous breakthrough
that was municipal reform. Possession of property
was a basis for local dynamic activity.
The Polish experience provides evidence that
transfer of state property to local governments is a
fundamental condition for effective decentraliza-
tion. Without unrestricted ownership and asset
management rights, local government would be
unable to act effectively.
The entire devolution process must be done
radically but very flexibly, as local conditions dif-
fer, and it is impossible to foresee all issues which
will arise. The way in which devolution is organized
and implemented has a decisive impact on the final
result…
Devolution of state property to municipalities
was the first, perhaps the only one-time operation
on such a scale to reduce national property in Po-
land. Results were positive because the operation
was conducted in a comprehensive and radical man-
ner. The principle of transfer by law, as well as the
organization of a system for negotiations and ap-
peals limited biased decision, although they could
not be entirely eliminated.  The results are easy to
see when traveling across Poland: the improving
conditions of previously neglected villages and
towns and the visible effects of owners’ greater care
for tidiness and order…
The most spectacular effects are to be seen in
the field of local infrastructure. The infrastructure
inherited by the new local authorities were frequent-
ly in an awful state of disrepair, making residents’
lives difficult and restraining opportunities for eco-
nomic development. Infrastructure development
became a municipal priority. The previous bureau-
cratic system of investment and development was
eliminated and a new system was launched, based
on market mechanisms. Sensational results were
achieved. Table 2 shows the development of sew-
age and water supply systems. The great improve-
ments were the result of work performed by mu-
nicipalities, owners of more than 90% of water and
sewage facilities.
2.2 What the Example Countries
Have in Common
Each of the four studied countries offers a unique set of good
and bad experiences; no country alone provides a perfect
example for Serbia to follow. The outcome of property trans-
fer to the municipal sector was positive. The results com-
mon to all four example countries is that genuine real estate
markets emerged; the mentality of municipal stakeholders
changed to that of owners with responsibilities to future
generations; local resource use became more efficient, and,
combined with new state programs, an “infrastructure ex-
plosion” occurred in environmental services such as water,
wastewater management, solid waste services and other lin-
ear services such as public heating, lighting and in some cas-
es telephone services. Municipalities were able to sell prop-
erty that would be more effectively used by private entities,
or which were financial burdens. Proceeds from sales were
then reinvested in new infrastructure and used for the reha-
bilitation of business districts etc.
Commonalities are as follows:
• Restoration of municipal property rights was a part of a
greater “package” of democratization begun immediate-
ly on transition to democracy.5 It took place in an at-
mosphere of overall consensus among parliamentary par-
ties. In other words, the issue of whether to restore mu-
nicipal property rights and to create a self-government
system was not significantly disputed. The decision was
a fundamental part of the democratization process.
• Restitution and compensation for nationalized property
(of natural and legal persons) was not a prerequisite for
the devolution of property to local self-governments.
Denationalization was dealt with separately in the form
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of constitutional amendments or laws. Potential claims
against the state or local governments were handled
through the courts, by regulation and special proce-
dures.6 Municipal property was not returned to indi-
viduals.
• Constitutional and/or systemic laws in each state
proclaim that municipalities have the right to own
property and to exercise all the rights of ownership, in-
cluding the right to purchase and sell property.
• Constitutions and higher order laws in all four example
countries guarantee that municipalities shall own at least
those properties needed for the completion of manda-
tory functions. If new functions are assumed by or del-
egated to municipalities, there are laws to guarantee that
sufficient property and recurring funds will be provided.
• Most property was returned and transferred to local self-
governments quickly—immediately upon passage of
critical legislation. In some cases, specialized property
like regional infrastructure providers and other state
enterprises were transferred in follow-up legislation. The
majority of property was transferred at once early in the
reform process.
2.3 How They Differ
To differing degrees, each country had not only to restore
municipal property nationalized by communist regimes, but
also consider the transfer of other properties needed for the
performance of new functions assigned to municipalities af-
ter the transition to democracy.7 In some cases, assets and
properties built with state, cooperative or ‘voluntary’ self-
contributions were given to municipalities outright. The four
states diverge in how state enterprises were privatized, with
varying degrees of compensation to municipalities.
The transformation into corporate entities and the ulti-
mate privatization of regional infrastructure services such as
natural gas, electricity distribution, water and waste man-
agement led to a decade of lawsuits and supreme court cases
in Hungary, while other states used different methods to
compensate municipalities for their ‘moral share’ of these
strategic enterprises.8 Poland did not initially compensate
municipalities for their contributions to infrastructure com-
panies. Instead, these regional firms were broken up, corpo-
ratized, and compensation schemes were developed after-
wards. The natural monopolies in Slovakia were partially
privatized in 2002, with compensations claimed by munic-
ipalities in the gas and electric sectors (compensation was
only paid in the gas sector).
In Poland, communal service companies that serve many
municipalities were first reorganized and broken into new
entities before being transferred to municipalities served by
the original larger firm. In Latvia, enterprises and compa-
nies providing water supply, sewage services, central heating
and street lighting were transferred to municipalities. Power
supply, gas and telecommunications companies were estab-
lished as state-owned enterprises and have been privatized
gradually. In view of the small size of Latvia (total area of
64,000 sq. km), establishing such municipal enterprises was
deemed economically ineffective.
Each country developed methods to prevent the squan-
dering of former state property by municipalities. Hungary
used a complex but efficient system of classification to pro-
tect public property and the mandatory tasks of municipal-
ities, while giving municipalities unfettered freedom to man-
age non-essential assets in a manner similar to commercial
entities. In the Hungarian system, properties serving man-
datory purposes are defined as “core assets” that cannot be
sold or mortgaged. However, there are provisions for reclas-
sifying core assets, if, for example, a school is closed due to
declining population. Reclassified property, along with non-
core property such as construction land and commercial
buildings, may be freely sold, invested in projects, mortgaged
and otherwise utilized as a revenue source for municipali-
ties. In the Hungarian system, as municipal tasks change, or
demographic trends encourage reorganization, even protected
assets may be reclassified for use in a more efficient manner.
Latvia requires that revenues from asset sales be used to con-
duct mandatory tasks, while Poland relies on the service pro-
vision obligation to leverage municipalities into efficient use
of revenues from asset sales.
The legal bases and devolution procedures were differ-
ent in each country, involving varying degrees of adminis-
trative fiats or decisions involving negotiation among vary-
ing levels of government.
3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SERBIA
Before attempting to make specific policy recommendations
for Serbia, we must emphasize that the national legislature
and executive branch must make several critical decisions.
These decisions and guiding principles should be enshrined
in a public and transparent manner before difficult techni-
cal and administrative procedures are put into place to start
a process that will take years to complete. These legislative,
administrative and technical recommendations assume that
a consensus-based political decision can be made to support
the following seven principles.
The highest-order political principles that need to be
made clear to all stakeholders are the following:
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1) Democracy, decentralization and ultimately EU acces-
sion status are difficult to achieve without the resto-
ration of full property rights to municipalities and
cities. This includes the right to buy, sell, use and
otherwise manage property, as is the case with any
private owner.
2) Denationalization of property taken from individuals
will not affect municipal property restitution since prop-
erty used or to be returned to municipalities will not be
returned to individuals. Instead a separate set of laws
will offer compensation to private persons with claims
on municipalities.
3) Original municipal property shall be returned before a
certain date (to the fullest extent possible) based on a
new law (or constitutional amendment). Original mu-
nicipal property could be defined narrowly as those prop-
erties and assets needed to perform current mandatory
tasks, or in a broader sense, those properties (in addi-
tion to the above) that are being currently used by mu-
nicipalities but owned by the state.  This definition must
be agreed on prior to the return of property.9
4) A higher order law or constitutional amendment must
guarantee that future tasks assigned to municipalities
and cities will be accompanied by relevant resources,
including financial resources and real property.
5) State, social and communal property10 to be returned
or retained by the state must be clearly identified before
their corporatization and potential privatization begins.
This is especially important in the case of infrastructure
such as electric and natural gas distribution and tele-
phone networks. In other words, future ownership of
these types of assets should be clearly designated in ad-
vance to preempt future claims on the state.
6) Municipalities must be given or at least compensated
for their self-contributions11 and local funds used to
construct socially and state-owned property within their
territories (this compensation may take place after priva-
tization, but the amount or share to be given to munic-
ipalities should be clearly stated in advance to avoid fu-
ture disputes).
7) Clear procedures should be announced in advance for
resolving disputes between the state and conflicting
claims among municipalities.
3.1 What Should Be Transferred
Recommendation 1
We suggest a combination of the functional and categorical
approaches to transferring property to Serbian municipali-
ties and cities. These approaches are detailed below.
• The Functional Approach
The state returns and/or transfers only property needed
to carry out mandatory municipal and city functions
defined in the Law on Local Self-Government (some
property currently “in use” may be retained by the state).
The functional approach, to be defined perhaps in the
Constitution, should follow the subsidiarity principle,
in that all the assets connected to the assigned local gov-
ernment functions should be transferred immediately
upon passage of amendments to current laws (the present
and future usage of assets is what matters).
• The Categorical Approach
Types of property are transferred that should categori-
cally belong to local governments if they are not already
in private ownership or soon to be privatized, or are
being used by institutions carrying out functions on
behalf of another layer of the state. These properties
should not be listed by cadastre number, but by type
and use (including property not currently ‘in use’ or
not currently serving an essential task). Sequence: in
Slovakia, decentralization of some functions (such as
elementary education) happened after property transfer
protocols were signed with each recipient. Basic, organ-
ic municipal property was returned many years prior to
decentralization of all functions.
Examples of categories, not all-inclusive, from Hun-
gary, Poland, Slovakia and Latvia: land, water-flows, nat-
ural resources, public spaces (parks, streets, squares, etc.),
service organizations (health, education, welfare), ur-
ban infrastructure, social housing units, urban land (con-
struction land), state-owned enterprises founded by the
municipality, financial assets, intangible assets (rights,
contracts, etc.).
A special category, reinforced by many Serbian mu-
nicipal officials, is: assets built entirely or with signifi-
cant self-contribution taxes and other local resources
(either entirely municipal ownership suggested or gen-
erous compensation if the state retains temporary own-
ership to prepare the asset for privatization.)
Jerzy Regulski suggests that each category needs a
different set of procedures and criteria. His categories
are: real estate (land, buildings and infrastructure),
enterprises and institutions (schools, etc.), intangible
assets (rights and obligations) and financial assets and
debts.
• Restoration of a Certain Status Quo Ante
The restoration of a certain legal status quo ante—own-
ership as of a certain date (1995)—may generate dis-
putes between municipalities as current or past users of
state property, as well as excessive claims by municipal-
ities. A ‘blanket’ cancellation of the 1995 Law on
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Assets must be reinforced by the two principles cited
above.
In this case, it is necessary to consider:
– Many properties may have changed owners,
changed legal form (transformation or privatization
of enterprises) or be legally unregulated.
– Authorities will be anxious about the fate of prop-
erty not essential to local governments for the
performance of their functions. Therefore, a mech-
anism to ensure that property is not wasted will be
essential.
• The Compromise Solution (Suggested by Regulski)
The state returns property currently managed by local
administrations, with some minor corrections. That is,
the state retains property essential to its functions and
devolves properties that were in local hands in 1995.
Local governments may claim additional properties from
the regional level if they serve new municipal functions
prescribed by law.
Recommendation 2
The solution for property transfer is not only to restore the
1995 status quo by rescinding the Property Law.
Talis Linkaits of Latvia strongly suggests the functional
approach, and rejects a mere restoration of a status quo that
may by itself not be optimal: “The functions of local govern-
ments should be reviewed and precisely defined. The prop-
erty transfer should be related to the functions of local gov-
ernment, not to the restoration of the pre-1996 situation.”
3.1 1 Urban Land
Recommendation 3
Urban land must be included in the property transfer pro-
cess, or compensation methods12 need to be developed be-
fore the restitution process begins, to avoid a decade of law-
suits as happened in Hungary. In addition to this, an
amendment to the Constitution should be introduced with
the purpose of abolishing the provision stating that all ur-
ban land is the property of the state.
3.1.2 Natural Regional Monopolies
and Communal Service Enterprises
Recommendation 4
• The state must announce in advance how municipali-
ties will share (if at all) in the privatization of natural
monopolies such as regional gas, electric, telephone,
water companies etc. One principle would be to com-
pensate municipalities for the value of the land and other
assets they ‘contributed’ to the establishment and ex-
pansion of these utilities within their own jurisdiction,
including self-contributions.
• Communal enterprises that serve a specific municipali-
ty should be the sole property of the municipality served,
including state-owned or established enterprises that pro-
vide public services to the territory of a municipality.
• Industrial enterprises and public utilities that provide
services to regions or to the whole country should not
be transferred to local governments.
• The state must develop a method to allocate ownership
among several municipalities if a regional communal
enterprise serves more than one municipality.
3.1.3 State-owned Enterprises
Located on Municipal Land
Recommendation 5
Compensation should be paid to local governments when
state-owned companies located in a municipality’s territory
are privatized (the 5% principle applies in Serbia).
In Hungary, local governments did not make a material
contribution when companies were established (in certain
situations they contributed the land), but have an economic
interest in the functioning of the company whether owned
by the state or individuals. There was a general principal
established in Latvia that the municipality receive 10% of
each privatization transaction performed by state institutions
(irrespective of the nature of the privatized business). As can
be seen in the Latvia country report, privatization revenues
formed an insignificant part of local budgets (less then 5% of
the total revenues of the municipalities). On the other hand,
the state received the same percentage (10%) of the each
privatization transaction performed by the municipalities.
3.2 What Should Not Be Returned
or Transferred
Recommendation 6
The types of property, enterprises, communal service and
public service, as well as utilities that will not be returned or
transferred in whole or in part to the municipal sector must
be defined by law or decree. Regulski suggests the following
exemptions: properties that serve public functions that fall
within the competence of central administration, courts and
state authorities; state enterprises and utilities that exercise
regional and national functions; national agricultural prop-
erty.
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Not all types of property were returned or transferred
in the countries analyzed here. Various laws followed the
initial restoration of property rights upon transition to de-
mocracy in 1990–1991. Examples follow:
• Hungary: gas, electric and phone companies were not
transferred. These public utilities had not been owned
by local governments nor managed by councils.
• Latvia: certain types of property were excluded from
transfer. Power supply, gas and telecommunications
companies were historically established as state-owned
enterprises and have been privatized gradually. In view
of the small size of the country (total area of 64,000 sq.
km), establishing such municipal enterprises was deemed
economically ineffective.
3.3 Resolving Disputes and the Issue
of ‘Unwanted’ Properties
Recommendation 7
Disputes, if any, that cannot be settled by law, should be
handled on a case-by-case basis with a type of commission
or committee formed by the state, province or municipality,
where a court or perhaps a supreme elected body has the
final say (all four reference countries formed committees and
established legal procedures to deal with disputed claims).
Recommendation 8
Municipalities should have the right to refuse ‘unwanted’
property (heavily polluted military or industrial land for ex-
ample). The burden of maintaining and cleaning up such
property should not fall on the municipality.
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, an own-
er must be found in a higher level of local administration or
even in a different sector of public administration. The more
complex question is what to do if unwanted property is con-
nected to a mandatory function of local government. A piece
of public property cannot remain ownerless. As a general
principle, if a transfer is refused, the property stays with the
original owner, that is, the state.
Recommendation 9
Certain properties must be privatized. A proper scheme to
share in privatization revenues with transparent rules must
be defined in advance.
3.4 Changing the Legal Framework
Recommendation 10
• Property rights for local governments should be estab-
lished in the Constitution, and then adjusted through
subsequent legislation. Some federal laws (laws on en-
terprises and bankruptcy, etc.) will be re-approved as
Serbian laws. In this case, the ministry of public admin-
istration and local government and the Standing Con-
ference of Towns and Municipalities should monitor the
legislative process, making sure that local government
interests are properly served.
• Systemic laws such as those decentralizing government
functions should be enacted over a short period of time.
Serbia should enact changes to the Property Law and
Local Government Law simultaneously. Property resti-
tution to municipalities should be included in these laws
(as in Poland, Hungary and Latvia).
• Most property returns should go into effect on the same
day.
Recommendation 11
Properties to be transferred to municipalities should not be
the subject to restitution to individuals or businesses. Prop-
erties given to municipalities need to be exempted from res-
titution claims during the denationalization process. Mu-
nicipalities should not pay compensation to private
persons—the state should.13
3.5 Additional Elements of the Process
3.5.1 Identifying a Competent
and Authorized Agency
Recommendation 12
• The property transfer procedure should be described in
the law. The state institution responsible for implemen-
tation (the ministry of public administration and local
government or a special agency controlled by the min-
istry) should be named.
• General guidelines should be prepared by the responsi-
ble institution and approved by the government.
3.5.2 Inventories
Recommendation 13
Do not wait for specific and complete lists of properties and
assets to be completed before transferring property based on
current and future functions, compensation for self-contri-
butions or subsidiarity principles.
Regardless of the path chosen to return to the status of
1995 or transfer property linked to local government func-
tions, it will be essential to conduct an inventory. This is a
difficult task, demanding time and capability. Therefore, it
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is recommended that administrative procedures for such an
inventory be developed. The following must be defined:
• the manner in which the body taking inventory is formed
(a commission formed by the local government or a
mixed commission of local government representatives
and local representatives of the national government or
employees would be advisable; it is important that the
staff conducting the inventory possess the proper level
of administrative ability)
• the manner of the commission’s work, dates for prepa-
ration of a protocol and the level of detail of each list/
protocol;
• rules for including a property in the inventory;
• a central government body which provides the legal basis
for transfer of property through approval of the inven-
tories;
• appellate organs, in the event that a local government
disputes elements on the list (this may be a joint com-
mission at the national level or the administrative court);
• competencies of each organ involved.
Moreover, procedures and resolutions should define the
date upon which property transfer goes into effect. Because
the preparation of an inventory is not easy, commissions
should be trained. The timeline for the entire process should
be established so that once procedures have been developed,
adequate time and resources are available to conduct train-
ing at the local level. Due to the number of local govern-
ments and components of property, the entire process should
be decentralized so that central government bodies deal only
with appeals, in other words unclear issues. It is also impor-
tant to ensure that decisions approving the list obligate reg-
istration bodies to register local government ownership.
3.5.3 Property Transfer Committees
Recommendation 14
Procedures and powers must be defined, with intergovern-
mental commissions working with citizens to oversee the
transfer process, negotiate disputes, provide local govern-
ments with information etc.
Property transfer committees created lists of properties
within a unit of territorial government based on instructions
in various laws. Polish gminas created lists based on laws,
functions and local tradition, and submitted these invento-
ries for approval by a higher level of government—the voivod-
ship. In Hungary, county committees were temporary ad-
ministrative bodies not directly controlled by local
governments. Municipal representatives were not allowed
to be members of the committees. The 13 committee-mem-
bers included a president and deputy designated by the min-
ister of the interior on the basis of the government’s delega-
tion with the approval of the ministers concerned. Repre-
sentatives of local governments served as observers and com-
mentators. In Slovakia, joint inventories were created within
public administration.
Recommendation 15
Administrative support must be provided for commissions
and local government staff. County property commissions
must have their own administrative staff. In Hungary, lack
of staff made commission operations cumbersome. Com-
missions had authority with no administrative support, and
there was no legal relationship between the decision-maker
(the commission) and the municipal staff who volunteered
to prepare the inventories.
Local governments, particularly in smaller settlements,
do not have the administrative background to manage prop-
erty transfer. Consequently, it is convenient to provide pro-
fessional, financial and material assistance to the manage-
ment over the course of the procedure. Assistance to the
central administration is necessary to assure the following:
1) procedural uniformity;
2) legality;
3) professionalism;
4) coordination between different organs of public admin-
istration, including coordination between local govern-
ment and local public administration;
5) balance between public good and special interests.
Recommendation 16
Local government staff must be trained. In Hungary, mu-
nicipal administrative personnel were not trained in prepa-
ration for their new functions as property managers, nor were
they prepared for executing the transfer process.
Preparation includes personnel and organization not
only at the local government level. Local governments must
prepare for the vast array of management-related tasks. This
can be understood when considering the range of local gov-
ernment functions as well as property necessary to their ful-
fillment. The capacity of the land registry office is likely to
be problematic. It is likely that without any preparation, the
office will not be able to cope with the task. In Hungary,
larger numbers of civil servants should have been employed
focusing only on the process of registry.
3.5.4 Transfer Protocols
Recommendation 17
Do not use transfer protocols for the one-time, first wave
return of property (Slovakia experienced problems with bad
technical conditions, refusal to sign protocols, unsettled resti-
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tution claims, as well as resistance and delays from public
administration). Protocols give too much arbitrary power to
local public administration bodies legally capable of sabo-
taging the overall goal.
In Slovakia, administrative and functional decentraliza-
tion took place in phases, and transfers by protocol negoti-
ated between municipalities and public administration took
place only in the second wave of property transfer (2002).
These protocols included definitions and value estimates,
rights and responsibilities, cadastre information, as well as
necessary costs of repairs. Given the much smaller scope of
property being returned (no environmental infrastructure),
this procedure is not practical for a massive transfer of prop-
erty.  The process took place as follows: the Law on Decen-
tralization of Competencies was adopted defining the exact
dates of competency transfers. The transfer of competencies
was directly linked to the transfer of property. As the dates
of transfer approached, protocols on the transferred proper-
ty were prepared. Municipalities were obliged to sign the
protocols within a certain time after the date of transfer.
3.5.5 Conflict Resolution
Recommendation 18
Public administration staff at the municipal level, and at any
level that takes part in the transfer process, such as in com-
mittees or commissions, need training before starting the
process of property transfer.
3.6 Suggestions for
Municipal Property Management
3.6.1 Property Classifications
and Protection of Public Assets
Recommendation 19
Decide who has responsibility for funding maintenance, re-
pairs and new capital projects once ownership is transferred.
Is the state ready to provide capital improvement funds?
3.6.2 Sales of Assets
Recommendation 20
Proceeds from the sale of municipal assets such as buildings,
construction land, apartments, commercial property, shares
in enterprises, enterprises etc. may only be used for capital
investment projects and may not be used to fund mainte-
nance, operations, salaries or other recurring expenses.
Restrictions on the use of capital income and revenues
from sales of capital assets are common in OECD member-
countries. Capital income and sales revenues may only be
used to fund capital expenses, or municipal assets may not
be sold at all as by definition there are no ‘excessive’ munic-
ipal assets beyond what is needed to perform mandatory func-
tions. Hungary and Poland demonstrate an extreme per-
missiveness, i.e. there are no restrictions on the use of funds
from asset sales. In Latvia, proceeds from sales of property
may only be used for mandatory functions; in Slovakia, pro-
ceeds may only be used for capital investment.
The uncontrolled sell-off of assets may be insured against
through the classification of property and limitations on the
freedom of control (especially of sale) over certain types of
property. Moreover, budget law may limit the use of reve-
nues from sale of property to capital investments. In this
manner, it will not be possible to sell property in order to
‘consume’ monetary sources (spending on current issues).
Regardless of whether greater or smaller limitations are
placed on the sale of assets by local governments, it is impor-
tant to ensure proper asset management. In particular, it is
recommended to:
• Ensure proper local public control over the sale of prop-
erty, e.g., through the requirement to obtain the ap-
proval of the local council for sale of property.
• Ensure proper and independent assessment of property
intended for sale.
• Ensure the existence of competitive procedures (similar
to public tender) in the sale of property.
In cases of particularly sensitive categories of property,
the requirement to obtain the approval of the central gov-
ernment for sale may be introduced. Moreover, effective
property management should also include reporting. It is
suggested that the reporting system be linked to the proce-
dure for budget approval and reporting. A consolidated re-
port on the state of communal property, in particular pro-
viding information on changes in property (purchases and
sales) and, even better, also changes in property values, should
be submitted together with the budget. The report should
be available to the local public and collected by the central
government administration for review and controlling pur-
poses.
Recommendation 21
The auditing and accountability standards for municipal
property management should also be developed as property
is transferred to the municipal level. Record keeping, book-
keeping, accounting, controlling and auditing procedures
regarding municipal property should be clear and developed
to go into effect as property is returned or transferred.
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4. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RETURNING
AND TRANSFERRING PROPERTY TO
MUNICIPALITIES
Besides the principles cited above, there are several other
reasons to return and/or transfer property to territorial self-
governments. These are justifications in addition to legal,
constitutional and historical/traditional arguments.
1. Local economic development and the creation of a real
estate market: Local governments have limited interest
in investing and developing local infrastructure if the
ownership rights will belong to someone else (the state),
especially in a situation where the state can sell it with-
out municipal approval. If municipalities cannot offer
shares in cash or in kind, they will be hindered in ob-
taining matching funds from donors and attracting pri-
vate capital in the interest of creating jobs. Municipali-
ties, as in Croatia and elsewhere, could use their real estate
portfolios for economic development, and earn rental
income to fund operations or improve citizen services.
2) The subsidiarity principle: In the EU, systems are de-
signed to operate on the principle that political and eco-
nomic issues should be addressed at the lowest possible
level— the level closest to the citizen. Thus, issues such
as primary education, basic health care and public light-
ing are controlled by local governments most closely
connected to the beneficiaries of these services, who
oversee the quality and quantity of public services being
offered.
3) Restitution: It is imperative to restore previous rights and
properties to local governments hindered during the
Milosevic years. More importantly, it is natural that as-
sets built by contributions from local governments and
citizens should belong to municipalities.
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ANNEX
The Experiences of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia
Each of the former Yugoslav republics has restored a certain
scope of property rights to local governments. Property rights
and the benefits of property ownership and management
are defined in constitutions, laws on self-government and
special laws on budgeting, economic activities and munici-
pal finance. Key provisions and the sources of these laws are
briefly highlighted below:
Slovenia
The Law on Local Government, first adopted in 1993 and
amended 7 times by 1999, established a system of new self-
governments that abolished the principle of social owner-
ship and introduced a pluralist model of ownership in a
market economy. Local governments are financed in accor-
dance with the 1994 Law on the Financing of Municipali-
ties, amended in 1998. The Finance Law detailed the fi-
nancing of mandatory tasks and financial equalization.
Municipal assets consist of movable and immovable proper-
ty, financial assets and rights. The value of such assets is
stated in the balance sheet of assets, approved by each mu-
nicipality in accordance with the law. Municipalities man-
age the following property:
• land (developed, vacant or agricultural) acquired by a
municipality through payment or by other means;
• municipal infrastructure (roads owned by the munici-
pality, waterworks, hot water supply, gas supply, etc.);
• housing (subsidized and non-profit municipal housing);
• commercial space (available for rent to commercial and
non-commercial entities);
• capital shares (in public companies, public institutions,
commercial enterprises, banks, etc.);
• financial resources from the budget, public funds and
agencies;
• other financial resources (deposits, securities, etc.).
The municipality must manage all its property in line
with sound economic principles. The disposal of municipal
assets is possible only against payment, unless the assets are
donated for humanitarian, scientific, research, educational
or similar purposes. The Municipal Council is the body com-
petent to decide on such disposal. A municipality may man-
age its property the following ways:
1) Manage it on its own through a municipal administra-
tion office; establish a public fund to which it transfers
a certain kind of property for management (e.g. hous-
ing funds manage housing and business premises).
2) Establish a public institution to manage a certain kind
of property (e.g. a public institution for the manage-
ment of building sites in cities).
3) Establish a public enterprise or public commercial in-
stitution to manage certain types of property (public
waterworks, sewage, waste disposal, maintenance of
municipal roads, etc.).
4) Grant concessions to natural and legal persons for the
management of certain types of property.
Article 7 of the newest version of Slovenia’s Law on Local
Government (70/2000), states that “self-governing local
communities shall be public legal entities with the right to
possess, acquire and dispose of all types of assets.” Article 51
of the law declares that municipal assets are intangible and
tangible property owned by the municipality, including
rights. Article 21 states that asset management is one of pri-
mary duties of a municipality.
Article 51c of the law defines what types of property
belong to municipalities. An excerpt is reprinted below:
• Every municipality shall become the founder of public
institutions and shall assume the rights and obligations
to public institutions and contractors carrying out, in
accordance with the public service network, activities
that the municipality must provide, only on the terri-
tory of this municipality and only for its inhabitants;
• Municipalities shall become co-founders of public in-
stitutions and shall together assume the rights and obli-
gations to public institutions and contractors carrying
out, in accordance with the public service network, ac-
tivities that the municipality must provide in the entire
territory and for all inhabitants of the previous munici-
pality. Each founder shall have the right and obligation
to provide, by common public institution, concession
contract or another contract, the execution of activities
in its territory and to take part in the management and
responsibilities toward the public institution, con-
cessionaire or contractor in proportion to the number
of its inhabitants or the inhabitants of the territory
that joined this municipality in the entire number of
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inhabitants of the previous municipality for whose ter-
ritory the public institution had been founded, or for
which a concession or another type of a contract had
been concluded;
• Every municipality shall become the founder and own-
er of public capital in public companies, public funds
and agencies that was the property of the previous mu-
nicipality, or enters a concession or another contract as
the only contracting party if the public company, pub-
lic fund, agency, concessionaire or another contractor
carries out a public service and other tasks in accordance
with an act or regulation of the previous municipality
exclusively for this new municipality’s inhabitants of
exclusively in the territory of this municipality;
• Municipalities shall become co-founders of public com-
panies, public funds and agencies that were founded in
order to carry out public services and other tasks in ac-
cordance with an act or regulation of the previous mu-
nicipality for the territory of the previous municipality,
and enter in concessions or other contracts and jointly
assume the rights and obligations toward public com-
panies, public funds and agencies, concessionaires and
other contractors. Each founder shall have the right and
obligation to ensure the carrying out of activities in its
territory by way of a joint public company, public fund,
agency, concession or another contract and to co-oper-
ate in the management and responsibilities toward a pub-
lic company, public fund, agency, concessionaire or con-
tractor in proportion to the number of its inhabitants
or the number of inhabitants of the area that joined the
municipality in entire number of inhabitants of the pre-
vious municipality for whose territory the public com-
pany, public fund or agency was founded, or a conces-
sion or another type of a contract was concluded. The
same proportions shall be used as the municipalities shall
become the owners of ideal shares of public capital of a
public company, public fund or agency that was the
property of the previous municipality.
Croatia
According to The Urban Institute, an American advisory
NGO active in Croatia, Croatian municipalities own sub-
stantial assets, including real estate:
Real property portfolios in Croatia contain very diverse
properties. The major characteristics of these portfolios, both
in Croatia and in other transitional countries, are as follows:
• Rapid devolution of property made many local govern-
ments the largest property owners in urban areas.
• Large real estate portfolios are being transferred from
direct ownership into ownership by enterprises that are
owned by local governments.
• Fiscal concerns prevent for further privatization.
• Large portfolios of social or core services properties with
negative cash flows are being transferred to local gov-
ernments.
• Large portions of portfolios are obsolete properties with
negative residual value.
• Real estate amounts from 50 to 95% of the total value
of local government assets.
• Most local governments have no inventory of physical
assets, and even more rarely an accounting of the value
of these assets.
• A clear understanding of assets and liabilities is a pre-
condition for moving forward intelligently with finan-
cial management in local governments.
• As in most of countries in the world, public real estate is
one of the most underutilized local resources.
• There is a need to establish appropriate standards of
accounting and reporting public property.
Revenues of real property assets in Croatia on average
bring in 8% of local governments revenues. This is the fourth
largest source of revenue, after personal income tax, taxes and
fees, and enterprise taxes. Deviations among local govern-
ments are significant, in absolute terms and as a percentage
of local revenues, from 1.3% to 25.3%.14
The legal framework supports the situation described
above. The Law on Local Government and Administration
(1990, amended 1999) indicates that municipalities are le-
gal persons (Article 8). As legal persons, municipalities own
moveable and immovable property—they are full owners
with all rights and obligations (Article 67). Municipalities
may also generate income through property management
(Article 68).
Using the functional approach, the 2000 law on Mu-
nicipal Economy defines mandatory municipal services (Ar-
ticle 3) and that concessionaires, municipal enterprises, or
private firms may perform most of these services. These
municipal activities are:
Article 3
(1) In the sense of this Law, municipal activities are:
1) drinking water supply;
2) wastewater drainage and purification network;
3) gas supply;
4) heating supply;
5) public transport;
6) maintaining of cleanliness;
7) municipal waste disposal;
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8) maintenance of public surfaces;
9) maintenance of unclassified roads;
10) retail sale markets;
11) maintenance of graveyards and crematories, and
performing funerals;
12) chimney sweeping;
13) public lighting.
What is most important is that enterprises which per-
form services on the territory of a municipality, including
those formed with social capital, are transferred to munici-
pal ownership. Article 31 of this law is cited here:
Adjusting the work of legal entities with the provisions
of this law:
(1) The social capital of legal entities registered to carry out
of municipal activities on the date this law comes into
force become the joint owners of units of local self-gov-
ernment organized in the territory of the former mu-
nicipality according to the seat of the legal entity.
(2) The Croatian Privatization Fund is obliged to transfer
stocks from joint-stock companies, arisen in the realiza-
tion of the provision in Article 3 of the Law on Amend-
ments and Supplements to the Law on Transformation
and Organization of Companies Engaged in Municipal
Activities and Activities of Arrangement of Settlements
and Spaces, Transport of Passengers in City and Com-
muter Traffic, and Activities of Arrangement and Main-
tenance of Retail Sale Markets to joint ownership by
units of local self-government organized in the territory
of the former municipality according to the seat of the
company within 3 months of the date this law enters
into force.
(3) Companies that did not act in accordance with the pro-
vision from Article 3 of the Law on Amendments and
Supplements of the Law on Transformation and Orga-
nization of Companies Engaged in Municipal Activi-
ties and Activities of Arrangement of Settlements and
Spaces, Transport of Passengers in City and Commuter
Traffic, and Activities of Arrangement and Maintenance
of Retail Sale Markets are obliged to transfer the stocks
to joint ownership by units of local self-government
organized in the territory of the former municipality
according to the seat of the company within 3 months
of the date this law enters into force.
(4) Social capital defined in Paragraph 1 and stocks defined
in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article will be divided by
units of local self-government in mutual agreement with-
in 6 months of the date this law enters into force. If an
agreement cannot be reached, the provision from Arti-
cle 87, Paragraph 2 of the Law on Local Government
and Administration will be applied.
It is apparent that Croatian municipalities may own
property and have received ownership of many formerly state,
social and joint-stock enterprises.
Macedonia
Article 5 of the 1995 Law on Local Government declares
that municipalities are legal entities. In addition, municipal-
ities may own land, facilities etc., to the extent that they
have been financed by self-contributions (Article 60) or
through other ways of participation. Funds earned through
disposal and management of property may be used for re-
furbishment or purchase of additional property. This defi-
nition is much more restrictive than in the case of Slovenia
or Croatia. New units of self-government (Article 61) are to
receive property defined in a distribution statement signed
by the Republic and the old and new unit of self-govern-
ment. Finally, property may be used to generate local reve-
nues (Article 62). Even in this modest scenario, assets built
with self-contributions are municipal property, and new
property may be acquired and fully owned.
Montenegro and Republika Srpska
Montenegro and Republika Srpska are also far ahead of Ser-
bia in terms of property rights of local governments. In Re-
publika Srpska, an initiative was launched to devolve prop-
erty rights on schools, medical centers, etc. If this goal is
achieved, it will constitute a second stage of property trans-
fer in Republika Srpska.
In Montenegro, the situation is still rather complex, but
some steps have already been taken. Namely, while the state
still holds the titles to property, local governments in accor-
dance with the Law on Property, have the right of disposal,
including the right to purchase and sell property without
approval from a state agency.
Except Serbia, all countries of the former Yugoslavia have
progressed regarding local property management and own-
ership. All transition countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope have provided local government with the right to own
property. There is nothing to specific to the situation in Ser-
bia to justify a failure to enact similar measures.
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NOTES
1 This document is primarily based on the studies included
here as well as commentary by Gábor Péteri, Du an
Vasiljevic´ and Zsuzsa Kasso. All authors contributed
policy suggestions and general conclusions. Charles
Jókay is fully responsible for any mistakes or misrepre-
sentations.
2 Amending the Federal and Republic Constitutions:
Amending Article 73 of the FRY Constitution required
submission of a petition signed by at least 100,000 voters,
or 30 deputies from the Chamber of Citizens (lower
house) or 20 deputies from the Chamber of Republics
(upper house).  Amendments may also be proposed by
the federal government. Both chambers require a two-
thirds majority to pass amendments. If an amendment
fails, it may not be resubmitted for a year. Amending
the Republic Constitution (see Article 132) requires a
petition signed by at least 100,000 voters, or the support
of 50 representatives in Parliament. Two-thirds of the
government or the president may also propose
constitutional amendments, which can be passed by a
simple majority in parliament. The Constitution is
changed if a majority of voters supports an amendment
through referendum, on the condition that turnout is
more then 50% of registered voters in the Republic of
Serbia.
3 These comments were made by Professor Regulski at
the Technical Conference on Property Devolution to
Local Governments in Serbia, held in Belgrade in
November, 2002, organized by the Standing Con-
ference, SLGRP, the PALGO Center and the Open
Society Institute’s Local Government Initiative.
4 See Mr. Regulski’s paper, “Devolution of National
Property to Local Government in Poland,” which also
includes a complete outline of the benefits of property
devolution to local government.
5 In some cases, the transfer of property and new res-
ponsibilities took place years after the original systemic
laws were put into place, as was the case with elementary
schools in Poland and Slovakia.
6 In the case of Hungary, the Local Government Law and
the Law on Property Transfer stated that property
transferred to local governments could not be transferred
to individuals. This meant that property given to
municipalities could not be the subject of claims by
individuals, who were compensated under a different
law. These properties were never to be transferred to
others in specie. In Slovakia, up until 1992 citizens could
claim restitution for property transferred to municipa-
lities. These properties could not be sold by the muni-
cipality if a claim had been filed (compensation was paid
by the state).
7 It is interesting to note what was not returned at the
moment of transition to democracy. In Hungary and
Latvia: gas, electricity and telephone companies. In
Slovakia: water, wastewater systems and enterprises
(transformation began in 2002); elementary schools
(functions and schools were transferred in 2002). In
Poland: regional infrastructure enterprises prior to their
breakup.
8 ‘Compensation’ should not be taken literally. In this
context, municipalities received a share of ownership in
the transformed enterprise before their privatization. Or
municipalities could receive a fixed share of privatization
revenue based upon their historical contribution of land,
labor or cash used to build the local portion of that
infrastructure.
9 It is theoretically possible that a municipality is using
more property than it would ultimately need to perform
current and future original and optional, voluntary tasks.
10 Social and communal property as categories are unique
to the former Yugoslavia. Social property can be defined
as collectively owned (as in the case of agricultural
collectives elsewhere) by workers or by residents of a
municipality. Communal property is synonymous with
municipal property elsewhere.
11 Self-contribution: another unique feature of the former
Yugoslavia that has survived to this date. Residents of a
municipality or sub-municipality (community) vote to
assess a tax or another type of one time or recurring
donation to build infrastructure such as housing for the
local doctor, additions to schools, new health clinics,
roads, playgrounds etc. These types of assets, built
entirely with local funds and with volunteer labor, were
seized by the Milosevic´ regime in 1995 and declared to
be state assets in “use” by the municipalities. These
should obviously be returned or compensation paid.
12 If urban land was ‘voluntarily’ contributed by a muni-
cipality for the construction of a state enterprise or
facility, and fair compensation was never paid at the
time, then some procedure needs to be in place to avoid
future lawsuits and administrative protests.
13 An exception was Latvia, where individuals could receive
property in specie on an as is basis. According to Talis
Linkaits’ description, municipalities had to return real
estate to individuals and religious organizations. Real
estate had to be returned to their previous owners if
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they submitted applications by December 3, 1994.
Restitution of enterprises could occur in three ways:
1) Property could be returned in kind.
2) Property rights could be restored by transferring
shares of the enterprise in equal proportion to the
amount of nationalized property.
3) The previous owners could receive compensation
vouchers if they wish (compensation vouchers can
be used to obtain state-owned land, enterprises or
apartments).
The restitution principle was status quo. Previous
owners were not compensated for property damage or
use, nor were current owners compensated for their
investments. Only in the case of enterprises—if there
was significant state or municipal investment, then in
some cases the state or municipality could receive shares
of the enter-prise. The restitution was understood as a
part of the economic reforms to encourage private
initiative. There were deadlines to submit claims for
property restitution. If a claim was not submitted before
the deadline, the individual had to justify the lateness of
their claims in court. Otherwise, no claims were accepted
after the deadline.
14 From the brochure on asset management at www.urban-
institute.hr.
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